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Abstract
This dissertation makes use of several methodologies to explore topics
ascribed to the field of development economics. Chapter 1 reviews the liter-
ature on social capital by presenting a decomposition of trust and networks
– the cognitive and the structural component of social capital, respectively–,
in several sub-dimensions. One of this dimension is used in chapter 2 where
we investigate, both theoretically and empirically, the role played by the cul-
tural norm of particularism, as opposed to universalism, for collusive bribery.
Consistent with the theory, particularism is found to have a positive causal
effect on the probability of offering a bribe. Chapter 3 assesses the impact
of a small-scale agricultural extension project implemented in rural Ethiopia
aimed at introducing the cultivation of horticultural gardens. Empirically,
a mixed impact evaluation design is used combining across-villages com-
parisons, through difference-in-differences estimations, with a within village
randomized control trial. The findings indicate that the project contributes
to production diversification while it does not influence total revenues from
sales, household welfare and diet. Chapter 4 shows that similar incentivized
mechanisms elicit similar decisions in terms of monetary risk aversion only
if other risk-related attitudes are accounted for. Furthermore, it examines
whether individuals’ characteristics and a self-assessed measure of risk aver-
sion relate to individuals’ choices in lotteries. The findings suggest that there
is some external validity of the two studied tasks as predictors of self-reported
risk attitudes.
Keywords: Social Capital, Corruption, Rural Development, Risk Aversion
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Questa tesi utilizza metodologie differenti al fine di esplorare argomenti
generalmente ascritti all’economia dello sviluppo. Il primo capitolo discute la
letteratura sul capitale sociale scomponendolo nel suo componente strutturale,
le reti, e cognitivo, la fiducia. Ogni componente e` a sua volta scomposto in
diverse sotto-dimensioni una delle quali, il particolarismo, e` utilizzato nel
secondo capitolo, sia a livello teorico che empirico, come determinante di
forme di corruzione collusiva. Come previsto dalla teoria, il particolarismo
ha un effetto positivo e causale sulla probabilita` di offrire una tangente. Il
terzo capitolo valuta l’impatto di un progetto di estensione agricola realizzato
in Etiopia, volto ad introdurre la coltivazione di nuovi prodotti ortofrutti-
coli insieme ad alcune tecniche e strumenti innovativi. Empiricamente si
utilizzano gli strumenti della valutazione d’impatto combinando confronti tra
villaggi, attraverso una stima difference-in-differences, con una comparazione
all’interno del villaggio usando uno studio controllato randomizzato. I risul-
tati indicano che il progetto ha contribuito alla diversificazione produttiva ma
non ha influenzato i ricavi ottenuti dalla vendita dei prodotti ortofrutticoli
e, di conseguenza, il benessere delle famiglie. Il quarto capitolo mostra come
meccanismi incentivati sufficientemente simili elicitino decisioni correlate in
termini di avversione al rischio solo quando si tengono in considerazione
altri atteggiamenti relativi al rischio. Inoltre si studia la correlazione tra
l’avversione al rischio riportata e l’avversione al rischio ottenuta tramite lot-
terie. I risultati suggeriscono una misurata validita` esterna dei due metodi
studiati.
Parole Chiave: Capitale Sociale, Corruzione, Sviluppo Rurale, Avversione
al Rischio
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CHAPTER 1
The Metonymy of Social Capital
Why we should not take a part for the whole1
1The author wishes to thank Fabio Sabatini and Luca Stanca for useful comments and
inputs.
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1.1 Introduction
In recent years academic interest in the concept of social capital has grown
fast. Inherited from sociology, the concept has been used in several disci-
plines, including political science, economics, education and anthropology.
Nowadays, the term describes more a strand of the literature than a specific
concept.2 While this paved the way to a genuine interchange among scholars
from different disciplines, the array of definitions and measurement methods
used in the empirical literature has often made it difficult to compare the
results of different studies and to formulate any general assessment about
the effects of social capital (Sobel, 2002).
One of the reasons behind this difficulty is the practice, very common in
economics, to use the label “social capital” to indicate one of its components,
thus measuring a part for the whole. Such metonymy of social capital” is
strictly related to the difficulty of measuring such a multifaceted phenomenon
and has often undermined the credibility of the whole area of research (Fine,
2001). Nevertheless, the fact that social capital is commonly considered a
key factor for economic development (Adhikari and Goldey, 2010), and that
it has been associated with several socio-economic outcomes3 make us believe
that its importance can not be refused due to a lack of methodological clarity.
This survey defines social capital first and foremost as a micro phe-
nomenon. Our goal is to show that by disentangling different components of
social capital we are able to reason more effectively about its positive and
negative effects and about their implications for economic and social devel-
opment. First, we give a definition of social capital. Second, we present the
two main components of social capital, networks and trust, respectively, by
further decomposing them into their sub-dimensions. Trust, the cognitive
2For a discussion regarding whether the concept of social capital is indeed a good social
science concept see Bjørnskov and Sønderskov (2013).
3Such as economic growth and poverty (Knack and Keefer, 1997), human capital (Cole-
man, 1988), development (Guiso et al., 2008), subjective health (Yip et al., 2007) and
well-being (Sarracino, 2010), political accountability (Nannicini et al., 2013), the size of
the shadow economy (D’Hernoncourt and Me´on, 2012), innovative outcomes (Akc¸omak
and Ter Weel, 2009), entrepreneurship (Bauernschuster et al., 2010), suicide (Helliwell,
2007), homicide (Rosenfeld et al., 2001) and crime rates (Buonanno et al., 2009)
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component of social capital, is decomposed into general, particular and in-
stitutional trust. Networks, the structural component of social capital, are
decomposed into three categories: bonding, bridging and linking. For each
sub-component, we present how it has been measured in the empirical or
experimental literature, make some critical points and highlight some open
areas for future research. Third, we conclude by presenting a simple theoriza-
tion of the micro-foundations of social capital. We show, in particular, how
different types of trust are interrelated and how different kinds of networks
produce different types of trust, thus producing negative or positive social
capital.
1.2 Defining Social Capital
Social capital is generally referred to as those features of social life enhanc-
ing coordination and cooperation among people who pursue the same goal
(Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 2001). Social capital arises from social networks
and it is the use that individuals make of them that may produce social cap-
ital. As in Bourdieu (1986) and Coleman (1994), social capital is therefore
intangible. In order to possess social capital, a person must be related to oth-
ers and it is those others, not himself, who are the actual source of his social
capital (Lin et al., 2001). To put it differently, for social capital to arise the
existence of a social network is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. In
fact, the existence of social capital depends on the quality of the networks,
the action undertaken by individuals in building trust and reciprocity inside
and towards those networks, and the resources available to their connections
(Portes, 2000). Social networks and trust are valuable assets that enable peo-
ple to build communities, to commit themselves to each other and, finally,
to cooperate. This cooperation, however, brings some benefits and some
costs by increasing the within-group welfare while decreasing the welfare of
non members. These opposite effects are usually referred to as the positive
and the negative side of social capital, and have been acknowledged in the
literature for a long time.
The literature usually defines trust as the cognitive component of social
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capital, while networks are generally referred to as its structural compo-
nent (Burt, 2000). While trust is more linked to individuals’ perceptions,
and it is therefore more difficult to measure, networks are usually identified
through observation of reality (e.g., participation in voluntary activities).
The structural and cognitive components of social capital are either posi-
tively or negatively related (Sabatini, 2009b). Trust, for instance, can confer
legitimacy to cooperative behaviors that can result in the formation of net-
works. These networks, in turn, strengthen trust and reciprocity. Conversely,
certain types of networks hamper trust by restricting others, outside the net-
work, in accessing it (Woolcock, 2001). Yet, the structural and the cognitive
components of social capital can be further decomposed in sub-components,
each one affecting several social and economic dimensions in a specific way.
This approach to the study of social capital is very common in other social
sciences but has not yet been extensively applied in economics.
1.3 Networks
Networks cover a wide terrain spanning from tight groups, such as the nuclear
family, to more extensive ones, such as volunteer organizations. They are
often themselves connected to one another, and accessing one of them could
sometimes be costly for individuals. Networks are generally classified into
bonding, bridging, and linking. Bonding social networks link homogeneous
groups of people, bridging networks connect people belonging to different
socio-economic groups, while linking networks refer to vertical connections
with people in power.
The literature generally finds that bridging networks of individuals gener-
ate positive social capital, since they foster the diffusion of information and
trust enhancing community cohesion. On the contrary, bonding networks
are thought of as negative social capital burdens on society, since they foster
societal interests at the expenses of the community.4 It is therefore impor-
4Burt (1982) emphasizes the importance of the way different parts of networks are
bridged. In particular, he points out the strategic advantage that may be enjoyed by
individuals with ties into multiple networks that are largely separated from one another.
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tant, in empirical works, to correctly disentangle the effects of bridging from
those of bonding and linking networks. Yet, only a few scholars have thus far
attempted to do so. Putnam (2001), for example, points out the importance
of the distinction between bonding and bridging networks, but then does not
really address the issue and does not perform separate analyses (Hibbing and
Theiss-Morse, 2002). A (pioneering) example of the different effect that dif-
ferent kinds of social networks may have on - for example - development, is
given in Banfield (1958) who partly attributed the backwardness of Southern
Italy (compared to Northern) to the inability of citizens to
act together for their common good or, indeed, for any end
transcending the immediate, material interest of the nuclear fam-
ily (p. 10)
A growing body of the literature suggests that networks are extensively
used in the labor market (Ioannides and Loury, 2004; Pellizzari, 2010) both on
the supply side, where social networks help workers to find a job, and on the
demand side, where firms use networks to find better workers to fill vacancies
(solving or trying to solve problems of adverse selection and moral hazard).
Actually, the (intuitive) fact that information about jobs is passed through
social networks becomes interesting when analyzing its implications for wage
and employment dynamics. Some authors support the idea that the use of
social networks may negatively affect behavior in markets. In fact, social
networks can be used by low skilled but connected workers to be selected in
place of more talented but unconnected individuals (i.e., discrimination in
favor, nepotism, amoral familism). From another perspective, a labor market
with referrals would improve the quality of job matches by reducing problems
of adverse selection and moral hazard.
To date, the empirical evidence provides conflicting results. While some
studies show that workers recruited through informal networks receive lower
wages (Pellizzari, 2010), others find evidence that workers who have found
their job through a social connection receive higher wages (Amuedo-Dorantes
and Mundra, 2007). The literature seems to suggest that when studying the
effects of specific networks in the labor market, the specificity of each network
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translates into a peculiar effect on the outcome of interest. More generally,
the literature shows that the effects of professional contacts (referrals from
current employees, i.e. weak ties and bridging networks) have a positive
effect on the quality of matches (in terms of wage, tenure, productivity, etc.)
while family contacts (i.e., bonding networks) have a negative one.
Recently, some scholars have argued that referral hiring could be a cause
of the persistence of inequality for labor force minorities (Calvo-Armengol
and Jackson, 2004). This strand of the literature focuses on the negative
role of social networks, leading to potentially self-perpetuating poverty traps
(Durlauf, 2002). Beaman and Magruder (2012) deal in general with the
problem of the activation of social networks in temporary and low-skilled
labor markets. The authors create short-term jobs in the field in urban India
by asking people drawn from a pool of active labor market participants to
participate in a paid laboratory experiment and then to refer a friend or a
relative to participate in it too. While everyone is asked to refer a friend who
will be highly skilled for the job (i.e., who can replicate the task the referral
did in the previous day), the type of referral contract and the amount offered
is randomized: some are proposed a fixed amount while others are offered a
guarantee plus a contingent bonus based on the referrals’ performance. The
results show that when individuals receive performance pay they become 7
percentage points less likely to refer relatives. This is a large change since
less than 15 per cent of individuals refer relatives. They are also 8 percentage
points more likely to refer co-workers.
1.3.1 Bonding Networks
Bonding networks refer to relationships between people who know each other
and have several interactions among them, i.e., family members, kin, mem-
bers of the same ethnicity or language group (Gittell and Vidal, 1998), and
neighbors (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999). These relationships are defined
“strong ties”by Granovetter (1973) and are considered the foundations on
which other relationships with broader social networks are built. Generally,
belonging to these networks is measured by considering the importance that
12
respondents assign to the family or to their closest group.
The empirical literature has often shown that bonding networks have
negative effects on several economic outcomes. As an example, a study on
Mexican immigrants by Amuedo-Dorantes and Mundra (2007) finds that so-
cial networks, particularly strong ties, contribute to the economic assimila-
tion of immigrants by raising their hourly wages. However, strong ties allow
for a lower employment likelihood. Sabatini (2009) examines the impact of
four types of aggregate level social capital (strong family ties, networks with
kin and friends, voluntary group affiliations and activities engagement, and
political participation) on human development and well-being, finding that
strong family ties and networks with kin and friends actually have negative
effects on human development, although they improve life quality by reducing
worker’s precariousness.
Family
Family ties are the most commonly studied bonding network, since they of-
ten work in a peculiar way by changing individual behaviors and shaping
economic institutions (La Porta et al., 1999). On the one hand, it is clearly
recognized in the literature that the family is an institution that substitutes
the state by internalizing social risk, by pooling resources across generations
or by providing public goods and welfare services. On the other hand, since
Weber (1904), the literature has often focused on the family as a potential
form of bonding social capital. Coleman (1994), for instance, noticed that
societies based on strong family ties promote codes of conduct according to
which a selfless behavior is required within the small circle of kin whereas
selfish behavior is acceptable outside this network. In the empirical litera-
ture, there is evidence showing that several economic behaviors and outcomes
(individual and aggregate) are affected both by the structure of the family
and by the strength of family ties.
The structure of the family is often classified along two dimensions, based
on Todd’s classification (Todd and Garrioch, 1985): vertical relationships
between parents and children and horizontal relationships between siblings.
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The first dimension is said to be liberal if children become independent of
their parents at an early age and leave their parental home as soon as they
get married, or authoritarian if children continue to depend on their parents
in adulthood and still live with them after marrying. The second dimension
defines the relationship as egalitarian if siblings receive an equal share of
family wealth after their parents’ death, or non-egalitarian when parents
can favor one offspring at the expense of the others. Based on these two
dimensions, four possible family types are identified: the absolute nuclear
family, the egalitarian nuclear family, the stem family and the communitarian
family.
Todd’s classification has been used in several economic papers. Greif and
Tabellini (2015) show that the presence of the nuclear family in Europe as
opposed to the clan in China was central in explaining patterns of urban-
ization in Europe. Moreover, they associate generalized morality5 with the
diffusion of the nuclear family in Europe, whereas limited morality was typ-
ical of China, where the clan was more diffused. Duranton et al. (2009) use
Todd’s classification to explain regional disparities across Europe in house-
hold size, educational attainment, social capital, labor force participation,
sectoral structure, wealth, and inequality. Galasso and Profeta (2013) use
Todd’s classification to show that family structures are crucial for explaining
different types of pension systems and that Todd’s definition of nuclear and
extended family is strongly correlated to the measure of family ties as defined
in Alesina and Giuliano (2011). The literature on family structure has also
examined, among other things, the relationship between family structure, in-
heritance norms and the performance of family businesses (Pe´rez-Gonza´lez,
2006), children’s achievements (Ermisch and Francesconi, 2001; Gennetian,
2005) and child poverty (Lerman, 1996), cooperation (Greif and Tabellini,
2010) and farmers’ decisions to adopt a new crop (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006).
Recently, scholars have focused, on the strength of family ties, rather than
the structure. Bentolila and Ichino (2008) study how countries with different
family ties cope with unemployment shocks. They find that the consumption
5The distinction between “generalized” versus “limited” morality was first introduced
by Platteau (2000) and stressed by Tabellini (2010).
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losses after the termination of a job are much lower in Mediterranean Europe,
due to strong family ties. Ermisch and Gambetta (2010) find that people
with strong family ties put a lower level of trust in strangers than people
with weak family ties. Alesina and Giuliano (2010) study the importance
of family ties for economic behavior. Using data from the World Values
Survey (WVS), they show that with strong family ties home production
is higher and families larger, whereas labor force participation of women
and youngsters and geographical mobility are lower. They address causality
by looking at the behavior of second generation immigrants. Alesina and
Giuliano (2011) show that there exists an inverse relationship between family
ties and political participation. In particular, the more individuals rely on the
family as a provider of services, insurance, and transfer of resources, the lower
is one’s civic engagement and political participation. Moreover, they show
that strong family ties appear to be a substitute for generalized trust, rather
than a complement. Alesina et al. (2015) study the relationship between
strong family ties and the regulation of labor. They find that individuals
who inherit stronger family ties are less mobile, have lower wages, are less
often employed and support more stringent labor market regulations. At the
aggregate level, they find a positive cross-country correlation between the
strength of family ties and labor market rigidities. On the contrary, a positive
correlation is found between labor market rigidities at the beginning of the
21st century and family values prevailing before World War II, which suggests
that labor market regulations have deep cultural roots. On the positive
side, Alesina and Giuliano (2014) find that family relationships are found
to improve well-being, as measured by self-reported indicators of happiness
and subjective health. At the aggregate level, the authors find a negative
correlation between the strength of family ties, economic development and
the quality of institutions measured by the Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGI) of the World Bank. Although they do not offer any definite answer to
the question of causality, they show that family values are quite stable over
time and that they determine institutional differences and differential levels
of development across countries.
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Kins
A peculiar aspect linked to the family is the so-called kin system. Following
Wolf (1955), this can be defined as a system of shared rights and obligations
encompassing a large number of near and distant relatives. The kin system
is a social contract of mutual assistance among members of an extended
family that allows people to reduce their exposure to risk and to cope with
financial markets failures (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Jackson et al., 2012).
As reported in Di Falco and Bulte (2011), kinship is the fundamental social
organization in less developed countries, regulating social relationships, so-
cial customs and the access to resources and services. Unlike other types of
networks, membership in the kin is not voluntary and it implies moral obliga-
tions for its members, such as sharing and redistribution. These obligations
are supported by customs and norms.
As formally explored by Hoff and Sen (2005), during economic transition
the kin system can become a poverty trap for its members since it imposes
barriers in entering the market economy such as workplace nepotism or in-
efficient transfers to kin. To date, the actual impact of the kin system on
economic development is unclear6 and the consequences of membership in a
kin group vary for people in different parts of the world. As an example,
while in African firms there is little evidence of positive effects of the kin
system on productive activities, the kin system has spurred entrepreneurship
in East Asia (Di Falco and Bulte, 2011).
Some recent experimental evidence shows how differences in kinship de-
termine the choices made by subjects in trust and ultimatum games. Barr
(2004), for instance, makes a behavioral comparison between two groups in
Zimbabwe: a group of new villages that were set up in 1997 as resettlements
consisting almost entirely of unrelated households, and a control group of
non-resettled villages made up almost exclusively of kin. She finds no dif-
ferences in socially transmitted behavioral rules, in altruism and in loyalty
between resettled and non-resettled villages. However, she finds that reset-
6For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between kinship groups and economic
outcomes see La Ferrara and Milazzo (2014) while for a review of the relevance of kinship
ties in development see La Ferrara (2007).
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tled villagers have lower level of trust than non-resettled villagers, a symptom
of a lower density in kinship ties, which in turn leads to less familiarity with
other people’s behavioral characteristics.
1.3.2 Bridging Networks
Bridging networks are horizontal ties connecting heterogeneous groups of
people. In the empirical literature, they have been proxied, among other
things, by membership in any kind of association, blood donations and by
the number of readers of local newspapers. The choice of mono-dimensional
indicators is not free from criticism. First, as suggested by Sabatini (2009a),
the use of mono-dimensional indicators generates confusion about the rela-
tionship between social capital and its effects, since social capital is actually
measured by its effects. The tautology, in this case, lies in the attempt to
measure a phenomenon by an indicator of its outcome. As an example, when
social capital is measured as the percentage of blood donations (Nannicini
et al., 2013), it is necessarily proxied by a (positive) outcome of its presence.
This tautologically results in a positive effect of social capital on any social
and economic phenomenon. Second, this strategy assumes all types of asso-
ciations to be equally bridging. However, most groups are likely to be both
bridging and bonding to some extent. As an example, religious organizations
often have hierarchical structures which may negatively affect the coopera-
tive attitudes of members (van Deth, 2010) while cultural and educational
associations may be conducive to particular interests which do not necessarily
entail relational activities or pro-social motivations and behaviors (Degli An-
toni, 2009). Hooghe (2003), for instance, argues that voluntary associations
contribute to strengthening the values that dominate a certain group. As an
example, let us suppose that anti-racism is considered as a positive value for
a society. If a group or an association is mainly composed by highly edu-
cated members who exert a preference for anti-racist sentiments, then group
interactions strengthen these anti-racist values (Stolle and Lewis, 2002). On
the contrary, if a group is mainly composed by members with ethno-centric
attitudes, then group interactions strengthen this ethno-centrism. Thus, the
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bridging degree of any association is inevitably affected by its members’ het-
erogeneity, by their degree of involvement into associational life and by the
relative size of each group (Blau, 1977).
To address the problem of the significant diversity among associations,
Paxton (2002) proposes to make use of the interconnections between volun-
tary associations and the diversity of their membership. By doing so, they
are able, to some extent, to divide associations according to their bridging po-
tential. Grießhaber and Geys (2012), find that the impact of membership on
corruption varies significantly according to the association’s characteristics
in terms of inclusiveness and interconnectedness.
1.3.3 Linking Networks
Linking networks are ties connecting individuals to people or groups in pow-
erful positions. A leading example of these networks are civil society orga-
nizations that allow citizens to interact with the institutions to carry out
advocacy activities through, for instance, collective action. These networks
are usually thought to produce civic capital. However, as underlined in Knack
and Keefer (1997):
if the economic goals of a group conflict with those of other
groups or of unorganized interests, the overall effect of group
memberships and activities on economic performance could be
negative. Although the ability of groups to articulate their inter-
ests is likely to be an important restraint on government, it also
provides groups a way to capture private benefits at the expense
of society (p. 1271)
As a result, linking networks may have positive as much as negative effects
and, as for bridging networks, they should be operationalized in a multidi-
mensional way. Despite this, previous studies have often proxied linking
networks by indexes measuring participation in political activities. These
indexes are normally composed of very different activities, such as partici-
pating in political meetings, boycotting products or wearing a sticker, the
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percentage of civically-oriented establishments in a community, voting, and
indicators of philanthropic activities such as charity and leisure. Given the
lack of unambiguous conceptualizations and explanations, studies relying on
a multitude of measures of linking networks have often generated equivocal
findings and interpretations (Durlauf, 2002).
Three main problems have been raised in the literature on linking net-
works. First, it is necessary to analyze separately the structure from the
level of participation. Ekman and Amn˚a (2012), for instance, propose to
consider political participation to be composed of a manifest and a latent
part. The manifest political participation comprises parliamentary and extra-
parliamentary forms of activism while the latent component refers to activ-
ities based on personal interest in politics and societal issues. In the latter
form of political participation, the extrinsic motivations are sharply prevail-
ing, at the point that these forms of political participation are actually rent
seeking, and maintaining connections with people in power becomes crucial
to spur personal (and in many cases antisocial) interests. This is the case
of Mafia-type organizations (C¸ayli, 2010). Second, the indicators proposed
above often include both participation and actions, while quite often partici-
pation does not immediately translate in concrete actions. Third, there exists
an important problem related to causality. In fact, several studies assume
that social networks mobilize people into political engagement. However, it
may also be the case that political participation in itself affects the types of
networks one belong to thus suggesting an opposite causal flow (Quintelier
et al., 2011).
1.4 Trust
Social scientists view trust as an economic lubricant that facilitates coopera-
tion, thus fostering economic activity. In general terms, trust is the decision
to rely on others (i.e., a person, a group, a firm, an institution) in a risky
situation. According to Arrow (1972)
virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an el-
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ement of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period
of time. It can be plausibly argued that much of the economic
backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual
confidence. (p.357)
For Fukuyama (1995) trust is:
both the condition for, and the effect of, the forms of social
capital - collective values, social networks and cultural mores -
that underpin social cohesion and shape economic growth.
The sociological literature decomposes trust in several sub-dimensions. If
trust occurs towards unknown members of society, then it is defined as general
trust. General trust is context-dependent, influenced by experience and, at
the society level, it is affected by some shared ethical and moral norms of
reciprocity (Fukuyama, 2001). General trust differs from institutional trust.
If the first one is generally horizontal, the second one is vertical, since it
includes trust in social system (Hayoz and Sergeyev, 2003), in institutions
(both formal and informal ones) and in their officers (Hardin, 2002). General
trust also differs from particular trust. While the former concerns unknown
others, the latter involves a narrow circle of familiar others. Uslaner (2002)
defines general trust as moral trust. Moral trust is a stable trait which
exists regardless of the context, regardless of prior experiences and regardless
of the recipient. The moral dimension of trust comes from the fact that
trusting strangers requires accepting them into our moral community without
having any personal knowledge of them but assuming that they all share some
fundamental moral values. Moral trust leads people to treat others as if they
were trustworthy (Uslaner, 2008b).7
1.4.1 General Trust
Within economics the most widely employed measure of generalized trust
is the question, introduced by Rosenberg (1956) and used cross-nationally
7For a discussion of the micro and macro foundations of trust see Uslaner (2008a)
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in the World Values Survey (WVS), the General Social Survey (GSS), the
European Social Survey, and most of the Barometers (the Latino Barometer,
the Afrobarometer, the Asian Barometer, etc.): “Generally speaking, would
you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful when
dealing with others?”. Possible answers are typically either, “Most people
can be trusted” or “Need to be very careful”.8
A large number of papers have analyzed the role of trust in economics.
This extensive literature, recently reviewed by Algan and Cahuc (2013), has
been challenged on several grounds. The first set of criticisms concern the
trust question itself. First, it is argued that the respondents are given only
the possibility to choose between trust and caution, rather then between trust
and distrust, whereas trust and caution are not always mutually exclusive
(Naef and Schupp, 2009). As an example, Miller and Mitamura (2003) have
shown, that Japanese students are more trusting than American ones. How-
ever, when measuring trust and caution separately, they find that Americans
are more trusting than Japaneses and, at the same time, also more cautious.
Second, the answers to the trust question may differ significantly depend-
ing on whether people understand most people in the question as meaning
acquaintances or strangers (Reeskens and Hooghe, 2008). Recently, Del-
hey et al. (2011) have addressed this question, finding that in 41 out of
51 countries, most people in the standard question predominantly connotes
out-groups. To this extent, it is a valid measure of general trust in others.
Nevertheless, the radius of most people varies considerably across countries.
Some country rankings for trust change when the standard question is re-
placed by a radius-adjusted trust score. Since the assumed civic nature of
trust depends on a wide radius, then the radius of trust matters for civic
attitudes and behaviors.
Another set of criticisms regards the fact that the answer about trust is
always context-dependent (Goudge and Gilson, 2005) and that this intrinsic
8In some other papers trust is elicited by constructing an index using either the “fairness
question” contained in the WVS (“Do you think most people would try to take advantage
of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?”) or the “help question”
contained in the GSS (“Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or
that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?”)
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characteristic leads to biased empirical results when passing from individual
to aggregate variables. The macro-level studies on social capital generally
use a trust indicator that is given by the percentage of respondents replying
“most people can be trusted” to the Rosenberg question. Trust represents in-
dividuals’ perception of their social environment and is, therefore, inevitably
related to the position people occupy in the social structure. By aggregating
individual data, every linkage with the social and historical circumstances in
which trust and social capital are located are inevitably lost, therefore alter-
ing the concept of trust (Foley and Edwards, 1999). According to this criti-
cism, aggregate levels of trust are, in fact, a proxy for the well-functioning of
institutions (Beugelsdijk, 2006). In a similar vein, Bjørnskov (2006) suggests
that social trust has a positive impact on the quality of government, whereas
Rothstein (2005) argues that it is rather good government that causes gen-
eral trust. Uslaner (2008a) strongly refuses this critique on the basis of the
difference between what he calls experience-based trust and moralistic trust.
In his view, while experience-based trust is fragile, and is based upon re-
sponses to how others have previously treated you and to your interactions
with others in a specific context, moralistic trust is not. According to Uslaner
(2008a) the academic literature based on the Rosenberg’s question reflects,
in fact, moralistic trust and not experience-based trust. However, Ahlerup
et al. (2009) show that the effect of social capital on economic growth, as
well as on the investment rate, is nonlinear and dependent on the quality of
formal institutions. More specifically, social capital matters the most when
formal institutions are weak and almost ceases to matter when institutions
are strong.
Recently, a stream of research has combined survey and experimental
methods to test the relationship between behavioral and attitudinal mea-
sures of trust. In contrast to survey measures, experimental measures of
trust between anonymous individuals and with monetary incentives can cap-
ture generalized trust behavior more effectively (Camerer, 2010) since they
allow to use actual choices as an appropriate way to infer preferences. How-
ever, behavioral measures of trust can potentially suffer significant short-
comings. In fact, behavioral measures of trust are primarily elicited through
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the trust game (Berg et al., 1995).9 However, some papers have recently
shown that behavior in the trust game often correlates with altruism (Cox,
2004; Schechter, 2007), thus rising the question of the accuracy of behavioral
methods, such as the trust game, in measuring trust (McEvily et al., 2012).
The empirical evidence on the correlation between the trust question and
experimental measures of trust is mixed. Glaeser et al. (2000) find that stan-
dard attitudinal survey questions about trust predict trustworthy behavior
in the experiments much better than they predict trusting behavior. To
put it otherwise, trust as elicited through the standard trust question has
no predictive power for trust as measured in the trust game, while it pre-
dicts trustworthiness. In contrast, Fehr et al. (2003) find a relation between
survey-measured trust and experimentally measured trust, but not trust-
worthiness, in a representative sample of the German population. Sapienza
et al. (2013) find that the World Values Survey (WVS) question on trust
captures mostly the belief-based component of a trust game. Yet, Bellemare
and Kro¨ger (2007) find no relation at all neither with trust nor with trust-
worthiness. Holm and Danielson (2005) find a strong and significant relation
between Dictator donations and proportions returned in Trust games among
undergraduates in Tanzania and Sweden. They find that, although using
the same protocol, the predictive power of survey trust questions differed
between countries. While they found a relation between survey trust and
trust behavior in Sweden, they found no relation at all in Tanzania. Johnson
and Mislin (2012) use a constructed data set containing observations of trust
and trustworthiness behavior from replications of Berg et al. (1995) collected
across 35 countries from more than 23,000 subjects, finding strong correla-
tion with the trust survey question. By contrast, they find no relationship
9Readers interested in a detailed review of results for the Trust Game are referred to
Cardenas and Carpenter (2008) and Johnson and Mislin (2011). In this game two are
players endowed with some fixed amount of money. The first player, the sender, moves
first by choosing how much money to send to the second mover, the receiver. The amount
sent is increased by the experimenter according to a commonly known function before
being given to the second player. The second player is then asked to give some amount
back to the first player, ending the game. Under standard economic assumptions, the sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game is that the receiver never returns any
money and that, in turn, the sender never sends any money. Trust in others is measured
through the sender’s behavior, whereas trustworthiness through the receiver’s behavior.
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between trustworthiness and the trust question.10
1.4.2 Particular Trust
In contrast with the literature at the macro level, numerous types of trust
have been developed at the micro level. In economics, a growing atten-
tion has been devoted to the fact that trust can be classified in two cate-
gories: in-group and out-group trust. If out-group trust involves confidence
in strangers, and is in fact equivalent to general trust (Delhey et al., 2011),
in-group trust concerns confidence in people who share the same values and
who are connected by social ties or social identities (Uslaner, 2002). Another
way to define the same categories is to use the terms particular and general
trust, particularized and generalized trust (Uslaner and Conley, 2003), or
thick and thin trust (Newton, 1997).
Particular trust arises in face-to-face interactions and can be thought of
as reputation (Bjørnskov, 2007). According to Uslaner (2002),
The difference between generalized and particularized trust is
similar to the distinction Putnam (1993) drew between bonding
and bridging social capital. We bond with our friends and people
like ourselves. We form bridges with people who are different from
ourselves. While Putnam argued that both can lead to trust, he
held that bridging organizations would produce much more trust.
(p. 7)
While confidence in unknown others is widely recognized as an essential
component of positive social capital, since it leads to widespread cooperation
(Putnam, 2001), confidence only in known people is usually conducive to
negative (or anti-social) capital (Banfield, 1958; Foley and Edwards, 1999).
In fact, as underlined in Baron (2010), agents overcome the incentive to
free-ride on other people when they interact with people who are close to
them.
10Another strand of the literature looks at the relationship between trust experimentally
elicited and cooperation. For a review of the literature see Tho¨ni et al. (2012)
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At present, the study of particular trust has not met with great success in
economics. Yet, there are many possible and interesting applications. If par-
ticularized trust is conducive to negative social capital, then it can constitute
an impediment to economic development and democratization (Bo Rothstein,
2008). Indeed, it could also become a self-feeding trap in the sense that when
particular trust becomes a key feature of state power, particular trust itself
is generalized and general institutions become the way to perpetuate par-
ticular interests. This is the case, for instance, of the Mafia-based societies
(Gambetta, 1996). Moreover, as suggested by Fukuyama (1995), if people
only trust those with whom they interact regularly and if trust decreases
with social distance, then the extent of this reduction determines the size of
the market.11 On the opposite, particular trust may translate into general
trust. This is what Putnam (1995) defines the transitivity of trust. One
of the possible mechanisms that guarantees this transformation is presented
in Macy and Skvoretz (1998). In their framework, cooperation can emerge
between strangers even without formal or informal social controls. In partic-
ular, general trust emerges in local settings in exchanges between neighbors
and spread through weak ties to outsiders.
With exception of Guiso et al. (2009),12 showing that In Europe managers
from any given country express more trust in people from that country than
managers from other European countries, the literature on particularized
trust is mainly experimental and is based on the analysis of individual-level
behavior using the trust game when group identity is hidden and when it is
not. Much of this literature has found that people transfer more money to
known than unknown others.
In Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) and Fershtman et al. (2005) subjects
11van Rijn et al. (2012) show, for instance, that structural social capital, especially in
the form of connections beyond the village, is associated with more extensive adoption of
innovations, the reverse is true for cognitive social capital measured as trust within the
local community.
12In a recent paper using the Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth
(SHIW), Albanese et al. (2013) adopt a behavioral approach and distinguish between
general trust and trust in known people. They show that time preferences and risk prefer-
ences are key covariates of self-reported trust and that both predict negatively a measure
of generalized trust. On the opposite, risk aversion is positively correlated with an index
of particularized trust (which refers to family and friends).
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play the Trust Game with different ethnic groups. Fershtman and Gneezy
(2001) find a systematic mistrust toward men of Eastern origin while a dicta-
tor game experiment indicated that this discrimination was due to (mistaken)
ethnic stereotypes and not to a taste for discrimination. Fershtman et al.
(2005) employ the trust game to compare the amounts sent by player A to
individuals with clear group affiliation and individuals with no clear group af-
filiation (i.e. anonymous individuals) to determine whether the player A’s be-
havior can be characterized as nepotism or discrimination. More specifically,
they use this experimental test to analyze linguistic segmentation between
the Flemish and Walloon in Belgium, and religious segmentation between
ultra-orthodox and secular Jews in Israel.
Brandts and Sola` (2010), implement the trust game between friends
and others, showing that friends are more likely to send each other higher
amounts, even under the presence of social inefficiency when the productiv-
ity of in-group members is varied. A similar result is found in Bran˜as-Garza
et al. (2012). Buchan et al. (2006), randomly assign people to artificially
created groups. Although this study involves students from different coun-
tries, students are paired only with participants from their own country.
Before playing the Trust Game, participants spend ten minutes in groups.
When the Trust Game is played each participant know whether he is playing
against someone from their discussion group (the in-group) or someone from
a different group (the out-group). They find heterogeneous effects of this
experimentally group membership across countries. While Americans send
(and return) more money to in-group members, Chinese students send (and
return) more to out-group members.
Buchan and Croson (2004) examine the boundaries of trust and trustwor-
thiness in the United States and China. More specifically, participants play
a standard Trust Game against someone from their own university. After
the Senders have made their transfers, but before they find out how much
he returns back, subjects are asked to fill a questionnaire containing a hypo-
thetical question regarding how much money they would send (or return if
they are a Recipient in the game) if they were to play the game against seven
different types of player with varying degrees of social distance: a parent, a
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sibling, a cousin, a student they know well, a student from another univer-
sity, a stranger from their home town and a stranger from another country.
They find that, both in the United States and in China, the hypothetical
amounts sent and returned tend to fall as social distance increases. Etang
et al. (2011) use experimental data, elicited through the trust game, from
rural Cameroon to quantify the effect of social distance on trust and altru-
ism. Subjects are asked to play a Trust Game with fellow villagers or with
someone from a different village. They find that significantly more money is
sent when the players are from the same village. Other factors that influence
transfers at least as much as the same-village effect are gender, education and
membership of rotating credit groups. Moreover, to test whether senders are
motivated by altruism, they ask subjects to play a Triple Dictator Game.
Senders transfer significantly more money on average in the Trust Game
than in the Triple Dictator Game. However, there is also a social distance
effect in the Triple Dictator Game. Furthermore, results from a Risk Game
suggest that Trust Game transfers are uncorrelated with attitudes towards
risk.
Vivian Lei (2010) studies how income inequality activate in-group fa-
voritism and, if so, whether such a bias is strong enough to survive the
removal of income inequality. The results suggest that there exists in-group
favoritism only on the part of rich first movers. Rich first movers trust their
in-group members significantly more in the presence of income inequality.
Poor first movers, in contrast, do not exhibit such in-group bias. They do
not discriminate between in-group and out-group. Moreover, in-group and
out-group favoritism established in the past can be alleviated, but not com-
pletely removed, by an equal income distribution.
These results, although interesting, leave open a large hole in the empiri-
cal literature. On the one hand: What are the individual-level determinants
of particular trust? Which kind of networks generate particular or general
trust?13 On the other hand: Do the real data confirm the theoretical relation-
ships between particularized trust, negative social capital and development?
13A first attempt to answer to this question is given in Iglicˇ (2010).
27
1.4.3 Institutional Trust
Institutional trust captures the degree of trust that people place in different
institutions. Differently from general and particular trust, institutional trust
focuses therefore on an impersonal object. Institutional trust can be defined
as the security one feels about a situation because of guarantees, safety nets,
or other structures (McKnight et al., 1998). Institutions can be formal (i.e.,
the legal system, the educational and vocational system, the financial sys-
tem, the government, the army etc.) or informal (i.e., customs). Informal
practices become important institutions when they are stable and commonly
acknowledged. Institutional trust is therefore closely linked to general trust
and civic engagement. In a study by Pearce et al. (2000), a minimum level of
institutional trust is regarded as a sine qua non for the emergence of inter-
personal trust. Therefore, as suggested by Fukuyama (2001), social capital
and the institutional environment are, in a sense, complementary. Institu-
tional trust links ordinary citizens to the institutions that are intended to
represent them, thereby conferring them legitimacy. At the same time, the
emergence of interpersonal trust depends on the extent to which institutions
provide an environment in which trust can be rewarded and not exploited
(Knack and Keefer, 1997).
Empirically, institutional trust is either measured directly in terms of
whether people trust the government and politicians to do the right thing, or
elicited through the answer to some specific question asking the respondents
to report their degree of trust from 1 to 10 in several institutions.14 A sur-
vey of the literature on institutional trust shows that most studies deal with
formal institutions (Tan and Tambyah, 2011). As an example, institutional
trust has been shown to have an effect on the support for government spend-
ing, re-distributive policies (Rudolph and Evans, 2005), compliance (Torgler,
2006), pro-social behaviors (Andriani and Sabatini, 2013), and on and sup-
port for law compliance (Marien and Hooghe, 2011).
Although it is important to examine trust in formal institutions, informal
14See for instance the WVS, the ESS and most of the Barometers (the Latino Barometer,
the Afrobarometer, the Asian Barometer, etc.)
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or non-political institutions, and the relationship between interpersonal trust
and trust in these institutions, may play a key role for development (Bratton,
2007). If trust confers legitimacy to institutions, therefore perpetuating their
role, then informal-institutional trust may play a crucial role. To the best of
our knowledge, thus far, no studies have investigated this relationship given
the lack of data.
1.5 Network(s) and Trust(s)
So far, we have seen that social capital, as an umbrella-definition, can be
further decomposed in several sub-dimensions producing either positive or
negative social capital. We have defined social capital as being composed by
a structural and a cognitive component underlying that both components are
inextricably linked to each another. The question now is to understand how
the sub-dimensions of each component are linked. In particular, we ask two
questions. First, how general trust is related with particular and institutional
trust? Second, which kind of networks foster the diffusion which kind of
trust?
The experimental and the theoretical literature suggest that general trust
is associated with beliefs in other people’s trustworthiness (Sapienza et al.,
2013), the preferences of the recipient (Tho¨ni et al., 2012) and that people
rely on preexistent cognitive schema regarding the general cooperativeness of
individuals and organizations (Robbins, 2016). Therefore, generalized trust,
as well as particularized trust, are context and experience dependent. In-
deed, it is the radius of experiences and predispositions that matters for the
radius of trust (Freitag and Traunmu¨ller, 2009). Generalized trust appears
to have both cultural and institutional foundations. Dinesen (2013), by look-
ing at immigrants having migrated from a broad range of countries of origin
to destination countries in Western Europe, examines how their generalized
trust is affected by the culture of their country of origin (in terms of the
level of trust of this country) as well as institutional quality in the country
they have migrated to (in terms of freedom from corruption). The results
show that controlling for confounding variables, both factors have a highly
29
significant impact on trust. However, the relationship between institutional
quality and generalized trust is reciprocal. Robbins (2012) uses data from
the World Values Survey, World Bank, and other data sources in an identi-
fied non-recursive structural equation model, to show that generalized trust
and institutional quality form a positive reciprocal relationship, where the
connection is stronger from generalized trust to institutional quality.
Generalized trust is strongly related also with particularized and insti-
tutional trust (Freitag and Traunmu¨ller, 2009). Newton and Zmerli (2011)
show, both at the micro and macro level, that particularized trust seems to
be a necessary but not sufficient condition for general trust, and both forms
of trust appear to be necessary, but not sufficient conditions for institutional
trust. At the same time, institutional trust is causally related with social
trust. Sønderskov and Dinesen (2015) make use of two Danish panel surveys
to address the potentially reverse and/or spurious relationship between insti-
tutional and generalized trust. Using individual fixed effects and cross-lagged
panel models, they provide strong evidence of trust in state institutions ex-
ercising a causal impact on social trust, whereas the evidence for a reverse
relationship is limited.
Generalized trust is related also to ethnic diversity, but the size of the
effect is mediated by the level of socialization and by individual-attitudes to-
wards diversity. Stolle and Harell (2013) build on the insights of the contact
hypothesis and political socialization literature to go beyond recent find-
ings that racial and ethnic diversity have overwhelmingly negative effects on
social capital, particularly generalized trust. Using the Canadian General
Social Survey (2003), the paper shows that, despite a negative relationship
among adults, younger Canadians with racial and ethnic diversity in their
social networks show higher levels of generalized trust. The results seem
to confirm that youth socialization experiences with rising diversity and the
normalization of diversity in a multicultural environment contribute to ben-
eficial, rather than detrimental (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002), effects of
diverse social networks. Moreover, there is another form of diversity that
can be fundamental in determining the levels of trust and social capital,
namely value diversity. Beugelsdijk and Klasing (2015) focus on the extent
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to which key human values and beliefs are shared in society, which captures
a dimension of diversity not previously discussed. The paper finds that value
diversity, in particular with regard to political ideological values concerning
income redistribution and the role of the government in influencing markets,
is important for understanding the international variation in trust, with high
diversity being associated with lower levels of trust. This relationship is ro-
bust to controlling for various other determinants of trust, including other
dimensions of diversity, and holds at various levels of aggregation. At the
micro-level the opposite conclusion is reached by Quintelier et al. (2011). The
paper shows that young people who have more diverse social networks are in
fact more likely to participate in a variety of social and political activities. In
particular, political diversity in one’s social network has the strongest pos-
itive effect on political participation, but ethno-cultural diversity also mat-
ters. However, in terms of causality, they find a reciprocal cross-lagged effect,
suggesting that political participation strengthens people’s network diversity
and diversity spurs political participation (controlling for prior participation
and diversity).
Sabatini (2009b) studies the causal relationships between four types of
social networks (i.e., bonding, bridging, linking, and corporate), and differ-
ent forms of trust (knowledge-based trust, social trust, trust towards public
services and political institutions) in a community of entrepreneurs located
in an industrial district in Italy. The paper suggests that the main factor
fostering the diffusion of generalized trust among entrepreneurs is the estab-
lishment of corporate ties through professional associations. Trust in people
is positively and significantly related also to higher levels of satisfaction and
confidence in public services, while participation in volunteering organiza-
tions does not appear to increase generalized trust, a result that has been
recently confirmed by Bekkers (2012). Recently, Ermisch and Francesconi
(2001) and Alesina and Giuliano (2011) have found that people with strong
family ties have a lower level of trust in strangers than people with weak
family ties
As already underlined above, in the social capital literature the micro-
relationship between membership in voluntary associations and generalized
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trust have been so far taken as an assumption (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008).
As a consequence, we actually do not know exactly which kind of social inter-
actions are sufficient and necessary for the institutionalization of cooperative
behaviors and generalized trust and which kind are conducive, instead, to
particularized trust. Iglicˇ (2010) shows that when members of voluntary
associations build particularized trust rather than generalized trust, this de-
creases their levels of social and political tolerance. Since associations are
social contexts within which processes of interpersonal influence and political
mobilization take place, they reinforce civic as well as un-civic orientations
of associational members. Indeed, it is the scope (Wollebæk and Strømsnes,
2007; Isham et al., 2006) or the multiple affiliation to several associations
with different purposes (Wollebaek and Selle, 2002), more than the activity
level of members, that matters for the formation of social capital. However,
a problem of selective attrition emerges. People self-select into association
groups, depending on their original levels of generalized trust and reciprocity
(Bekkers, 2012). The empirical literature must therefore carefully address
the question of causality before claiming any effect.
Moreover, although in the economic literature intrinsic motivations have
received much attention in explaining human behavior, quite surprisingly the
existing literature on social capital fails to consider intrinsic motivations as
a source of social capital. One relevant exception is Degli Antoni (2009).
The paper studies the role that different motivations (ideal motivations, the
desire to feel useful to others, the pursuit of social recognition and the desire
to increase the number of acquaintances or friends) to volunteer have on the
creation of volunteers’ social capital, which is intended in this paper as net-
works of cooperative relations. The author finds that intrinsic motivations
enable people to extend their social networks by creating relations character-
ized by a significant degree of familiarity. By contrast, extrinsic motivations,
and in particular the decision to join an association in order to increase the
number of acquaintances or friends, promote the creation of networks from a
quantitative point of view, but they do not facilitate the creation of relations
based on a particular degree of confidence.
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1.6 Conclusions
This survey claims that the very common practice in economics to use the
label “Social Capital ”to indicate one of its components, measuring unidimen-
sionally a multifaceted phenomenon, has undermined the credibility of the
whole area of research. In order to regain credibility the empirical literature
has to go back to the theory and, instead of focusing only on a component
to measure social capital, should adopt a multidimensional prospective. An
effort is therefore required in further decomposing both the structural and
the cognitive components of social capital into their sub-components to study
their effects on different economic dimensions. In fact, when disentangling
different types of social capital’s sub-components, the results may allow for
a better understanding of the phenomenon observed greatly reducing the
confusion that often surrounds the empirical research on social capital.
Despite the large number of papers produced on social capital, there
are still many areas in which this concept could be usefully applied once
correctly decomposed. The space to develop new research is very broad
and the possibility of relevant policy implications is substantial, especially
because changing habits regarding the use of networks and trust takes a long
time and requires strong incentives.
I want to conclude this survey in a non-standard way, using Saint-Exupe´ry’s
words:
La grandeur d’un me´tier est peut-eˆtre, avant tout, d’unir les
hommes: il n’est qu’un luxe ve´ritable, et c’est celui des relations
humaines. (Terre des hommes, p.42, Livre de Poche)15
These words are, in themselves, a summary of the motivations of this
survey and the reasons why it is still sensible to put effort in the study of
the networks and trust linking individuals in societies.
15The size of a business is perhaps above all to connect men: it is a real luxury, and it
is that of human relationships.
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CHAPTER 2
The Effect of Particularism on Corruption:
Theory and Empirical Evidence 1
1This chapter is based on a joint work with Luca Stanca (DEMS, University of Milan-
Bicocca). The authors wish to thank Eric Uslaner, Francesco Sarracino, participants to
the Laboratory for Comparative Social Research workshop, participants to the workshop
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the Italian Economic Association for useful comments and inputs. A version of this chapter
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2.1 Introduction
It is widely recognized that corruption has significant adverse effects on eco-
nomic development and growth (Mauro, 1995, 1997), social equality (Gupta
et al., 2002) and several other relevant socio-economic phenomena (Spector,
2005). As a consequence, the search for effective policies against corruption
plays a key role in the agenda of policy makers throughout the world. How-
ever, despite a growing body of literature on corruption, a full understanding
of its determinants is yet to come. This paper investigates, both theoreti-
cally and empirically, the role played by the cultural norm of particularism,
as opposed to universalism, as a determinant of corruption at the individual
level.
A large number of studies has focused on the determinants of corrup-
tion at the macro level, showing that corruption is generally lower in coun-
tries characterized by centralized government, long lasting democracy and
open-market economy (Treisman, 2000), lower ethnic heterogeneity (La Porta
et al., 1999), fiscal decentralization (Fisman and Gatti, 2002), higher share
of Protestants (Treisman, 2000), free press (Brunetti and Weder, 2003) and
higher share of women in government (Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy et al.,
2001).2 These studies are generally based on cross-country aggregate data,
and therefore do not address the role played by individual characteristics and
context for the decision to engage in corruption.
With the recent availability of micro-level surveys that include specific
questions on acts of corruption, such as offering or accepting bribes, a rela-
tively smaller number of studies has turned to the determinants of corruption
at the individual level (e.g., Dong et al., 2012; Dong and Torgler, 2009; Mo-
can, 2008; Guerrero and Rodr´ıguez-Oreggia, 2008; Swamy et al., 2001; Tor-
gler and Valev, 2006, 2010) . Within this micro-level literature, most studies
have focused on the monetary incentives and disincentives for engaging in
corruption, despite the existence of a growing literature indicating that cul-
tural factors also play an important role for economic behavior (e.g., Alesina
2See Rose-Ackerman (2007) and Treisman (2007) for comprehensive reviews of this
literature.
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and Glaeser, 2004; Ferna´ndez and Fogli, 2009; Guiso et al., 2006). Our paper
contributes to the literature on the individual-level determinants of corrup-
tion by investigating the role played by the cultural norm of particularism
vs. universalism.3
In philosophy, the difference between particularism and universalism re-
lates to the sphere of morality. Particularism implies that there are no general
moral principles and that the moral status of an action is context-dependent
(Dancy, 1993). Conversely, universalism implies that principles have to be
conceived abstractly, so that they should guide individuals to do the right
action in every circumstance (Kant, 1788). In political science, particularism
has been defined as “the policymakers’ ability to further their career by cater-
ing to narrow interests rather than to broader national interests” (Carey and
Shugart, 1995). Political particularism stands in contrast to political univer-
salism and its emphasis on universal rights and separation of powers.
The sociological literature extends the philosophical definition to general
rules of behavior, while adding the dimension of social interactions. Parsons
and Shils (1951) characterize the universalism-particularism continuum as a
pattern of attitudes and behaviors typical of specific groups that, in turn,
guide individual behavior. Universalism implies that correct behavior can
always be defined and applied, irrespective of the context. Particularism, in-
stead, implies that relationships come ahead of abstract social codes, so that
norms and appropriate behavior are context-dependent and can occasion-
ally be broken. To put it otherwise, while for universalists general codes of
conduct take precedence over the needs and claims of friends and other per-
sonal relations, particularists tend to focus more on friendship and personal
relationships than on formal rules and laws.4
While the attention for the effects of particularism vs. universalism is
relatively recent in the economic literature, in sociology particularism has
3A number of studies have shown that, at the aggregate level, national culture (i.e.,
Davis and Ruhe, 2003; Husted and y de Estudios, 1999; Barr and Serra, 2010) , religion
and religiosity (La Porta et al., 1999; Treisman, 2000), and family values (Lipset and Lenz,
2000) are important determinants of corruption.
4The definition by Parsons and Shils (1951) has been used by Hampden-Turner and
Trompenaars (1997) to develop a model of culture defining a set of seven cultural dimen-
sions that include the universalism-particularism continuum.
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often been associated with more widespread informal institutions (Mungiu-
Pippidi, 2005), lower civic mindedness and higher corruption (Lumby, 2006).
This relationship, however, is theoretically underdeveloped, since the precise
mechanisms underlying the causal link between particularism and corruption
have not been fully understood. In order to fill this gap, this paper develops
and tests empirically a model of collusive bribery, focusing on the role played
by the cultural norm of particularism.5
In our framework, the act of offering or demanding a bribe is perceived
as inappropriate, according to a commonly held social norm, thus resulting
in a psychological cost for the agents involved. We assume that this psycho-
logical cost is lower for particularistic individuals, defined as in Parsons and
Shils (1951), since they are less sensitive to the burden imposed by corrup-
tion on society, as in Uslaner (2002). In this perspective, social relations in
particularistic societies rely on strong ties informed by principles of tradi-
tion, conformity and benevolence inside small circles of related people (i.e.,
members of the family, friends, members of the clan). Outside this small
network, selfish behavior is considered morally acceptable (Tabellini, 2010).
Therefore, as shown in Baron (2010), particularists can overcome the incen-
tive to free-ride on others or to impose negative externalities to other people
when they interact with people who are close to them.6
We test the predictions of the model by using individual-level data for 25
countries from the European Social Survey. The findings indicate that, con-
trolling for a wide set of individual characteristics, particularism increases the
probability of offering a bribe. This result is robust to alternative definitions
of particularism, specifications of the model and econometric techniques that
take into account the potential endogeneity of cultural norms. Overall, our
findings indicate that there is a causal link between particularism and cor-
ruption at the individual level. As a consequence, policies aimed at favoring
5Collusive bribery is defined as an illegal transaction that is beneficial to both the
briber and the bribee, and is therefore particularly difficult to deter (Ryvkin and Serra,
2012).
6This assumption is corroborated by research suggesting that closed and socially exclu-
sive networks are a fertile ground for corruption (e.g., Lambsdorff, 2008; Lambsdorff et al.,
2004; Tonoyan, 2003) and that informal institutions are more widespread in particularistic
rather than universalistic societies.
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universalism can provide an effective tool to reduce corruption.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the
related literature. Section 2.3 presents the theoretical framework. Section
2.4 describes the data and methods. Section 2.5 presents the results. Section
2.6 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
Our work contributes to the relatively small body of empirical literature on
the determinants of corruption at the individual level. Using micro-level data
for 49 countries, Mocan (2008) finds that high-income individuals, males and
people living in larger cities, are more likely to be asked for a bribe. At the
country-level, the paper shows that the extent of corruption, as reported by
citizens, is strongly correlated with indices of corruption perception. Guer-
rero and Rodr´ıguez-Oreggia (2008) study the socio-demographic and institu-
tional factors affecting corruption in Mexico, showing that weak enforcement
of law, higher education and higher income levels are associated with a higher
propensity to bribe. Tavits (2010) studies the relationship between the act
of offering a bribe and its justifiability. Using original survey data for Esto-
nia, she finds that both public officials and citizens are more likely to engage
in corruption when they do not view corruption as wrong, and when they
perceive that corrupt behavior is widespread among their peers. Lee and
Guven (2013) use micro-level data from the European Social Survey to focus
on masculinity, gender roles and risk preferences as cultural traits affecting
the individual propensity to engage in corruption. Their results suggest that
risk-seeking individuals are significantly more likely to offer and to be asked
for a bribe, and that promoting gender equality might lead to less corrup-
tion.7
Given the hidden nature of corruption transactions, empirical studies
7Svensson (2003), using data on bribe payments of Ugandan firms, finds that the in-
cidence of corruption can be explained by the variation in policies and regulations across
industries. By combining data on corruption with financial information from the surveyed
firms, he shows that firms’ ability to pay and refusal power can explain a large part of the
variation in bribes across graft-reporting firms.
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at the micro-level are particularly difficult to implement (Lee and Guven,
2013). Recently, scholars have therefore turned to experimental methods
to study the motivations driving individuals to engage in corruption (see
Serra and Wantchekon (2012) for a comprehensive review). Some of these
experimental studies have focused on culture to explain corruption (e.g.,
Cameron et al., 2009; Alatas et al., 2009; Barr and Serra, 2010) . The findings
in this literature generally indicate that culture can only partially explain
corruption behavior at the individual level.
Another strand of related literature focuses on the micro-level determi-
nants of justifiability of corruption. Swamy et al. (2001) study the relation-
ship between gender and corruption. Based on World Values Surveys data
for over 90,000 individuals in 49 countries, they find that women are signifi-
cantly less likely to condone corruption.8 Torgler and Valev (2006) use World
Values Survey and European Values Survey data to study the effect of age
on acceptability of corruption, finding a positive and significant effect of age,
but no cohort effect. Dong and Torgler (2009) find that a higher level of po-
litical interest is associated with a lower acceptability of corruption and with
a lower level of perceived corruption. Torgler and Valev (2010) investigate
whether attitudes towards corruption and tax evasion vary systematically
with gender and, more specifically, whether gender differences decrease as
men and women face similar opportunities for illicit behavior. Their results
indicate that aversion to corruption and tax evasion is significantly stronger
for women.
A third strand of related literature investigates the relationship between
social capital and corruption. The mechanism through which social capital
may affect corruption is twofold. On the one hand, higher levels of social cap-
ital generally imply a stronger moral obligation for public officials to abstain
from acting opportunistically. On the other hand, social capital may favor
corruption, since belonging to a closed network reduces informational asym-
metries, thus favoring collusive behavior. At the empirical level, high levels
of interpersonal trust have been found to reduce corruption (e.g., Bjørnskov,
8Using survey data for 350 Georgian firms, they also find that firms owned or managed
by women are significantly less likely to be involved in bribing.
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2006; La Porta et al., 1999; Uslaner, 2013), whereas high levels of bonding
social capital (Putnam, 2001) positively affect corruption, by leading those
within a privileged network to feel that they can act illegally with impunity
(Lipset and Lenz, 2000). Harris (2007) shows that indicators of strong ties,
family orientations and particularized trust are significantly associated to
higher levels of corruption. This suggests that the adverse effect on corrup-
tion is specific to generalized trust, as opposed to particularized trust (e.g.,
Warren, 2004; Uslaner, 2013).
The distinction between particularism and universalism thus plays a key
role for understanding the determinants of corruption. While the sociological
literature on particularism and corruption is well developed (e.g., Lambsdorff
et al., 2004; Lambsdorff, 2008; Tonoyan, 2003), within economics there are
relatively few papers investigating this relationship, mainly confined to the
experimental setting (e.g., Fong and Luttmer, 2011; Eckel and Grossman,
2005). In a recent paper, De Blasio et al. (2014) show that three measures of
particularism (in trusting behavior, political participation and associational
activity) are positively related to each other and negatively related to several
indicators of universalism. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first
to provide an economic analysis of the effects of particularism on corruption.
2.3 Theory
In our theoretical framework, corruption is viewed as the outcome of a social
interaction, rather than contract design or information sharing (Chang and
Lai, 2002). We consider a society in which risk neutral citizens and public
officials meet randomly9 and interact for the provision of a good or a service.
All agents have the option to engage in bribery with their transaction partner,
provided that both parties accept the illegal transaction. Each agent can be
either particularist or universalist.10 Each agent knows his own type, but
9As in Bowles and Garoupa (1997), Chang and Lai (2002) and Ryvkin and Serra (2012),
our model focuses on a setting of “casual corruption”, i.e. situations in which there is no
repeated interaction between the briber and the bribee.
10We make the assumption that the particularism vs. universalism continuum can be
treated as a binary outcome for the sake of simplicity. The results presented below are
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does not know the type of his counterpart. Citizens are particularist with
probability γ and universalist with probability 1 − γ, while public officials
are particularist with probability pi and universalist with probability 1 − pi.
Since all transactions involve a citizen and a public official, there are equal
numbers of citizens and public officials in the economy and their populations
are normalized to unity.11
A social norm against corruption exists among both citizens and public
officials, so that violating this norm implies a psychological cost. As in
Akerlof (1980), this disutility depends not only on the individual’s sensitivity
to the norm, but also on his perceived level of widespread corruption. In
particular, when corruption is low, the cost of violating the social norm is
higher, so that individuals tend to engage less in corruption. On the other
hand, when corruption is widespread, the cost of violating the social norm is
lower and more individuals engage in corruption (Torgler, 2003). We assume
that the disutility of corruption also depends on the perceived cost imposed
by corruption on society. Particularists, characterized by limited morality as
in Tabellini (2010), bear a lower cost, relative to universalists, when engaging
in corruption. As a consequence, they are less reluctant to impose a burden
on the society or to free-ride on others.
In order to prevent illegal transactions, the authority conducts random
audits, so that agents engaging in corruption are jointly punished when dis-
covered. The two agents engaging in corruption share the same probability
of detection (q) and penalty (G). The timing of the corruption problem is
described in Figure 2.1.
Let us denote the endowments for the citizen and the public official as
Yc and Yp, respectively, the bribe as B, and the gain from corruption for
the citizen as K. In the first stage, the citizen internalizes the possibility
of collusion with the public official and evaluates the benefits and costs of
qualitatively unchanged under a more general definition of particularism.
11The assumption of equal number of citizens and public officials is made for simplicity,
since it allows us to interpret the shares of those offering or accepting bribes (α and β,
respectively) as individual-level probabilities. The same assumption is made in Boadway
et al. (2002) and, implicitly, in Ryvkin and Serra (2012). It is also equivalent to assume,
as in Chang and Lai (2004), that a seller faces N customers with N normalized to unity.
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Figure 2.1: Corruption game tree
Citizen
-G 0
A NA
Public Officer
PPO (pi)
-G 0
A NA
Public Officer
NPPO (1− pi)
O NO
PC (γ)
Citizen
-G 0
A NA
Public Officer
PPO (pi)
-G 0
A NA
Public Officer
NPPO (1− pi)
O NO
NPC (1− γ)
Note: (N)PC=(Non-)Particularist citizen, (N)PPO=(Non-)Particularist Public Officer,
(N)O=(Does not) Offer bribe, (N)A=(Does not) Accept bribe. γ = probability that
Citizen is particularist, pi = probability that Public Officer is particularist, G = penalty
if detected (with probability q).
corruption. If he chooses not to offer a bribe, then his payoff is Yc, whereas
if he chooses to offer a bribe his payoff depends on his own type, the choice
made by the public official, and the probability of being discovered. If the
public official accepts the bribe, the citizen’s expected payoff is
q(Yc +K − Cc −B −G) + (1− q)(Yc +K − Cc −B) =
Yc +K − Cc −B − qG
(2.1)
The psychological cost of corruption is defined as
Cc = Cc(µ, θ, C) =
µ
θ
C (2.2)
where µ is the subjective sensitivity to the social norm. The density function
of µ, denoted by f(µ), is assumed to be uniform with support on [0, 1]. The
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parameter θ, with 0 < θ ≤ 1, denotes the perception of overall corruption.
C is the perceived cost imposed by corruption on society. It is equal to L
if the citizen is particularist (with probability γ) and to H if the citizen is
universalist (with probability 1− γ), with L < H.
If a citizen decides to offer a bribe and the public official does not accept,
the citizen’s payoff is Yc. Given that the matching between a citizen and a
public official is isolated and random, the probability of successful collusion
faced by a citizen is given by the fraction of collaborative public officials,
denoted with β. By internalizing this success rate in his decision, the citizen’s
expected payoff is:
Λ = (1− β)(Yc) + β(Yc +K − Cc −B − qG) (2.3)
In the second stage, the public official decides whether or not to accept
the citizen’s proposal for collusion. If he refuses, then his payoff is Yp, whereas
if he accepts his payoff is
q(Yp +B −G− Cp) + (1− q)(Yp +B − Cp) =
Yp +B − Cp − qG
(2.4)
Thus, if the public official accepts, he will obtain the bribe B, but will
also suffer a psychological cost Cp,
12 arising from the violation of the social
norm, where
Cp = Cp(ε, θ, C) =
ε
θ
C (2.5)
As for the citizen’s cost above, Cp is assumed to depend on the individual-
specific sensitivity to the social norm (ε), uniformly distributed on [0, 1],
the perception of overall corruption (θ), and the perceived cost imposed by
corruption on society (C), that is L for a particularist (with probability pi)
and H for a universalist (with probability 1− pi).
In the third stage, the bribe amount B is determined by bargaining be-
12The moral cost of the agent who takes the initiative to break the social norm is likely
to be higher than that of the counterpart. However, it is possible to show that introducing
such heterogeneity in the psychological cost of engaging in bribery does not alter the key
predictions of the model.
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tween the public official and the citizen.13 The model can be solved back-
wards, starting from the bargaining game in the third stage.
2.3.1 Bargaining Over the Bribe Amount
In the last stage of the game, the size of the bribe B is determined by Nash
bargaining between the public official and the citizen. The amount of the
bribe in equilibrium is therefore determined by maximizing the product of
each player’s gain from making a deal, with the bargain being feasible if and
only if the net gain from bargaining is positive for each party:
max
B
[K − Cc −B − qG] [B − Cp − qG]
subject to
K ≥ B + qG+ Cc
B ≥ qG+ Cp
(2.6)
The feasible bribery set is therefore
qG+ Cp ≤ B ≤ K − qG− Cc (2.7)
and the equilibrium bribe with equal bargaining power is:
B∗ = B∗(K,Cp, Cc) =
1
2
[K − Cc + Cp] (2.8)
i.e.
B∗ = B∗(K,H,L, γ, pi, ε, µ) =
1
2
[
K − µ
θ
((1− γ)H + γL) + ε
θ
((1− pi)H + piL)
]
.
(2.9)
From the expression above, ∂B
∗
∂Cp
> 0 indicates that the higher the cost for
the public official of taking part in a corrupt transaction (Cp), the larger the
equilibrium bribe. ∂B
∗
∂K
> 0 shows that the higher the gain from corruption
(K), the higher the size of the bribe. Finally, the higher the psychological
13Bribery is often the result of bargaining between public officials and clients (either
firms or citizens). This explains the within-country and within-sector variation in both
the frequency of corrupt transactions and the size of the bribes paid (Svensson, 2003).
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cost born by the corrupt citizen, the lower the size of the bribe (∂B
∗
∂Cc
< 0).
Therefore, if the probability that the public official is particularist is high,
the equilibrium bribe will be smaller (∂B
∗
∂pi
< 0). On the other hand, if the
probability that the citizen is particularist is high, the equilibrium bribe will
be larger (∂B
∗
∂γ
> 0).
2.3.2 The Public Official’s Decision
The public official is willing to collaborate with the corrupt citizen as long
as:
pi(B − Cp − qG) + (1− pi)(B − Cp − qG) ≥ 0 (2.10)
This expression indicates that the public official is corruptible if the net
gain from corruption is positive, and therefore, given Cp(ε, θ, C), public offi-
cials with a lower value of ε are more likely to accept bribes. The critical ε∗
which makes a public official indifferent between engaging in or abstaining
from corruption is therefore:
ε∗ = θ
[
K − 2qG− Cc
(1− pi)H + piL
]
(2.11)
Then, the fraction of public officials accepting bribes is equal to ε∗:
β =
∫ ε∗
0
f(ε)dε = ε∗ = θ
[
K − 2qG− Cc
(1− pi)H + piL
]
=
θ
[
K − 2qG− µ
θ
((1− γ)H + γL)
(1− pi)H + piL
]
where ∂β
∂q
< 0 and ∂β
∂G
< 0 indicate that the higher the probability of
being detected, or the higher the size of the fine, the lower the willingness
to accept bribes. ∂β
∂pi
> 0 suggests that the higher the probability that the
public official is particularist, the higher the probability that he will accept
bribes. Finally, ∂β
∂θ
> 0 indicates that the more widespread corruption, the
higher the probability of accepting a bribe.
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2.3.3 The Citizen’s Decision
Given the public official’s incentives, citizens internalize the probability β
that a bribe is accepted and choose whether to offer a bribe or not. Since
matchings are randomly determined, and the sensitivity of the public official
to the social norm cannot be observed ex ante, citizens do not know the exact
size of the bribe before the bargain takes place. However, citizens recognize
that collusion can occur if and only if the public official’s sensitivity to the
social norm is sufficiently small (0 < ε < ε∗). Thus, based on equations
(2.9) and (2.2), the expected bribery amount E(B), under the condition
0 < ε < ε∗, is
E(B) =
1
2
[
K + Cc +
1
θ
E(ε|0 < ε < ε∗)((1− pi)H + piL)
]
(2.12)
with E(ε|0 < ε < ε∗) = ε∗
2
given the assumption that ε has a uniform
distribution. Using equations (2.9) and (2.11), the expected bribery amount
is equal to
E(B) =
3
4
K − 3
4
Cc − 1
2
qG. (2.13)
A citizen will offer a bribe as long as
γ
[
(1− β)(Yc) + β(Yc +K − Lµ
θ
−B − qG)− Yc
]
+
(1− γ)
[
(1− β)(Yc) + β(Yc +K −Hµ
θ
−B − qG)− Yc
]
> 0 (2.14)
i.e.
K − E(B)− qG− µ
θ
[(1− γ)H + γL] > 0 (2.15)
Using (2.13) in (2.15), given equation (2.2), we can find the value µ∗ that
makes the citizen indifferent between engaging in bribery or not:
µ∗ = θ
[
K − 2qG
(1− γ)H + γL
]
(2.16)
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As above, given the uniform distribution of µ, we obtain:
α =
∫ µ∗
0
f(µ)dµ = µ∗ = θ
[
K − 2qG
(1− γ)H + γL
]
(2.17)
where ∂α
∂γ
> 0, ∂α
∂q
< 0, ∂α
∂G
< 0 and ∂α
∂θ
> 0. These partial effects indicate
that the higher the probability of being detected, or the higher the size of the
fine, the lower the probability that the citizen offers a bribe; the higher the
probability that the citizen is particularist, or the higher the perception of
overall corruption, the higher the probability that the citizen offers a bribe.
The model also provides explicit predictions about how the effect of par-
ticularism on offering a bribe is affected by aggregate variables, such as the
overall diffusion of corruption, the level of deterrence and the pervasiveness
of particularism. Taking the partial derivative of (2.17) with respect to γ,
we obtain
∂α
∂γ
= θ(H − L) K − 2qG
[(1− γ)H + γL]2 (2.18)
The expression in (2.18) indicates that the effect of individual particu-
larism on the probability to offer a bribe is higher when corruption is more
widespread ( ∂
2α
∂γ∂θ
> 0). When corruption is widespread, the social stigma
associated with this behavior is smaller, so that the cost of offering a bribe
is lower. Since the effects of individual particularism and overall corruption
are complements, being particularist has a stronger effect on bribe offering
in countries where corruption is more widespread. From (2.18) it can also be
shown that ∂
2α
∂γ∂G
< 0 and ∂
2α
∂γ∂q
< 0, indicating that the effect of particularism
on bribe offering is smaller in countries where deterrence is stronger.
Furthermore, ∂
2α
∂γ2
= −2(L−H)(H − L)θ K−2qG
[(1−γ)H+γL]3 > 0, indicating that
the effect of particularism on the decision to offer a bribe is higher when the
fraction of particularists in the society is higher.14
14It is possible to consider cases where it is the public official who asks the citizen for a
bribe, rather than the citizen offering a bribe to the public official. A modified version of
the model that considers such transactions is presented in Appendix A.
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2.4 Data and Methods
Our empirical analysis is based on the second round of the European Social
Survey (ESS) 15, covering 49,066 individuals in 25 countries for the period
2004-2006.16 The questionnaire in the ESS included, among others, questions
on family status, employment, well-being, health and economic morality.
Three main questions on bribery were included in the questionnaire. The
first is whether respondents have offered a bribe (“How often, if ever, have
you offered a favor or bribe to a public official in return for their services in
the last five years?”). The second is whether respondents have been asked for
a bribe (“How often, if ever, a public official asked you for a favor or a bribe in
return for a service in the last five years?”). The responses are coded as never
= 1, once = 2, twice = 3, three or four times = 4 and five times or more = 5.
For ease of interpretation, we re-coded these variables into binary outcomes
with “ever offered/been asked for bribes” equal to 1 and “never” equal to 0.
The third question is about bribe justification (“How wrong is that a public
official asks someone for a favor or bribe in return for their services?”), with
responses coded as: seriously wrong = 1, wrong = 2, a bit wrong = 3, and
not wrong at all = 4. For the 25 countries in the sample, 1.7 per cent of the
individuals in the sample report to have offered a bribe and about 4 per cent
to have been asked for a bribe. As shown in Table 2.9 in Appendix B, there
is substantial variability across countries, with Finland displaying the lowest
fraction of people declaring to have offered or been asked for a bribe (0.15
per cent and 0.90, respectively) and Slovakia the highest (7.8 per cent and
14.3 per cent, respectively).
We operationalize Parsons and Shils’ (1951) definition of particularism as
the difference between the answer to the question “It is occasionally alright
to ignore the law and do what you want” and the question “You should
always strictly obey the law, even if it means missing good opportunities.”17
15Edition 3.2 released on February 2, 2011
16Although there are 26 countries in the ESS, observations for Ukraine were excluded
due to data quality problems.
17Both variables are coded as “Disagree strongly”=1, “Disagree”=2, “Neither disagree
nor agree”=3, “Agree”=4, “Agree strongly”=5.
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We define an individual as particularist if the difference between these two
variables is positive (particularism). Therefore, any individual in the sample
who reports a higher score in the first question than in the second is identified
as a particularist, while all the others are considered non-particularists.
In our empirical specifications, we include among control variables the
respondent’s self-reported political interest, trust, religion, education mea-
sured as completed years of schooling, family income (Dong and Torgler,
2009; Torgler and Valev, 2010; Guerrero and Rodr´ıguez-Oreggia, 2008). We
also include risk tolerance and a gender cultural indicator as defined in Lee
and Guven (2013). The estimated specifications include a variable account-
ing for individual honesty (“How much do you agree or disagree with this
statement: If you want to make money, you cannot always act honestly”)18
and a variable accounting for the importance of being admired (“Now I will
briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me
how much each person is or is not like you. It’s important to her/him to
show her/his abilities. She/he wants people to admire what she/he does.”)
in order to control for the effects of social desirability. Moreover, in order to
take into account the networks of relations that can favor collusive bribery,
we included among the regressors a variable measuring the number of friends
who are willing to support the respondent in case of illegal activities.19
In two specifications of our model, we also accounted for the perception of
overall corruption by including an aggregate measure of the level of overall
corruption, the Corruption Perception Index (International), or a variable
measuring the fraction of individuals that in each country declared to have
actually offered a bribe (Corruption Diffusion). Furthermore, in order to ac-
count for the government’s ability to deter corruption and for the perception
of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, we also
added an aggregate measure of the Worldwide Governance Indicators of the
18The answers are coded as agree strongly=1, agree=2, neither agree nor disagree=3,
disagree=4, disagree strongly=5. In the sample 28% of the respondents declared that they
agree strongly, 18% that they agree, 33% that they neither agree not disagree, 14% that
they disagree and the remaining 8% that they disagree.
19“Suppose you planned to get benefits or services you were not entitled to. How many
of your friends or relatives do you think you could ask for support?.”
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World Bank (Control of Corruption). Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics
for all the variables used in the econometric analysis.
In order to assess the robustness of our definition of particularism, we also
considered a number of alternative indicators. Particularism2 and particu-
larism3 are based on an alternative threshold (the difference between the two
underlying components being greater than 1 and -1, respectively). Particu-
larism4 is a discrete variable defined as the simple difference between the two
underlying components described above. We also constructed additional in-
dicators based on the fact that, as suggested by Uslaner (2013), particularists
rely on strong family ties and are characterized by low levels of generalized
trust. We therefore created a dummy variable (particularism5 ) equal to one
when both particularism and the dummy variable indicating strong family
ties are equal to one.20 In order to account for the fact that particularists
are characterized by a lower degree of generalized trust, we created a dummy
variable equal to one when particularism is equal to one and respondent’s
generalized trust is lower than the median of the weighted sample (particu-
larism6 ). We also compared our indicators of particularism with measures of
general trust and respect for rules.21 All the indicators of particularism are
positively and significantly correlated pair-wise among them and negatively
and significantly correlated with the indicators of general trust and respect
for rules. This indicates that our measure of particularism is qualitatively
robust to alternative definitions. In the following analysis, we thus focus on
the indicator particularism as the key explanatory variable, while the alter-
native indicators of particularism are used for assessing the robustness of the
results.
The theoretical model presented in Section 2.3 provides a number of rele-
vant testable predictions. First, at the individual level, particularism decreas-
eses the psychological cost of bribing. As a consequence, being particularist
20Overall, an individual has strong family ties when he declares that: (1) A person’s
family ought to be his or her main priority in life and that (2) when choosing a job is
important that it allows to combine work and family.
21As for trust, we considered the standard question “Generally speaking, would you
say that most people can be trusted?”, while respect for general laws was proxied by the
answer to the question: “How much do you agree or disagree with this statement about
how people see rules and laws: It is important to follow rules ”.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Offered bribe 0.02 0.13 0 1 45503
Been asked for bribe 0.05 0.21 0 1 43074
Bribe wrong 0.96 0.19 0 1 45419
Particularism 0.14 0.35 0 1 44811
Particularism2 0.14 0.35 0 1 44811
Particularism3 0.51 0.5 0 1 44811
Particularism4 -1.18 1.63 -4 4 44811
Particularism5 0.05 0.22 0 1 46955
Particularism6 0.02 0.15 0 1 46955
Gender 0.46 0.5 0 1 46955
Age 46.48 18.4 13 102 46714
Age squared 2498.82 1812.09 169 10404 46714
Education 11.5 4.07 0 44 46398
Employed 0.5 0.5 0 1 46955
Married 0.53 0.5 0 1 44941
Family members 2.87 1.5 1 18 46926
Income 2.02 0.86 1 4 44418
Minority ethnic group 1.96 0.2 1 2 46015
Immigrant 0.06 0.24 0 1 46585
Son of immigrants 0.02 0.15 0 1 46585
Big city 0.2 0.4 0 1 46846
Suburbs big city 0.12 0.33 0 1 46846
Village 0.3 0.46 0 1 46846
Friends support 1.6 0.76 1 4 35532
Political interest 2.67 0.9 1 4 46803
Follow rules 3.94 1.35 1 6 43676
Trust 5.92 2.48 1 11 46762
Trust in legal system 6.18 2.62 1 11 45567
Trust in public officials 3.21 0.92 1 5 44038
Religiosity 5.89 2.99 1 11 46624
Risk 3.97 1.45 1 6 43970
Male role index 3.41 0.77 1 5 44738
Admired 3.23 1.38 1 6 43876
Honesty 3.17 1.2 1 5 45053
Corruption Diffusion 35.11 49.7 1 203 46955
COC 1.4 0.85 -0.33 2.59 46955
CPI 6.73 2.03 3.2 9.70 46955
European unification 6.28 2.67 1 11 42451
Important care nature 4.86 1.03 1 6 44051
Source: European Social Survey, 2004-2006. See Section 2.4 for a description of the
variables.
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increases the probability of offering a bribe and, to the extent that particular-
ism is observable, also the probability of being asked for a bribe. Second, at
the aggregate level, corruption deterrence decreases the probability of offering
and being asked for a bribe, while the pervasiveness of corruption increases
the probability of offering and being asked for a bribe. Third, focusing on
moderating factors, the effect of individual particularism on the probability
to offer a bribe is higher in countries where corruption or particularism are
more widespread, while it is lower in countries where corruption deterrence
is stronger.
2.5 Results
This section presents the results of the empirical analysis. We start by using
univariate probit models to estimate the effect of particularism on the prob-
ability of offering and being asked for a bribe, respectively. We focus on the
effect of particularism, while controlling for a wide set of control variables, at
both individual and country level. Standard errors are clustered by country,
in order to take into account the nested structure of the data (individual
level within country level), and the use of aggregate variables in a micro-
level specification. We then present the results of Instrumental Variables
and Propensity Score estimation to validate the causal interpretation of our
findings. Finally, we turn to a structural equation model to explicitly address
the simultaneous relationship between particularism, the psychological cost
of bribing and the decision to offer a bribe.
2.5.1 The Determinants of Bribing
Table 2.2 reports probit estimation results (marginal effects multiplied by
100) for the determinants of the decision to offer a bribe. We consider five
different specifications, with progressively larger sets of control variables.22
22It should be observed that the use of larger sets of control variables reduces the number
of observations. However, it allows us to obtain a more complete characterization of the
determinants of the decision to engage in corruption.
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The first specification includes only standard socio-demographic character-
istics, such as age, years of schooling, gender, marital and employment sta-
tus, household’s composition, income and minority status. Model (2) also
accounts for immigration status and living context, as well as network char-
acteristics and political interest. Model (3) also includes variables related
to trust (both general and institutional) and religiosity. Models (4) and (5)
include alternative country-level indicators of the pervasiveness of corrup-
tion. Except for these last two models, all specifications also include country
dummies.
Consistent with the theoretical predictions, particularism has a positive
and significant effect on the probability of offering a bribe in all specifications.
The size of the effect is small in absolute terms, ranging between 1.42 and
0.75 probability points, similarly to related studies based on micro data (e.g.,
Mocan, 2008; Lee and Guven, 2013). This reflects the fact that having offered
a bribe has a very small frequency in the sample (about 1.6 per cent).23 In
relative terms, however, the size of the effect of particularism is sizeable,
being larger than that of gender, employment status and all other individual
characteristics. As shown in Table 2.10 in Appendix B, the key result of a
positive effect of particularism on the decision to offer a bribe is robust to
the use of alternative definitions of particularism, as described in Section 2.4.
Focusing on aggregate variables, higher levels of perceived corruption (i.e.,
higher Corruption Diffusion) are associated to a significantly higher proba-
bility of offering a bribe. Stronger corruption deterrence (i.e., higher Control
of Corruption) is negatively related to the probability of offering a bribe,
although not significantly. Turning to individual characteristics, in line with
the literature, institutional trust (in the legal system and in public officials)
is associated with a significantly lower probability of offering a bribe. Being
an immigrant or a son of an immigrant is not significantly related to the
probability of offering a bribe. As expected, being more honest is associated
with a significantly lower probability of offering a bribe, while having a large
23The large size of our sample allows us to rule out the possible bias arising from the fact
that our binary dependent variable describes a rare event (King and Zeng, 2001). Indeed,
using a penalized maximum likelihood regression approach (Firth, 1993), the results are
virtually unchanged.
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number of friends supporting illegal activities is associated with a signifi-
cantly higher probability of offering a bribe (Rose-Ackerman, 2001). As for
gender, we find that, consistent with the literature, males are significantly
more likely to offer a bribe than females (Lee and Guven, 2013).
Table 2.2: Determinants of offering a bribe, probit estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Particularism (d) 1.42∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗
Gender (d) 0.38∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗ 0.18 0.22∗∗ 0.19
Age 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
Age squared -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Education -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04∗∗
Employed (d) -0.26∗∗∗ -0.31∗∗∗ -0.35∗∗∗ -0.39∗∗∗ -0.39∗∗∗
Married (d) -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 0.01 -0.05
Family members -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.04
Income 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.04
Minority ethnic group -0.48∗∗∗ -0.52∗∗ -0.42∗ -0.45∗ -0.36
Immigrant (d) 0.25 0.30 0.13 0.39
Son of immigrants (d) 0.39 0.17 -0.00 0.13
Big city (d) 0.18 0.22∗ 0.39∗∗ 0.04
Suburbs big city (d) 0.20 0.21 0.18 0.09
Village (d) 0.15 0.18 0.25 0.23
Friends support 0.48∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗
Political interest -0.09 -0.09 -0.12 -0.07
Follow rules -0.06∗ -0.04∗ -0.02 -0.00
Trust 0.01 -0.00 0.03
Trust in legal system -0.03 -0.07∗∗ -0.06∗∗
Trust in public officials -0.24∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗
Religiosity 0.02∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.00
Risk -0.06∗ -0.06 -0.06
Male role index -0.09∗ -0.12∗∗ -0.07
Admired -0.01 -0.03 0.04
Honesty -0.22∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗
Corruption Diffusion 0.01∗∗∗
COC -0.29
CPI 0.31
Observations 40456 29202 26645 27066 27066
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes No No
Note: probit estimates (marginal effects multiplied by 100). Dependent variable: binary
variable for having offered a bribe. (d) indicates discrete change of dummy variable from
0 to 1. Standard errors clustered by country. * denotes significance at 0.10 level (** at
0.05, *** at 0.01).
Table 2.3 reports probit estimates (marginal effects multiplied by 100) for
the determinants of being asked for a bribe, using the same set of specifica-
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tions and control variables as for the probability of offering a bribe. Overall,
we find a positive and significant relation between particularism and being
asked for a bribe. This can be interpreted as an indication that particular-
ism, rather than being private information of the bribee, is to some extent
observable (see Appendix A).
Table 2.3: Determinants of being asked for a bribe, probit estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Particularism (d) 2.52∗∗∗ 1.86∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 0.57∗ 0.89∗∗∗
Gender (d) 1.32∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗
Age 0.09∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.05 0.03 0.05
Age squared -0.00∗∗∗ -0.00∗∗∗ -0.00∗ -0.00 -0.00
Education 0.14∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.10∗ 0.14∗∗∗
Employed (d) -0.47∗∗ -0.41∗ -0.38∗ -0.41 -0.50∗∗
Married (d) 0.17 0.45∗∗ 0.52∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗
Family members -0.11 -0.10 -0.12 0.01 -0.14
Income 0.63∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗
Minority ethnic group -1.22∗∗∗ -0.84∗∗ -0.47 -0.44 -0.43
Immigrant (d) 0.60 0.76∗∗ 0.56 1.43∗∗
Son of immigrants (d) -0.10 -0.13 -0.33 0.16
Big city (d) 0.82∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗ 1.95∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗
Suburbs big city (d) 0.26 0.26 0.47 0.23
Village (d) -0.46 -0.32 -0.25 -0.27
Friends support 1.08∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗
Political interest -0.60∗∗∗ -0.54∗∗∗ -0.65∗∗∗ -0.55∗∗∗
Follow rules -0.10 -0.06 -0.00 -0.01
Trust -0.07 -0.17∗∗∗ -0.05
Trust in legal system -0.07∗ -0.09 -0.06
Trust in public officials -1.37∗∗∗ -1.48∗∗∗ -1.44∗∗∗
Religiosity 0.05∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.06∗
Risk -0.23∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗∗ -0.30∗∗∗
Male role index -0.06 -0.21 0.01
Admired -0.17∗∗ -0.32∗∗∗ -0.11
Honesty -0.46∗∗∗ -0.63∗∗∗ -0.45∗∗∗
Corruption Diffusion 0.03∗∗∗
COC -0.40
CPI 1.21∗∗
Observations 38451 28444 26281 26281 26281
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes No No
Note: probit estimates (marginal effects multiplied by 100). Dependent variable: binary
variable for having being asked for a bribe. (d) indicates discrete change of dummy
variable from 0 to 1. Standard errors clustered by country. * denotes significance at 0.10
level (** at 0.05, *** at 0.01).
Table 2.4 reports the results of estimating model (5) in Table 2.2, while
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adding interaction terms between particularism and a number of country-
specific factors: control of corruption, perceived corruption, corruption dif-
fusion and the overall fraction of particularists. As shown in Section 2.3, the
first interaction term is predicted to be negative (i.e., higher corruption de-
terrence lowers the effect of individual particularism), while the other three
interaction terms are expected to be positive. Empirically, all the estimated
interaction terms have the expected sign and are statistically significant.
Table 2.4: Determinants of offering a bribe, interactions with particularism
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Interaction with:
CoC -0.09∗
(0.05)
CPI 0.41∗∗
(0.21)
Corruption Diffusion 0.02∗∗∗
(0.01)
Particularism Diffusion 0.00∗
(0.01)
Observations 26429 26429 26330 26330
Note: probit estimates (marginal effects multiplied by 100). Dependent variable: binary
variable for having offered a bribe. CPI: Corruption Perception Index. CoC: Control of
Corruption. Number of observations: 27807. All specifications include the same set of
control variables as in Table 2, column 5. Standard errors clustered by country
(multiplied by 100) reported in brackets. * denotes significance at 0.10 level (** at 0.05,
*** at 0.01).
In the sociological literature on particularism, Eastern and Southern Eu-
rope are generally viewed as particularistic societies, whereas Central and
Northern Europe are considered universalist (Hampden-Turner and Trompe-
naars, 1997).24 As shown in Section 3.3, the effect of individual-level particu-
larism on the probability of offering a bribe is expected to be stronger where
24According to this literature, Central and Northern Europe have been historically
shaped through the institutions of the former Austro-Hungarian empire that were more in-
formed by principles of universalism relative to Eastern Europe, where the Ottoman and
Communist legacies can be expected to have enhanced particularism (Mungiu-Pippidi,
2005). Moreover, as suggested by Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars (1997), Protestant
cultures are more likely to be Universalistic, while predominantly Catholic and Orthodox
cultures retain more particularist features.
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particularism is more widespread. Table 2.5 reports coefficient estimates for
the effect of individual particularism by geographical area (Southern, East-
ern, Central and Northern Europe). As expected, the marginal effect of
particularism on the probability to offer a bribe is relatively larger in East-
ern and Southern Europe (2.45 and 1.34 probability points, respectively),
where particularism is more widespread, and smaller in Northern and Cen-
tral Europe (0.43 and 0.79 probability points, respectively). The difference
between Eastern-Southern Europe and Central-Northern Europe is strongly
statistically significant (p-value < 0.05).
Table 2.5: Determinants of offering a bribe, by geographical area
(1) (2) (3) (4)
North Center East South
Particularism (d) 0.36∗∗ 0.61∗∗ 2.03∗∗ 0.99∗∗
(0.16) (0.28) (0.94) (0.31)
Observations 10693 8205 5779 5699
Note: probit estimates (marginal effects multiplied by 100). Dependent variable: binary
variable for having offered a bribe. All specifications include the same set of control
variables as in Table 2, column 5. North: Denmark, Finland, United Kingdom, Ireland,
Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden South: Spain, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Turkey.
East: Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia Center: Switzerland,
Germany, Luxembourg, Austria, Belgium, Hungary. Standard errors clustered by
country (multiplied by 100) reported in brackets. * denotes significance at 0.10 level (**
at 0.05, *** at 0.01).
2.5.2 Accounting for Endogeneity
In order to take into account the possible endogeneity of our key explanatory
variable, we estimate the effect of particularism on the probability of offering
a bribe by using an Instrumental Variables (IV) estimator. Given the binary
nature of the endogenous regressor, we estimate a bivariate marginal effect
probit model consisting of two specifications, a reduced form equation for
the potentially endogenous dummy variable for particularism and a struc-
tural form equation determining the outcome of interest. We included two
instruments in the reduced form equation. The first is based on a question
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about how important it is for respondents to care for nature and environ-
ment. We assume that nature and environment are public goods and that
particularist individuals, who have a smaller concern for general interest,
care relatively less for them. The second instrument is based on a question
regarding whether European unification should go further or whether it has
gone too far. As in Uslaner and Conley (2003), we assume that particularist
individuals, who are related primarily with people of their own kind, tend
to support institutions defending national interests, whereas universalist in-
dividuals with looser ties are more likely to support institutions overcoming
national interests.
Table 2.6 reports IV estimation results. In the first-stage equation, both
instruments have the expected sign, although only the first instrument is
significantly related to particularism. The validity of the instruments is not
rejected by a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions (χ22 = 0.909, p =
0.6346). The IV estimate of the effect of particularism on the probability of
offering a bribe is positive and significant. Indeed, the size of the estimated
effect is larger when using IV, suggesting that failing to account for the
endogeneity of particularism may lead to underestimate its effect on the
propensity to offer a bribe.
As an additional way of addressing the potential endogeneity of particu-
larism, we present results obtained by using Propensity Score (PS) matching
estimators (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). These are obtained by using ei-
ther the nearest neighbor method, which selects the comparison units whose
propensity scores are closest to the treated unit in question, or the kernel
method, whereby every treated subject is matched with the weighted aver-
age of the control subjects, with weights being inversely proportional to the
distance between the treated and the control group’s propensity scores. In
both cases, the computation of the Average Treatment on Treated (ATT)
was restricted to the region of common support.25
The propensity scores were computed considering variables affecting both
25Common support ensures that persons with the same value of the set of observable
covariates have a positive probability of being both particularist or non particularist (Heck-
man et al., 1999). Intuitively, this means that there is enough overlap in the distribution
of particularist and non-particularist individuals.
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Table 2.6: Determinants of offering a bribe, Instrumental Variables estima-
tion
Particularism Offered a bribe
(First Stage) (Second Stage)
Particularism 12.55***
Important care nature -0.34*
European unification -0.01
Gender (d) 2.13*** -1.14***
Age -0.02 0.01
Age squared -0.00 0.00
Education -0.15** -0.05*
Employed (d) -0.23 -0.26**
Married (d) -1.18** 0.58***
Family members -0.12 0.05
Income -0.56 * 0.36***
Minority ethnic group -1.93 0.77**
Immigrant (d) -3.09*** 6.77 *
Son of immigrants (d) -2.09 3.05
Big city (d) 0.51 -0.23*
Suburbs big city (d) -0.89 0.69*
Village (d) 2.35*** -0.94***
Friends support 2.03*** -0.72*
Political Interest 0.30 -0.26***
Follow rules -4.02*** 2.36***
Trust 0.17 -0.07**
Trust in legal system -0.93*** 0.49 ***
Trust in public officials -2.14*** 1.00***
Religiosity -0.37*** 0.22***
Risk -1.55*** 0.84***
Male role index -0.85*** 0.44***
Admired -0.58*** 0.36***
Honesty -4.61*** 2.55***
COC 3.76*** -2.39***
CPI -0.11 -0.31
Observations 27038 27010
Note: IV estimates (marginal effects multiplied by 100). Dependent variable: binary
variable for having offered a bribe. (d) indicates discrete change of dummy variable from
0 to 1. Standard errors clustered by country. * denotes significance at 0.10 level (** at
0.05, *** at 0.01).
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treatment and outcome (Heckman et al., 1999), fixed over time, and found
to be relevant in previous research. Moreover, following Bryson et al. (2002),
we preferred to estimate a conservative model with a short list of covariates.
More specifically, the first estimated propensity score is based on religiosity,
gender and education. The second also adds immigrant status, while the
third considers religiosity, gender, education and minority status. The three
propensity scores are calculated by restricting the analysis of the balancing
property to all treated plus those controls in the region of common support.
Table 2.7 reports PS estimation results. The coefficient for particularism
is positive and significant, and virtually unchanged, across all specifications.
Overall, we conclude that the findings are robust to the use of alternative
estimation techniques that account for the possible endogeneity of our key
explanatory variable, and the relationship between particularism and corrup-
tion can be given a causal interpretation.
Table 2.7: Determinants of offering a bribe, Propensity score matching estimation
Nearest Neighbor Kernel
PS 1 PS 2 PS 3 PS 1 PS 2 PS 3
Particularism
1.91∗∗∗
(0.21)
1.91∗∗∗
(0.32)
2.01∗∗
(0.23)
2.01∗∗
(0.33)
1.91∗∗
(0.31)
2.02∗∗
(0.20)
Note: propensity score estimates. Dependent variable: binary variable for having offered
a bribe. * denotes significance at 0.10 level (** at 0.05, *** at 0.01). Standard errors
(multiplied by 100) reported in brackets.
2.5.3 The Psychological Cost of Bribing
Our theoretical model assumes that particularism reduces the perceived cost
of bribing and, through this effect, it increases the probability of offering a
bribe. In order to investigate this causal mechanism, we estimate a structural
model for the simultaneous relation between particularism, the psychological
cost of bribing, and the act of offering a bribe. In the first equation, the prob-
ability of being particularist is explained by a set of individual characteristics,
including age, gender, education, income, family structure, employment, im-
migration and minority status. In the second equation, the cost of bribing
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is modeled as a function of particularism, the set of exogenous variables de-
scribed above, Control of Corruption and CPI. In the third equation, offering
a bribe is explained by the cost of bribing, particularism, and the same set
of individual-level and aggregate control variables.
The results, reported in Table 2.8, support the theoretical hypothesis.
Particularism is associated to a significantly lower perceived cost of bribing.
Second, through this mechanism, particularism significantly increases the
probability of offering a bribe. These results complement the findings in
Tavits (2010), indicating that individuals are more likely to engage in bribery
when they do not view corruption as wrong. Our results thus contribute
to identify the mechanism through which universalism may help to deter
corruption.
Table 2.8: Structural Equation Model estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Particularism Bribe cost Offered bribe
Particularism -5.59*** 1.59***
(0.99) (0.23)
Bribe Cost -1.35***
(0.14)
Standard Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 26968 26968 26968
Note: Structural Equation Model Estimates. All specifications include the same set of
control variables as in Table 2, column 5. Standard errors clustered by country
(multiplied by 100) reported in brackets. * denotes significance at 0.10 level (** at 0.05,
*** at 0.01).
2.6 Conclusion
Reducing corruption is a key policy objective throughout the world. In order
to achieve this objective, it is necessary to have a better understanding of
the causes of corruption. Until recently, economists have focused mainly on
the macro-level determinants of corruption. Much less is known about the
individual-level determinants of corruption and, in particular, about the role
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played by individual cultural norms.
In this paper, we analyzed theoretically and empirically the effects of
the cultural norm of particularism, as opposed to universalism, on collusive
bribery. We found that, as predicted by the theory, particularism lowers the
perceived cost of corruption and, as a consequence, it has a positive causal
effect on the probability of offering bribes. Particularism is also found to have
a positive and significant effect on the probability of being asked for a bribe.
Our results are robust to the use of alternative definitions of particularism,
specifications of the model and econometric techniques to account for the
potential endogeneity of particularism. Overall, our results indicate that
decreasing particularism can be identified as an effective tool for decreasing
corruption. The key question is then how to favor the development of the
cultural norm of universalism as opposed to particularism.
Several studies in social psychology show that an individual builds his
own social identity on the basis of perceived membership in a social group
(Tajfel and Turner, 2004). The intrinsic psychological need for a positive self-
image drives individuals to compare their own group with other groups to
which they do not belong, giving preferential treatment to members relative
to non-members. In this perspective, humans are naturally sectarian and
particularism is a feature of human nature that may not be easily changed.
Our view, as economists, is slightly different. If particularism can be consid-
ered an individual cultural norm, it can be shaped by the social, economic
and political environment, albeit in a medium- to long-run time frame (Bisin
and Verdier, 2001).
Although it is difficult to indicate specific policy actions aimed at reducing
particularism and favouring universalism as a way of combating corruption,
education can be identified as the most promising area of intervention. As ar-
gued by Glaeser et al. (2007), education enhances social trust thus contribut-
ing to overcoming problems of collective action and, in particular, systemic
corruption (Uslaner and Rothstein, 2012). Despite the fact that universalism
cannot be built by political means (Uslaner, 2013) and that trust is highly
persistent over time, since it is transmitted in communities through fami-
lies (Guiso et al., 2008), several studies have shown that schools, rather than
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families, might contribute to increase universalism (Aghion et al., 2010). The
relationship between education and universalism, however, should be further
explored. There is evidence indicating that schools may affect the building
of trust differently depending on their teaching methods (Algan et al., 2013).
In addition, it is necessary to better understand how universalism and par-
ticularism evolve in societies where they are the predominant cultural norm.
Our findings provide a contribution to the understanding of the deter-
minants of corruption at the individual level. However, they can also be
extended to other types of illegal economic behavior. For instance, particu-
larism can be expected to be positively related to tax evasion, since it raises
the willingness to free-ride on others. Further research will have to assess
the role played by particularism and universalism for other relevant types of
anti-social economic behavior.
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Appendix A
It is possible to consider cases where it is the public official who asks the
citizen for a bribe, rather than the citizen offering a bribe to the public of-
ficial. The model presented in Section 3 can be easily adapted to describe
such transactions. In the first stage, the public official internalizes the pos-
sibility for collusion with the citizen and evaluates the costs and benefits
of corruption. As above, given that the matching between a citizen and a
public official is isolated and random, the probability of successful collusion
faced by a public official is given by the fraction of collaborative citizens (β).
The public official internalizes this success rate in his decision, and decides
whether or not to ask for a bribe. In the second stage, the citizen decides
whether or not to accept the public official’s proposal for collusion. In the
third stage, the bribe amount B is determined by bargaining between the
public official and the citizen. The amount of the bribe in equilibrium is
therefore the same as in equation (2.9). The citizen is willing to collaborate
with the corrupt public official as long as:
K −B − qG− µ
θ
[(1− γ)H + γL] > 0 (2.19)
Therefore, given B, the probability that the citizen accepts to collude, is
β = θ
[
K − 2qG− Cp
(1− γ)H + γL
]
. (2.20)
The public official internalizes the probability β that a citizen accepts to
offer a bribe and chooses whether to ask for a bribe or not. Since matchings
are randomly determined, and the sensitivity of the citizen to the social
norm cannot be observed ex ante, public officials do not know the exact size
of the bribe before the bargain takes place. However, they recognize that
collusion can occur if and only if the citizen’s sensitivity to the social norm
is sufficiently small (0 < µ < µ∗). Thus, the expected bribery amount E(B),
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under the condition 0 < µ < µ∗, is
E(B) =
1
4
K +
3
4
Cp +
1
2
qG (2.21)
A public official will ask for a bribe as long as
E(B)− Cp − qG ≥ 0 (2.22)
Therefore, the probability that a public official asks for a bribe, that is, the
probability that a citizen is asked for a bribe is:
α =
∫ ε∗
0
f(ε)dε = ε∗ = θ
[
K − 2qG
(1− pi)H + piL
]
(2.23)
where ∂α
∂pi
> 0, ∂α
∂q
< 0, ∂α
∂G
< 0 and ∂α
∂θ
> 0. These partial effects indicate
that the higher the probability of being detected, or the higher the size of
the fine, the lower is the probability that the citizen is asked for a bribe; in
addition, the higher the probability that the public official is particularist, or
the higher the perception of overall corruption, the higher is the probability
that the citizen is asked for a bribe.
So far, we have assumed that there is uncertainty regarding the type and
the psychological cost born by the citizen with whom the public official in-
teracts. This implies that the citizen’s particularism is unobservable and,
therefore, does not affect the probability of being asked for a bribe. How-
ever, it is possible to consider a setting where randomly matched citizens and
officials can observe their counterpart’s private psychological cost of corrup-
tion. In this case, the game becomes a bribery game of complete information
(Ryvkin and Serra, 2012). Matchings are still randomly determined, but the
sensitivity of the citizen to the social norm and his particularism can be ob-
served ex ante. Public officials therefore do know the exact size of the bribe
before the bargaining takes place. Solving the game as above, and keeping
the same notation, the probability that a citizen is asked for a bribe is
80
αperfectp =
[
θ(K − 2qG)− εL
(1− pi)H + piL
]
(2.24)
if the citizen is particularist, and
αperfectnp =
[
θ(K − 2qG)− εH
(1− pi)H + piL
]
(2.25)
if the citizen is universalist. Therefore, other things being equal, the proba-
bility of being asked for a bribe under complete information is higher for a
particularist than for a universalist individual (αperfectnp < α
perfect
p ).
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Appendix B
Table 2.9: Bribery and particularism, country averages
Countries Offered bribe Been Asked for bribe
Austria 0.016 0.055
Belgium 0.008 0.017
Switzerland 0.003 0.013
Czech Republic 0.075 0.132
Germany 0.006 0.020
Denmark 0.007 0.022
Estonia 0.018 0.100
Spain 0.013 0.026
Finland 0.001 0.009
France 0.008 0.014
United Kingdom 0.003 0.012
Greece 0.026 0.118
Hungary 0.013 0.049
Ireland 0.002 0.017
Iceland 0.002 0.014
Italy 0.020 0.053
Luxembourg 0.010 0.036
Netherlands 0.004 0.014
Norway 0.007 0.019
Poland 0.042 0.122
Portugal 0.013 0.036
Sweden 0.007 0.017
Slovenia 0.011 0.033
Slovakia 0.078 0.143
Turkey 0.012 0.067
Source: European Social Survey, 2004-2006. See Section 2.4 for a description of the
variables.
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Table 2.10: Determinants of offering a bribe, robustness check
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Offered Offered Offered Offered Offered
Particularism2 (dummy) 0.88∗∗∗
(0.23)
Particularism3 (dummy) 0.73∗∗∗
(0.14)
Particularism4 0.43∗∗∗
(0.11)
Particularism5 (dummy) 0.65∗∗
(0.27)
Particularism6 (dummy) 0.84∗∗
(0.41)
Observations 26281 26281 26281 26557 26557
Note: probit estimates (marginal effects multiplied by 100). Dependent variable: binary
variable for having offered a bribe. All specifications include the same set of control
variables as in Table 2.2, column 5. (d) indicates discrete change of dummy variable
from 0 to 1. Standard errors (multiplied by 100) clustered by country in parentheses. *
denotes significance at 0.10 level (** at 0.05, *** at 0.01).
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3.1 Introduction
A large proportion of the world’s poor live in rural areas and for 70% of this
population agriculture is the main source of income and employment (FAO
et al., 2014). In most Sub-Saharan countries agriculture and its associated
industries are essential tools to foster a dynamic and inclusive growth and to
reduce mass poverty and food insecurity. However, using agriculture as the
basis of economic growth requires a productivity revolution in smallholder
farming (World Bank, 2007). This revolution has not yet taken place in Sub-
Saharan Africa where, despite an increase in agricultural productivity, the
agricultural sector lags behind (Evenson, 2003; Krishnan and Patnam, 2014).
Empowering rural people by rising their productivity has been and still is an
important focus of the agricultural economics research agenda (Udry, 2010;
Jack, 2011; Taye, 2013) and, at the same time, it has been the main goal of
several development programs (Christiaensen and Demery, 2007).
Low agricultural productivity may be caused by market incompleteness
such as credit constraints (Fink et al., 2014; Croppenstedt et al., 2003;
Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993), imperfect financial and insurance markets
(Kazianga and Udry, 2006; Conning and Udry, 2007), weak property rights
(Goldstein and Udry, 2008), lack of knowledge and information regarding new
technologies, products and methods and their role in enhancing agricultural
productivity. Several countries have tried to tackle informational constraints
through agricultural extension services, with the goal to include information
transfer from the global knowledge base and from local research to farm-
ers, by enabling them to clarify their own goals and possibilities, educating
them on how to make better decisions, and stimulating desirable agricultural
development (Van der Ban and Hawkins, 1996; Birner et al., 2009).
Despite decades of investment in agricultural extension programs, a gen-
eral agreement regarding their effectiveness is still lacking and the empirical
evidence often gives mixed results, reflecting differences in how the programs
are delivered and in the circumstances of beneficiaries (Anderson and Feder,
2007; Aker, 2011). Several scholars show that extension programs have a pos-
itive effect on several rural livelihoods including knowledge, skills, productiv-
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ity, consumption, and poverty reduction (e.g., Dercon et al. 2009, Godtland
et al. 2004, Praneetvatakul and Waibel 2008, Romani 2003, Maffioli et al.
2011, Owens et al. 2003, Davis et al. 2012) while some others find only neg-
ligible achievements (e.g., Rivera et al. 2001, Ashraf et al. 2009b, Maffioli
et al. 2013). In general, these findings differ according to the technology
and context of project implementation, while the estimation of the impact
of these programs is often hampered by attribution issues, endogeneity and
selection bias. The causal interpretation of the results can be challenging and
understanding how new technologies and good practices are (not) adopted
by farmers is still an open issue (Udry, 2010). For this purpose, the imple-
mentation of monitoring and evaluation tools is increasing at all levels, with
the aim to provide impact assessments. These can be used by implementers
to improve the quality, efficiency and cost-effectiveness of interventions, as
the focus is on the results, rather than on the inputs and outputs. Moreover,
measuring program impacts raises public awareness and promotes account-
ability by stakeholders, while, at a more global level, it contributes to build-
ing knowledge on what does and does not work to reduce poverty, improve
welfare and sustain development.
Assessing the impact of extension services requires to address the at-
tribution issue through the use of identifications which tackle endogeneity
problems. Endogeneity may arise from the fact that allocation of exten-
sion efforts may not necessarily be random across or within localities. For
example, targeting more advantaged (disadvantaged) areas with extension
services may respond to different policy aims, but would bias impact esti-
mations upwards (downwards). Moreover, it could be the case that farmers’
ability or motivation determines their participation to some activities. This
would lead to overestimations of impacts if only more motivated and skilled
farmers benefit from extension activities. Few rigorous impact evaluations
of extension services in developing countries explicitly tackle the issue of en-
dogeneity and self-selection (Aker, 2011). Different empirical strategies have
been adopted, such as quasi-experimental techniques (e.g Godtland et al.
2004), panel data (e.g Maffioli et al. 2011), instrumental variables (e.g Der-
con et al. 2009) and randomized experiments (e.g., Ashraf et al. 2009a).
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Given the severe limitations in data collection and rigorous research designs,
methodological heterodoxy is deemed essential in the study of technological
change and agricultural productivity growth (Barrett and Carter, 2010).
In this paper we assess the effect of an agricultural extension project
implemented in a village in Ethiopia between 2013 and 2014 and aimed at
introducing the cultivation of horticultural gardens along with some more
innovative techniques, products and inputs. The project consisted of a series
of extension activities including training sessions with the preparation of a
show-garden, the distribution of inputs such as vegetable seeds and working
tools. Households then received some technical follow-up visits by local de-
velopment agents. The intervention was targeted to vulnerable households.
In accordance with the project’s theory of change, our main outcome of in-
terest is the level of adoption of new horticultural products. This specific
outcome is crucial to create a new condition where the increased availability
of horticultural products may contribute to a more diversified diet and new
revenues from sale of products.
The impact of extension programs on agricultural innovation, production
and welfare have been thoroughly studied in the literature. Maffioli et al.
(2011) evaluate the effectiveness of the Farm Modernization and Development
Program in Uruguay and find a positive effect of the program on improved
production techniques, such as plantation density and the rate of adoption
of certified varieties. Maffioli et al. (2013) find evidence that extension pro-
grams increased plantation density. However, they find no evidence of the
program’s impact on yields for the period under study. Owens et al. (2003)
find that, after controlling for innate productivity characteristics and farm-
ers’ ability, access to agricultural extension services raises the value of crop
production by about 15%. A positive impact of extension services on produc-
tivity is also found in Romani (2003) in the Ivory Coast. Dercon et al. (2009)
assess the impact of public investments in agricultural extension and road
quality on consumption growth and poverty rates in rural Ethiopia. Results
suggest that receiving at least one extension visit reduces headcount poverty
by 9.8% and increases consumption growth by 7.1%. Davis et al. (2012) esti-
mate the effect of a particular form of agricultural extension service in East
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Africa, delivered through farmer field schools, on the economic and produc-
tion spheres. Results show that farmer field schools have a positive impact
on production and income among women, low-literacy, and medium land size
farmers. Ashraf et al. (2009b) evaluate the effect of an extension project im-
plemented in Kenya and attempting to support farmers in adopting market
export crops by relieving financial and informational constraints. Results
suggest that after one year the program led to an increase in the produc-
tion of export-oriented crops and lower marketing costs; this translated into
household income gains for new adopters.
The present work contributes to this literature by exploiting a mixed
impact evaluation design combining across-villages comparisons, through
difference-in-differences (DID) estimations, with a within village random-
ized (WVR) control trial design. To this aim, we make use of micro-data
collected through surveys administered to 602 households in two time peri-
ods (2013 and 2014) to compare the outcomes of three groups: a random
selected pool of project beneficiaries in the treated village, a random pool of
non-treated farmers in the same area and a pure control group in another
village with similar characteristics. We first exploit a DID design to compare
changes in the dependent variables of interest between treated and control
village across time, conditional on observable characteristics. We also ex-
ploit a WVR design and implement an instrumental variable (IV) approach
to solve the problem of missing or unknown controls, using the random as-
signment to treatment and control group as instrument. These exercises,
taken together, give us upper and lower-bound estimates of project impacts.
This paper partly contributes also to the literature on the effect of ex-
tension services on nutritional outcomes whose link with agricultural inter-
ventions has been widely reviewed (see for instance Berti et al. 2004, Girard
et al. 2012, Masset et al. 2012, Ruel and Alderman 2013).
Our findings indicate that the project has contributed to production di-
versification as the number of households growing vegetables increases by
about 30 percentage points, corresponding to a 78% increase with respect
to the baseline value. We also find a significant increase in revenues from
sale of vegetables and, partially, fruits. However, overall, such changes do
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not seem to influence total revenues from sales of agricultural products in
a relevant way. As far as nutrition is concerned, our results indicate that
the intervention did not produce significant changes in the consumption of
vegetables and only a marginal increase in fruit uptake. This leads, to an
overall irrelevant impact on diet diversification. We provide some possible
contextual reason for such results.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows: section 3.2
presents the context and the project intervention. Section 3.3 presents sam-
pling strategy and estimation methodology. Section 3.4 reports the results
and discussion of the impact evaluation exercise while section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Context and project intervention
Ethiopia is the second-most populous country in Sub-Saharan Africa with a
population of about 90 million (Malik, 2013) and a population growth rate of
2.6% (Michael and Lars Christian, 2013). One of the world’s oldest civiliza-
tions, Ethiopia is also one of the world’s poorest countries with a per capita
income of 470 dollars, substantially lower than the regional average (Gross
National Income, Atlas Method). The Ethiopian economy has experienced
strong growth over the past decade, averaging 10.9% per year in 2004/05 -
2012/13 compared to the regional average of 5.3%. Expansion of the services
and agricultural sectors account for most of this growth, while manufacturing
sector performance was relatively modest.2 Agriculture remains mainly tra-
ditional and employs more than 80% of the national labor force, accounting
for 45% of GDP and 85% of export revenues. Ethiopia is an interesting case
study with respect to extension services. In fact, the Ethiopian government
has directed for a long time its growth strategy on agriculture by investing
close to 1% GDP on these programs (DFID, 2014).
The Siraro district is located in the south-west of the Federal state of
Oromia, with a population of around 167,785 inhabitants (CSA, 2014). Sir-
aro is a typical area of the Ethiopian plateau, characterized by an altitude
2http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia
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ranging from 1500 to 2300 meters above sea level. 51.8% of land is arable
or cultivable while 1.8% is dedicated to pasture and 4.7% is characterized
by forests. The remaining 41.6% is considered swampy, degraded or oth-
erwise unusable. Agriculture is the main activity in the district especially
in remote areas. In line with the rest of the country, in the Siraro district
there are two crop production seasons referred to as the meher (or main) and
belg (short rain). The meher season starts in June and extends to October
with the highest concentration in July and August. The belg season most
often refers to a small but timely rain season, which normally occurs from
February to May. The study area includes two villages in the Siraro district,
Ropi and Alemtena, located about 10 Km apart. Life expectancy is around
45 years and average age of the population is 16 years. The villages show a
substantial shortage of services (e.g. water supply systems, schools, offices,
health services, etc). Considering health, three main problems are reported:
malaria, malnutrition and water borne diseases. While malaria is reported
only during a few months of the year, water borne diseases and malnutrition
cases are present permanently. The incidence of malnutrition appears to be
particularly relevant for children.
The project first provided eligible farmers with two training sessions which
took place in 2013 and 2014, lasting three days and focusing on horticultural
process of vegetables and fruits. The vegetables introduced were cabbage,
onion, beetroots and carrot along with papaya. Theoretical sessions about
the advantages of vegetable and fruit production to improve household wel-
fare were accompanied by the preparation of show-gardens. A specialist from
the local health center was invited to illustrate the nutritional properties of
vegetables and fruits. Farmers were also trained about the correct use of
pesticides, both natural and chemical, to control for major pests and dis-
eases. Some training about soil fertility management, compost making and
post-harvest practices was also provided. Participants had the possibility to
receive the seeds of the plants discussed in the training sessions and some
agricultural tools (hoes and racks). Upon receiving the training and the
inputs, farmers were visited by project staff (in collaboration with the lo-
cal development office and its experts at district level) in order to receive
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a technical follow-up on garden maintenance and on the implementation of
the techniques explained during the training, such as seed beds preparation,
compost and pesticide making, etc. During the visit, a qualitative assessment
of the state of the garden and of the implementation of soil fertility manage-
ment was made by the project staff. The project intervention was designed
and implemented by the Italian Center for Children Aid (CIAI), an Italian
NGO which has been engaged in cooperation and development activities in
Ethiopia since 2003 and which started operating in the municipality of Ropi
in 2011.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
3.3.1 Sampling and data
The project was intended to target 250 farmers, 25% of which female-headed
households, 8% of model farmers3, the rest being male-headed, owning at
least some land and household size between 5 and 8 members. The first
step of the sampling procedure was the selection of beneficiaries farmers
in the treated village, following project guidelines. A list of 545 potential
beneficiaries satisfying the required criteria was constructed by field project
staff, based on local administrative data. Based on the available information,
we stratified the sample with respect to per capita land, dividing total land
by household size (which we partitioned in tertiles) and gender of the head.
We randomly selected from each cell proportionally in order to reach the
targeted composition of beneficiaries, for a total of 250 households. The
control group in the treated village was randomly selected from the pool
of remaining households for each stratum and was drawn with the same
proportion employed for the treatment group. The control group was formed
by a sample of 121 households.
For the control group in the control village (Alemtena) we started from a
3Farmers officially recognized as the most innovative and more productive in the area
by government development agents.
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list of 425 farmers provided by local authorities, we adopted the same strat-
ification criteria (using the same threshold levels of per capita land) as in
the treated village. The sample included a total of 250 households. Unfor-
tunately, the administrative data on which we based the sampling revealed
to be slightly different from the actual data collected through surveys. As
a consequence, the composition of eligible beneficiaries was slightly different
from the initial project objectives.
The baseline survey was conducted in June 2013 before project activities
had started, by 10 local enumerators and it included 485 observations: 244 in
the treated village and 241 in the control one. Due to financial constraints,
only treatment households in the treated village could be surveyed at the
baseline.
15 questionnaires could not be included in the analysis and were discarded
due to the low quality of data and unreliability of information. The follow-
up survey was conducted in November 2014. 481 households visited at the
baseline could be successfully tracked, of which 242 in the treated village and
239 in the control one. The very small extent of attrition4 (less than 1%)
and mean comparisons of baseline characteristics between attrited and non-
attrited sample lead us to rule out that the final sample of analysis differed
significantly from the initial sample of analysis. At the follow-up we also
administered the questionnaire to 121 households in the control group in
Ropi.
Questionnaires were administered on paper and in local language to the
head of the household. In 93% of cases the respondent was the head of house-
hold; in the remaining cases the wife (or another key informant) answered
the questions, due to the unavailability of the head. Quality and coherence of
filled questionnaires were checked by research assistants who also dealt with
data-entry using Census and Survey Processing System (CSPro). Data were
then cleaned and datasets for analysis were created using Stata software.
Descriptive statitistics were produced by computing means and differences
in means (using Student’s t-tests) across different samples.
4The main reason for the inability to track households is due to change of place of
residence of the family
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3.3.2 Difference-in-Differences (DID)
We first estimate the project impact by using the DID estimator. This
method compares the change in the dependent variables of interest in the
treated village between two points in time, before and after the project
implementation, to the change in the same outcomes in the control area,
conditional on observed characteristics. DID relies on the assumption that,
conditional on observables, the evolution of the outcomes in treated and
control areas would have been the same in the absence of the project, or,
equivalently, that any difference in the relevant outcomes between treated
and control areas due to unobserved factors is fixed over time (e.g Heckman
et al. 1997, Abadie 2005).5 We estimate the effect of the project on the out-
come Yi using repeated cross-section data. More explicitly, we estimate the
following regression with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)6:
Yit = β0 + β1Pi + β2t+ β3(Pit) + γxi + εit (3.1)
where Pi is a dummy variable equal to one for treatment village (Ropi)
and zero for the control one (Alemtena), t is equal to one for post-program
and to zero for pre-program. The coefficient attached to the interaction term,
β3, is the parameter of interest and gives the DID estimate of the average
effect of the project on outcome Y. β0 is a constant term, β1 is the treat-
ment group specific effect which accounts for average permanent differences
between treatment and control individuals, β2 gives the time trend effect
common to control and treatment groups, while xi is a vector of head and
household observable baseline characteristics including household’s charac-
teristics (households’ size, number of children below five in the household,
size of the land owned), head of the household characteristics (whether the
head is female, whether he/she lives in couple, his/her age, his/her grade of
schooling and whether he is a model farmer), participation in the program
and in social activities (whether the household has received at least one
5This is also known as the parallel trend assumption and means that unobserved char-
acteristics affecting program participation do not vary over time with treatment status.
6Heckman and Robb (1985)
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visit from development agents, whether the household has benefitted from
other support programs, whether the household participates in community
based organizations (CBO)7 and whether the head knows any model farmer).
Among the controls we also included the average monthly household’s income
quintiles and a wealth index computed using Principal Component Analy-
sis (PCA) as suggested by Filmer and Pritchett (2001)8, by aggregating the
information on all assets possessed by the households in a single synthetic
index.
While the assignment to the treatment has followed some controlled cri-
teria, there are several reasons why the effective treatment status may be the
outcome of some selection process, which goes beyond our control and may
hinder the impact evaluation exercise. First of all, among eligible farmers
treatment provision was not uniform and homogeneous for all the beneficia-
ries. A non-random sub-sample received inputs in Summer 2013, a larger
sub-sample of eligible farmers received it in Spring 2014, while a relatively
small amount of individuals did not receive any project intervention. More-
over, it could be that only more motivated farmers have participated in the
training session or may have shown interest in receiving as many inputs as
possible. The level of farmers’ motivation is a typical unobservable variable
which may affect both the likelihood of receiving the intervention and the
7CBOs are non-profit groups working at local level to improve life of residents through
the provision of services to their members, such as credit and saving opportunities or re-
ciprocal financial support during moments when extraordinary expenditures are required,
such as funerals. They can also be focused on human services, natural environment con-
servation or restoration, and urban environment safety and revitalization.
8Formally, the wealth index uses the first principal component of the set of introduced
variables. The use of the first principal component yields a wealth index that assigns a
larger weight to assets that vary the most across households so that an asset found in all
households is given a weight of zero. The first principal component or wealth index can
take positive as well as negative values. The categorical variables expressing house facilities
such as toilet and water facilities are transformed into ordinal variables and treated as
continuous, as suggested by the literature (Vyas and Kumaranayake, 2006). The items
considered in the index are: toilet facilities, drinking water facilities, N. of sleeping rooms in
the dwelling, hoes, ploughs, granaries, bikes, motorbikes, mobile phones, big-size animals
(donkeys, horses, cattle), mid-size animals (goats, sheep), small-size animals (poultry),
beds, tables and chairs, kitchen appliances (jerry cans, pots, pans, fans, stoves), energy
sources (batteries, generators), other appliances (sewing machines, iron, wheelbarrow,
kettle, radio).
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final outcomes of interest, for example the adoption of improved techniques
and products. In such case we would not be able to disentangle the effect
of farmers’ motivation from the effect of the project. It could also be that
the project staff decided to put more effort in supporting either more skilled
and quick learners, as the task would be easier or the more disadvantaged
ones (for personal or institutional reasons). Again, it would be hard to dis-
tinguish the effect of the selective effort from the real treatment effect. Since
we cannot rule out that any of such processes occurred in our study, we eval-
uate the Intention to Treat Effect (ITT) in (3.1), by considering the overall
group of households eligible to receive project activities. The results are
therefore being interpreted as the effect of being eligible to participate in the
treatment.
Then, in order to check the potential heterogeneous effect of different
levels of program take-up we create three categories corresponding to differ-
ent degrees of program intensity: one corresponds to the uptake of the full
package of project activities (participation in training, provision of tools and
seeds, at least one technical follow-up visit), the second characterizes farm-
ers who were not exposed to any activity at all while the third is a residual
category gathering individuals who were partially exposed to some project
activities. Similarly to (3.1), we estimate the effective treatment effect by
OLS:
Yit = β1 + β2Pi + β3t+ β4(APit) + β5(PPit) + γxi + εit (3.2)
where Pi is a dummy variable equal to one for treatment village (Ropi)
and zero for the control one (Alemtena); APi is a dummy variable equal to
one for effective exposure to all project activities, PPi is equal to one for
partial intensity of the project, t is equal to one for post-program and to zero
for pre-program. The coefficients attached to the interaction terms, β4 and
β5, are the parameters of interest and give the DID estimates of the effects of
different levels of program intensity with respect to not receiving anything.
β1 is a constant term, β2 captures group specific effects which accounts for
average permanent observable differences between assigned treatment and
control individuals, β3 gives the time trend effect common to control and
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treatment groups, while xi is a vector of head and household observable
baseline characteristics as in (3.1).
We cannot interpret, β4 and β5 as unbiased average treatment effects of
the project since they incorporate both the true treatment effect and the
effect of some unobservables. Unfortunately, we are unable to disentangle
the two forces (we lack an exogenous instrument), but we can reasonably
suppose that the sign of the bias is positive, meaning that we expect that
unobservables, such as farmers skills or curiosity, are positively related to
both the uptake of the program activities and outcomes. In fact, qualita-
tive discussions with field project staff allow us to rule out that selection of
the most disadvantaged has been in place; conversely, farmers demonstrat-
ing interest towards the project tended to be more involved by the project
staff. Therefore, we are exclusively able to draw conclusions on outcomes
which remain unaffected by the project. In other words, on the one hand
when estimates are significant, we cannot conclude anything, due to the im-
possibility to disentangle treatment effect and positive selection bias; on the
other hand, when estimates are not significantly different from zero, we can
conclude that the project has not impacted the given outcome.
3.3.3 Within village randomization (WVR)
The second evaluation methodology relies on the random assignment of po-
tential project beneficiaries in a treatment and a control group within the
village of Ropi. Randomization ensures that the two groups are on average
homogeneous along all aspects except the exposure to the treatment, and al-
lows us to attribute causal effects of the project to the differences in outcomes
observed. We estimate by OLS the following specification on the sample of
Ropi in 20149:
Yi = β0 + β1Pi + γxi + εit (3.3)
Pi is a dummy equal to one for farmers randomly assigned to receive the
9As mentioned more extensively in the section on sampling, we do not have baseline
data for the control group in Ropi
105
project and β1 reports the Intention to Treat Effect (ITT), our parameter of
interest. xi is a vector of observable time-invariant characteristics, including
head and household characteristics as in (3.1).
WVR approach bears the risk of violation of the stable unit treatment
value assumption (SUTVA), according to which the treatment status of
any unit does not affect the potential outcomes of the other units (non-
interference). In fact, the control group may directly or indirectly benefit
from the exposure to the treatment, for example through the contact and
relationship between project beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries which may
lead to imitation processes. Moreover, some project activities, such as show
gardens, were implemented in public spaces where access was free for all the
villagers. We cannot therefore rule out that spillover effects may have influ-
enced non-beneficiaries outcomes. This fact hinders the attribution of effects
to the project. However, we can safely assume that spillovers are likely to be
positive, meaning that non-beneficiaries may be either directly or indirectly
influenced by the project which may change the behavior in the direction of
the purposes of the intervention. The evaluation exercise would then tend to
underestimate the effects of the programs. In other words, when significant
effects are found, those are likely to be underestimated, being even larger in
reality, whereas in case of non-significant effects, we cannot conclude any-
thing, due to the impossibility to disentangle the true impact effect from the
spillover effect.
We encountered partial compliance issues in the actual project exposure
in Ropi, as some eligible farmers did not receive any benefit from the pro-
gram, whereas some farmers in the control group actually received some
benefits which we can observe, through the questionnaire, beyond the unob-
servable spillover effects. As previously expressed, the mechanism underlying
the effective program uptake is non-random and prone to bias. In order to
overcome such a problem, we implement an instrumental variable approach
(IV) using as instrument the random assignment to the treatment and con-
trol groups. We compute the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE), the
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treatment effect on the population of compliers10, as follows:
Yi = β0 + β1(EˆPi) + γxi + εit (3.4)
where EˆPi represents the effective treatment exposure and reports the fitted
values of the first step regression (using a two stage least squares proce-
dure) in which the effective treatment status is regressed on Pi, the random
assignment to treatment variable.
The main purpose of both DID and WVR approaches is to assess aver-
age treatment effects on the outcomes of relevance. However, effects may
not be necessarily homogeneous throughout the distribution: there might be
some classes of individuals who benefit more or less from the intervention.
Throughout both methodologies, we explore the existence of heterogeneous
effects across some observable characteristics linked to the extent of house-
hold vulnerability, by running regressions as in (3.1) and (3.3) on different
sub-samples linked to the amount of land owned (above and below the me-
dian) and the level of wealth (above and below the median of a wealth index).
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Descriptive statistics
Household characteristics
Table 3.1 show the characteristics of household heads and their families mea-
sured in 2013, during the baseline survey.11 Sample differences in initial
conditions between the village of Ropi (treated) and Alemtena (control) are
reported in column 4. Lack of significance in sample differences means very
10See Angrist et al. (1996) for more details on the methodology
11In the case of Ropi control, variables are measured in 2014. In most cases, the variables
reported change very slowly in time and are unlikely to be influenced by the project
intervention. As a precautionary measure, we asked respondents to date changes of time-
variant variables and to repeat comparison of samples on the same time horizon. Results
do not vary significantly.
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similar initial conditions for treatment and control individuals. Since sam-
ple selection of households in Ropi and Alemtena was based on limited and
possibly imprecise administrative data, the two samples differ along some
characteristics. However, DID approach is such that, as long as differences
are assumed constant over time, they do not influence the estimation of treat-
ment effects. Conversely, the use of randomization in the sample selection of
individuals in treatment and control groups in Ropi should guarantee that
the two groups are identical, on average, across observable and unobservable
characteristics, as they only differ in the eligibility to receive the treatment.
In the impossibility to show sample differences at the baseline, because we
do not have baseline data for Ropi control, we only present differences of
variables which are not supposed to change over time. A successful ran-
domization should lead to no significant differences between treatment and
control group, however, small sample problems could determine the presence
of significant differences. Differences across samples in Ropi are reported in
column 5.
Agriculture is the main income generating activity: 90% of the sample
works in agriculture, while slightly less than 1% works in the formal sector
as public servant, for private companies or NGOs and 2% works in the in-
formal sector, for example running small businesses. Data reveal that even
those whose main income generating activity is not agriculture spend some
time in growing crops. Income is measured as the sum of all monthly in-
come sources of the household. The average income is 454 BIRR ($ 22) in
Ropi and 330 BIRR ($ 16) in Alemtena. The difference varies significantly
between sub-samples. The wealth index does not differ significantly across
groups. Household heads were asked whether they had received any type
of agricultural support provided by NGOs or government in the previous
seasons and visits by development agents, governmental extension and agri-
cultural support providers employed by local authorities. With respect to
these variables, averages seem to diverge between Ropi and Alemtena (mea-
sured at the baseline) and between Ropi and Ropi Control (measured at the
follow-up).
The average household is composed of six members of whom at least
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one child is less than 5. Land is owned by farmers in almost all our sam-
ples. On average, each household own 0.80 hectares. The difference between
the amounts of land owned varies significantly among sub-samples: in Ropi,
households owns about 0.15 hectares more than in the comparison groups.
Female-headed households are about 20% in both Ropi and Alemtena, al-
though they are under-represented in Ropi control. Household heads are
about 40 years old and have completed an average of less than 2 years of
schooling, however in general in each household at least one member is able
to read and to write.
On average, about 10% of our sample is composed of model farmers.
Over 80% of the farmers know at least one model farmer. Almost all the
households in the sample participate, with some members (normally, but
not necessarily the head) in community-based organizations (CBOs). About
19% are members of saving groups, around 78% participate in funeral groups
while 20% participate in self-help groups. Significant differences in CBOs
involvement arise between Ropi and Alemtena.
Project uptake
According to data collected during the follow-up survey, 93% (226 farmers)
of households eligible to receive the treatment declared that they had par-
ticipated in at least one training session organized within the project. For
those not participating, the most common reason cited is linked to the fact
that they had not been invited or did not know anything about the project.
Among attendants, 82% remembered training and activities on vegetable
production, 34% on soil fertility, 23% that on pest control and 22% on diet.
77% of eligible farmers (187 farmers) received at least one tool for agriculture
(plough and watering can), 86% of them declared that they had used such
tools in the current agricultural season. 82% (199 farmers) declared that they
had received seeds 12 but only 52% had actually used them. 85% of eligible
farmers visited the show-garden at least once. 89% (213 farmers) received
12Among those receiving some seeds, 86% received onion seeds, 96% carrot seeds, 93%
beet-root seeds, 94% cabbage seeds
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at least one follow-up visit by project staff, on average about 2 visits. 6%
(8 farmers out of 121) of the households living in Ropi but not beneficiaries
of the project declared that they had participated in some project activities.
The garden was visited by 23% of the control sample in Ropi.
Based on this information, the beneficiaries of the program have been
classified in three sub-groups according to their degree of project intervention
uptake. Beneficiaries who had undertaken all the project activities (training,
received at least one tool for agriculture, visited the show garden at least
once and had at least one follow-up visit) constitute 64% of the beneficiaries.
Beneficiaries who had undertaken none of the project activities are 4% of the
sample of beneficiaries. Eligible beneficiaries who had undertaken some are
the remaining 32% of the sample.
No households in Alemtena declared that they had been exposed to treat-
ment activity or visited the show garden in Ropi. Only one farmer in the
control village declared that he knew project beneficiaries in Ropi. We can
therefore exclude any sort of spillover or contamination between the two
villages.
Agricultural production and revenues from sale
Table 3.2 provides a characterization of the agricultural sector in the study
area, including both Ropi and Alemtena, and presents the main crops culti-
vated, their main source of seeds, the use of fertilizer, whether the harvest
is sold or self-consumed, measured at the baseline. The most commonly
cultivated cereal is corn, grown by 98% of households. 30% of households
cultivate teff, also known as lovegrass, a particular cereal grown in Ethiopia
and Eritrea, where it is used to make enjera, a local substitute for bread. 37%
cultivate millet. Cereals’ seeds are normally bought at the market and only
to a small extent are already owned by families or come from government
and NGOs. Much less common is the cultivation of pulses and vegetables,
exception made for haricot beans cultivated by almost 50% of the households.
Even for pulses and vegetables most of the seeds are purchased at the market,
except for carrot seeds that are provided by NGOs in 60% of cases. The use
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of fertilizers is quite common for all types of crops. The most sale-oriented
crop cultivated is teff (65% of households declared that they had sold all the
yields of the previous season) while only 1% of the households declared that
they had sold the entire harvest of corn.
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 provide the initial values of outcome variables referring
to season 2012, collected at the baseline in Ropi and Alemtena and the values
referring to season 2014. In table 3 agricultural enterprises are grouped by
main types (cereals, vegetables, fruits, pulses and tubers). Single differences
between Ropi and Alemtena samples for each period are shown in columns 3
and 7, while column 9 reports the double difference, which constitutes a first
raw evidence of the impact of the project. We also show differences within
the treatment and control samples in Ropi, observed in 2014 (column 8).
The initial level of diversification of the production seems relatively low,
confirming the picture drawn from table 3.2. On average, farmers grow 2 to
2.5 different crops (significantly more in Ropi than in Alemtena). Prelimi-
nary descriptive evidence suggests that the project contributed to increase
the variety, which reaches 5 products in the treatment group. Cereals are
cultivated by the whole sample, with insignificant differences across samples
and time. The share of farmers growing vegetables in 2012 is significantly
higher in the Ropi treatment (19%) than in Alemtena (4%). Shares increase
in both samples across time, however such growth is much higher in the
Ropi treatment group (the share reaches 81%), compared to both Alemtena
(31%) and in the Ropi control group (46%). All the products introduced by
the project are influencing the total number of products cultivated which in-
creases as does the share of households cultivating vegetables. In particular,
cabbage is grown by 70% of the households (40% more than in the control
group), carrot by 62% (60% more than the control group) and beet root by
50% (50% more than the control group). The share of farmers growing some
fruits in the treatment group also increases significantly, compared to both
control groups and across time, although the difference is smaller than in
the case of vegetables. About half of the sample also cultivates some pulses
and tubers. Despite the presence of sample differences between Ropi and
Alemtena at the baseline, no significant changes in such enterprises seem to
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occur in time among the two samples.
We compute a measure of sales revenues for the entire agricultural pro-
duction and for each crop type. Average revenues from sales range from
about 1000 to 2000 BIRR ($ 48-96) at the baseline. In general, we observe
that the crops having the highest weight on revenues are cereals and pulses
while fruits and vegetables have a marginal role. Ropi farmers get more rev-
enues from the sale of products both at the baseline and at the follow-up,
compared to the control village. A common time trend leading to higher
revenues in the second period in both locations is observed. However, for
cereals, vegetables and fruit the increase is higher in the treatment group
in Ropi (column 9). Compared to the control sample in Ropi, significantly
higher revenues from the sale of vegetables are found in the treatment sample
(column 8). We cannot draw any rigorous conclusion on the impact of the
intervention from such an exercise which remains mainly descriptive and we
postpone the discussion of treatment effects to the next sections.
Food consumption and diet diversification
Table 3.4 shows descriptive statistics on food and nutrition habits. Following
international standards, information is obtained from answers to questions
concerning the consumption (or lack thereof) of different food items during
the week preceding the interview. For the items eaten, the frequency (num-
ber of times within the past week), the origin (own harvest vs markets vs
donation) and the amount spent are also asked.
It turns out that cereals are the most common food eaten by the house-
holds, in their different forms. Cereals or tubers are eaten by all sampled
households at least once a week, on average over six times a week; vegetables
and milk are consumed at least once a week by 76% and by 20% of house-
holds, respectively. Pulses, fruits and meat or fish are consumed by less than
10%. Treated households, after the project intervention, tend to consume
cereals, vegetables and meat less frequently. On the contrary, consumption
of fruits, oil and fats increases. Even the share of households that declare the
consumption of vegetables, fruits, meat or fish at least once a week increases.
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However, this information should be jointly considered in order to have a
clearer idea of the effect of the project on the households’ nutritional status.
A proxy of the level of diet diversification is computed as the simple sum
of food types (out of a list of 16 Ethiopian common items included in the
questionnaire) which have been eaten at least once in the previous 7 days.
Out of 16 types, the average is around 5 at the baseline (slightly higher in
the treatment than in the control group), while it grows significantly to 7
and 6.3 at the follow-up in the treatment and control groups, respectively.
We also compute the Household Dietary Diversity Score (HDDS) - developed
by the Food and Nutrition Technical Assistance Project (FANTA) - which
corresponds to the number of different food groups (out of 12), consumed
over the past 7 days (Swindale and Bilinsky, 2006). The HDDS food groups
are constructed as follows: main staples are disaggregated into two groups
(cereals, and roots and tubers), meat, fish and eggs group is disaggregated
into its three subgroups; and there is a group for “other foods” , such as
condiments, coffee, or tea. The HDDS does not vary significantly between
treatment and control group neither at the baseline, nor at the follow-up.
3.4.2 Results
Agricultural production and revenues from sale
Table 3.5 reports the results related to agricultural production and revenues
from sale. Within the DID evaluation exercise, column 1 reports ITT as
described in (3.1), column 2 and 3 show the coefficient of interest described
in (3.2). For what concerns the WVR exercise, column 4 and 5 report the
ITT and LATE coefficients described in (3.3) and (3.4), respectively. The
project induces a strongly significant increase in the share of farmers cultivat-
ing vegetables by over 33 percentage points, confirmed in all specifications.
Such a result is likely to be driven by the introduction of the horticultural
products promoted and distributed within the project intervention, as wit-
nessed by the increase in farmers growing cabbage (+22 percentage points),
carrot (over 50 percentage points), onion (+28 percentage points), beet root
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(between 34 and 50 percentage points). The increase in the probability of
growing fruits appears lower than vegetables, around 7 percentage points,
but it is not confirmed in the within village analysis. In general, the project
seems to contribute to a larger product differentiation, as the total number
of cultivated products significantly increases by almost 2 items.
Evidence suggests that the number of households which does not sell any
product to the market and uses it for self-consumption tends to increase
significantly by a range between 8 and 19 percentage points. Concerning
sales of products and consequent revenues, we observe a significant increase
in the revenues from sale of vegetables, estimated around 150 and 200 BIRR
(corresponding to $ 7.2-9.6 per harvest). We find suggestive evidence, not
confirmed throughout all specifications, of increases in revenues from sale of
cereals and decreases in revenues from sale of pulses and tubers. Overall, such
effects lead to no significant changes in total revenues from sale of agricultural
products.
The analysis of heterogeneous effects along different levels of owned land
and wealth does not point to any significant difference between sub-samples.13
It is worth noticing that the five different specifications provide rather
similar results in terms of size of coefficients and statistical significance. In
particular, in DID specifications no statistical significant difference arises
from the comparison of coefficients, meaning that there were no observ-
able relevant differences in outcomes depending on different project inten-
sity. Moreover, ITT and biased ATT estimates are not significantly different
from each other, indicating a relatively low level of endogenous unobservable
selection.
Estimates from WVR are smaller than DID ones. The former indeed
represent lower bounds, given the likely presence of positive spillover effects.
ITT and LATE coefficients are relatively similar given the high explanatory
power of the instrument in the first step, being around 0.8 throughout the
different specifications with a level of significance never above 0.01.14
13Results are not shown but are available upon request
14Results of the first steps are not shown, but are available upon request
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Food consumption and diet diversification
Table 3.6 shows the estimated effects of the project on food consumption
and diet diversification. There is no evidence of project impact on diet di-
versification, as measured by the number of food types eaten in the previous
seven days and summarized in the HDDS. By looking at the effects for dif-
ferent food categories, we find that no relevant changes occur neither along
the extensive nor in the intensive margin consistently across both estimation
approaches. DID estimation suggests slight reductions in the frequency of
cereals and milk uptake and an increase in the share of people consuming
fruits, oil and fats. Such results, however, are not confirmed in the WVR de-
sign. It is worth pointing out that, assuming positive within village spillover
effects, WVR provides overestimates of the treatment effect. The only signif-
icant effect arising from both specifications is the increase in the frequency
of fruit consumption, in a range between 0.2 and 0.4 times per week.
3.4.3 Discussion
Results discussion
The project was successful in inducing changes as consequences of the activ-
ities proposed and inputs provided. In particular, we find that the number
of households growing vegetables increases by about 30 percentage points,
i.e. 78% increase compared to the situation at the baseline. This result, in
line with the literature (Bushamuka et al., 2005; English and Badcock, 1998;
Faber et al., 2002; Laurie and Faber, 2008; Olney et al., 2009), seems to ex-
plain a significant increase in revenues from sale of vegetables which is also
found by Kumar and Quisumbing (2011). However, overall, such changes
do not seem to influence in a relevant way the total revenues from sales of
agricultural products, which remain very much anchored to the relevance of
cereals and pulses. In terms of revenues from sales, cereals and pulses account
for about 88% and 10% of the total, respectively. The role of vegetables seem
very marginal, around 1% (the role of fruits is negligible). As a consequence
of that, the assessment of project impact on households’ economic sphere
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(Table 3.7) does not show particularly relevant results. The project does not
impact on households’ monthly expenditure and on none of its components,
namely food, non-food, schooling, healthcare and agricultural expenditures.
We do not find conclusive evidence of impacts on the share of people saving
and on amounts saved. Other sources of saving and buffer stocks, such as
the purchase of cattle or other animals, do not significantly change as a con-
sequence of project activities. We can reasonably rule out that the project
caused a short-term raise in disposable income which could be used in ex-
penditure for food, health, schooling or saving. Similar results are also found
in the long-run in Kumar and Quisumbing (2011) where a home gardening
project is found to have no impact on food and nonfood expenditure, total
assets, land owned, and per capita household income.
Households’ nutritional sphere does not seem to be affected by project
activities. We do not find evidence of improvement in diet diversification, in
terms of consumption of vegetables. While we find some indication of changes
in the share of households consuming fruits and in the frequency of uptake,
the size of the change remains quite small. This result is not surprising in the
light of the fact that no storage of vegetable products is available in the area
in terms of both processing and conservation. Due to the perishable nature of
horticultural products and the impossibility to rely on multiple cycles every
year (no irrigation is available and agriculture is mostly rain fed), benefits
from horticultural production, both in terms of diet improvement and income
generation, can only be considered for a small fraction of the year. This is
also found in Hirvonen et al. (2015). Moreover, we cannot rule out that
impacts occurred for some particular categories of individuals living in the
household, although the overall effect was insignificant, as in Quisumbing
and Kumar (2011).
Although our endline survey occurred in a period relatively far from the
harvest of the newly introduced horticultural products, our data reveal that
the majority of such products has been allocated to households’ consumption.
Almost 40% and 60% of the households used all vegetables and all fruits
harvested exclusively for self-consumption, respectively. The remaining 60%
and 40% sold part of their fruits and vegetables to the market, respectively.
116
This result seems to suggest that, in line with Bushamuka et al. (2005),
household beneficiaries could, in principle, generate small income by selling
part of their garden production to the market. No households decided to sell
on the market the entire production of vegetables and fruits. When looking
at the products introduced by the project, the pattern is even more evident.
Among 70 and 80% of the households that had actually grown vegetables
and fruits promoted by the project used the entire amount harvested for
self-consumption. It is likely that such increase in self-consumption of new
horticultural products have contributed to short-term improvements in diet
diversification, which the timing of our survey prevents from detecting. This
result is confirmed in other studies on home-gardening interventions (Faber
et al., 2002; Laurie and Faber, 2008; Olney et al., 2009).
Study limitations and robustness checks
Measurement errors are a first source of concerns given that the data col-
lection process is particularly difficult in development contexts, due to, for
example, respondents’ low levels of education, recall bias, misunderstand-
ing caused by linguistic barriers (given the different local dialects present
in the area) or purposely misreporting in the expectation of receiving future
support. However, it shall be noted that such issues, if any, should not be dis-
tributed in a systematically different manner between treatment and control
groups, so that they should not contribute to bias the results. Despite this
fact, self-reported values of land extensions do not seem always compatible
with the amount of harvest declared, given the regional level of productivity.
Thus, we decided not to consider any measure of productivity (like yields per
hectare), given the high level of uncertainty in the measure of land extension
by each crop. Instead, we rely more on estimates of harvested quantities,
as for many products standards of sales and storing exist and are easier to
recall (for example corn is stored and sold in sacks of fixed weight). We are
unable to rigorously evaluate changes induced by the project in productivity
and labor supply within households; we have only indications of an overall
increase of the weekly time dedicated to farming. Such an increase is mostly
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covered by the household head and wife, when present. Qualitative evidence
reveals that all family members take care of the vegetable garden, although
this activity is mostly carried out by women, as the garden is normally real-
ized in the proximity of the house. Conversely, men are usually farming cash
crops in the larger fields, not necessarily close to the house. As a consequence
of these limits in calculating inputs and productivity, we are unable to rig-
orously assess the profitability of growing horticultural products, in relation
to local market prices.
In general, the very early endline survey (less than one year after project
implementation) can only capture short-term impacts, leaving out possible
longer term effects. Consequently, we should take this into consideration in
the evaluation of the chain of changes, whose full development may require
several years.
Concerning methodology, both estimation approaches present limits re-
lated to the assumptions made or to unobservable factors which may bias
the estimates of impacts. A first possible threat to the validity of the DID
estimation exercise lies in the possible presence of sample contamination
through spillover effects from households in the treatment village to those
in the control one. However, since only one household in Alemtena declared
that they knew one of the project beneficiaries in Ropi and no household
living in Alemtena has visited the show gardens in Ropi, we can rule out
spillover effects across villages as a source of identification concern. The
second source of concern is related to the DID identifying assumption for
which unobservable differences between treatment and control samples are
supposed to remain constant over time. In fact, the assumption implies the
absence of village-specific shocks, while the very limited number of villages in
the treatment and control groups prevents from disentangling village-specific
shocks from treatment effects. That said, exposure to shocks does not seem
very different for the two villages, given their relative proximity. We look at
households exposure to negative shocks occurring between the two rounds of
surveys across the two villages, we find that about 50% of households in Ropi
experienced some type of shock, while about 35% in Alemtena (the differ-
ence is significant at 1%). However, by decomposing the previous variable for
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each type of shock, among a list of 13 types, we find that differences across
samples are significant only for share of households experiencing flood (5%
in Ropi, 0% in Alemtena), heavy rains preventing work (8% vs 0%), increase
in price of inputs (8% vs 2%). Overall, the presence of negative shocks to a
larger extent in the treatment village may affect the evaluation exercise by
underestimating impacts.
In order to better compare treatment and control groups, we repeat the
DID exercise, by using propensity score matching. This non-parametric
method allows us to balance the two samples along several observable co-
variates. We construct a propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983)
considering variables affecting both treatment and outcome Heckman et al.
(1999), fixed over time, and found to be relevant in previous research. Follow-
ing Bryson et al. (2002), we preferred to estimate a more conservative model
with a short list of covariates. More specifically, the estimated propensity
score includes indicators of family wealth (the amount of land owned by
the household, wealth index and income quintiles), head’s characteristics
(whether the head is female, whether he/she lives in couple, his/her age,
his/her grade of schooling and whether he is a farmer or a model farmer)
and indicators of participation in the program and in social activities as de-
scribed in section 3.2. We implement different matching algorithms, namely
the nearest neighbor bias corrected matching estimator (k=1) put forward
by Abadie and Imbens (2008), the bootstrapped kernel matching estimator
by Becker et al. (2002), the nearest neighbor (k=4) matching with caliper,
biweighted kernel matching and radius matching with caliper (Leuven and
Sianesi, 2014).15 In all exercises we impose common support and sample bal-
ancing appears satisfactory (the absolute standardized bias16 is less than 5%
for all covariates and the mean propensity score is not different for treated
and control individuals in each of six blocks the distribution has been divided
in). Results are reported in tables 3.8 and 3.9 in the Appendix and appear
15See Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) for a discussion of trade-off among different match-
ing algorithms
16Absolute standardized bias indicates the average percentage difference between treated
and control individuals after matching. The literature indicates 5% as the rule of thumb
for a satisfactory balancing
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in line with estimations obtained with OLS.
Given our small sample and the significant differences between treated
and control households in our WVR design, as depicted in column 6 of table
3.1, we re-weight the observations of our control sub-sample in order to per-
fectly balance covariate distributions in the treated and control groups along
the first three sample moments (i.e. mean, variance and skewness), turning to
entropy balancing (Hainmueller, 2011; Hainmueller and Xu, 2013). It turns
out that none of the results as regards the treatment depend on re-weighting
our sample. Results are available upon request.
3.5 Conclusions
We assess the impact of an agricultural extension project implemented in a
rural village in Ethiopia between 2013 and 2014 and aimed at introducing the
cultivation of horticultural gardens along with innovative techniques, prod-
ucts and inputs. The intervention was targeted to vulnerable households. In
accordance with the project’s theory of change, our main outcomes of inter-
est is the level of adoption of new horticultural products. As a consequence
of adoption, we also assess project impacts on the level of revenues from sale
and diet diversification. We find that the project contributes to production
diversification as the number of households growing vegetables increases by
about 30 percentage points. Overall, such changes do not seem to influence
in a relevant way the total revenues from sales of agricultural products, which
remain very much anchored to the relevance of cereals and pulses.The results
suggest that extension projects similar to the one implemented in the area
are an effective strategy for the introduction of vegetables and fruits through
home gardens. However, the impact of vegetable sales from small land ex-
tensions, as proposed by the project, remains secondary in terms of share of
revenues compared to the role of cereals and pulses and does not impact on
the total amount of revenues from sales. Although we do not find significant
changes in the diet diversification level measured at the time of our sur-
vey, we cannot conclude that the program failed to improve the households’
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nutritional status. The perishable nature of the products introduced and
their seasonality, combined with the relatively small size of land dedicated to
these crops, the absence of irrigation and adequate storing technologies are
important barriers for the realization of multiple cultivation cycles and the
consequent long-term effects on diet diversification. Arguably, better results
would have been reached by teaching basic storage and irrigation techniques
during the training sessions.
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3.6 Tables
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ropi
(R)
Alemtena
(A)
Ropi C.
(RC)
(R-A) (R-RC)
HH Characteristics
HH size 6.46 6.06 6.16 0.40*** -0.30**
N.children less than 5 1.38 1.40 1.13 -0.02 -0.25**
Size of own land 0.77 0.92 0.63 -0.15*** -0.14**
Head characteristics
Head is female 0.19 0.18 0.12 0.01 -0.072*
Head lives in couple 0.87 0.83 0.82 0.04 -0.04
Age of head 39.97 34.79 38.98 5.18*** -0.99
Head school grade 1.59 1.96 1.61 -0.37 0.02
Head is a model farmer 0.09 0.13 0.06 -0.047* -0.03
Head is farmer or breeder 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.02 -0.02
Household monthly income 454.36 330.59 123.8***
Wealth Index 0.07 -0.06 0.13
Benefit Support Program 0.53 0.80 0.16 -0.27*** -0.37***
At least one visit from DA 0.90 0.93 1.00 -0.03 0.095***
Participation in CBO 0.88 0.70 0.91 0.18*** 0.03
Know model farmer 0.81 0.91 0.75 -0.098*** -0.06
Observations 242 239 121 481 363
Note: * denotes significance at 0.10 level (** at 0.05, *** at 0.01).
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Table 3.5: Project effects on agricultural production DID (Ropi vs Alemtena)
and within village randomization (Ropi beneficiaries vs Ropi control)
DID WVR
ITT ATT* ITT LATE
Full Partial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Agricultural production
Cereals are grown 0.021 0.013 0.024 0.023 0.027
0.017 0.017 0.020 0.017 0.021
Vegetables are grown 0.348*** 0.331*** 0.418*** 0.338** 0.386***
0.048 0.052 0.054 0.057 0.062
Fruits are grown 0.074*** 0.081*** 0.072** 0.024 0.027
0.022 0.027 0.036 0.024 0.041
Pulses and tubers are grown -0.101 -0.084 0.049 0.018 0.021
0.062 0.066 0.075 0.063 0.072
Total number of
cultivated products
1.957*** 1.913*** 2.327*** 1.581*** 1.806***
0.191 0.226 0.252 0.207 0.296
Products introduced
by the project
Cabbage is grown 0.261*** 0.220*** 0.355*** 0.219*** 0.265***
0.049 0.055 0.061 0.062 0.070
Carrot is grown 0.587*** 0.603*** 0.598*** 0.480*** 0.561***
0.033 0.041 0.055 0.049 0.062
Onion is grown 0.285*** 0.307*** 0.283*** 0.189*** 0.243***
0.030 0.037 0.052 0.040 0.057
Beet root is
grown
0.496*** 0.507*** 0.498*** 0.342*** 0.405***
0.032 0.042 0.059 0.054 0.065
Papaya is grown 0.050*** 0.061*** 0.034 0.030** 0.033
0.018 0.023 0.026 0.014 0.031
Total revenues from sale of
Entire production
for self-consumption
0.191*** 0.157*** 0.197*** 0.076** 0.087**
0.047 0.046 0.054 0.030 0.036
Cereals 836.73** 1306.22*** 933.69* -591.34 -675.52
368.332 431.138 509.421 610.745 586.917
Vegetables 173.11*** 171.58*** 220.14*** 145.51*** 166.23***
35.030 41.927 61.208 39.826 62.164
Fruits 3.223* 3.832* 1.952 0.958 1.094
1.741 2.313 1.944 0.954 3.297
Pulses and tubers -449.18*** -251.37* -418.02*** 45.17 51.60
128.007 145.625 126.842 116.524 144.583
Total revenues
from crop sale
565.206 1233.047** 737.387 -397.719 -454.335
413.917 483.916 552.985 638.953 626.535
Observations 962 962 962 361 361
Note: the effects of the program on the variable reported in rows are shown with robust
standard errors reported under the coefficient. DID regressions include the set of controls
as described in section 3.1. * denotes significance at 0.10 level (** at 0.05, *** at 0.01).
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Table 3.6: Project effects on food consumption and diet diversification. DID
(Ropi vs Alemtena) and within village randomization (Ropi beneficiaries vs
Ropi control)
DID WVR
ITT ATT* ITT LATE
Full Partial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
N. of food types, past 7 days 0.329* 0.335* 0.410 0.060 0.066
0.192 0.196 0.256 0.241 0.252
HDDS 0.126 0.207 0.111 0.235 0.257
0.128 0.128 0.174 0.149 0.163
0.044 0.047 0.052 0.039 0.053
Food categories
Cereals at least once 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
n. of times -0.635*** -0.596*** -0.608*** -0.022 -0.025
0.125 0.120 0.149 0.102 0.114
Pulses at least once -0.022 -0.010 -0.056 -0.017 -0.023
0.036 0.040 0.044 0.042 0.048
n. of times -0.086 -0.116 -0.234* 0.039 0.045
0.118 0.136 0.132 0.095 0.143
Vegetables at least once 0.048 0.027 0.095** 0.013 0.015
0.041 0.043 0.044 0.038 0.045
n. of times -0.655** -0.622** -0.375 -0.097 -0.144
0.274 0.283 0.303 0.236 0.298
Fruits at least once 0.136*** 0.122*** 0.223*** 0.058 0.069
0.032 0.035 0.052 0.043 0.052
n. of times 0.281*** 0.231** 0.449*** 0.193** 0.178
0.096 0.097 0.131 0.092 0.115
Meat at least once 0.066* 0.083** 0.069 -0.017 -0.020
0.034 0.039 0.049 0.047 0.049
n. of times -0.054 -0.058 -0.159 0.026 0.029
0.101 0.124 0.112 0.067 0.109
Milk at least once -0.086 -0.044 -0.076 0.052 0.048
0.053 0.056 0.065 0.058 0.066
n. of times -0.445** -0.267 -0.405* 0.146 0.116
0.207 0.218 0.236 0.177 0.240
Oils and fats at least once 0.168*** 0.166*** 0.180*** -0.007 -0.004
0.043 0.044 0.047 0.040 0.045
n. of times 0.201 0.441* 0.384 -0.082 -0.123
0.257 0.265 0.305 0.240 0.311
Observations 962 962 962 361 361
Note: the effects of the program on the variable reported in rows are shown with robust
standard errors reported under the coefficient. DID regressions include the set of controls
as described in section 3.1. * denotes significance at 0.10 level (** at 0.05, *** at 0.01).
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Table 3.7: Project effects on expenditure and savings DID (Ropi vs
Alemtena) and within village randomization (Ropi beneficiaries vs Ropi con-
trol)
DID WVR
ITT ATT* ITT LATE
Full Partial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total monthly expenditure 70.071 118.711 74.140 62.995 76.644
92.784 93.890 98.407 70.288 79.120
Monthly food
expenditure
121.632 154.359** 140.304* -1.859 6.130
74.713 77.067 74.438 51.525 56.956
Total monthly
non-food expenditure
-27.681 -22.679 -49.332 1.451 2.616
30.115 29.631 33.707 30.395 34.311
Monthly school
expenditure
-4.003 -3.062 -1.428 -0.869 -0.830
3.293 2.955 3.571 1.777 2.132
Monthly
healthcare expenditure
1.307 6.259 3.386 14.695* 17.508
8.747 9.480 9.592 8.127 11.576
Monthly
agriculture expenditure
-16.802* -15.103 -17.007 14.842 15.880
9.493 10.455 12.362 9.586 11.757
Other
expenditures
-3.449 0.217 -1.839 30.904*** 31.192**
12.772 13.282 16.199 10.909 14.848
Cash saving 0.022 -0.038 -0.017 0.104** 0.129**
0.048 0.053 0.066 0.051 0.063
Amount saved 73.579 81.810 81.121 -132.094 -150.898
56.773 63.538 98.003 147.157 152.323
Observations 962 962 962 361 361
Note: the effects of the program on the variable reported in rows are shown with robust
standard errors reported under the coefficient. DID regressions include the set of controls
as described in section 3.1. * denotes significance at 0.10 level (** at 0.05, *** at 0.01).
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3.7 Appendix
Table 3.8: Project effect on agricultural production and household expendi-
tures, Propensity Score Matching Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcome Nearest Neighbor Kernel Caliper Biweighted kernel Radius
Agricultural Production
Cereals are grown 0.021 0.021 0.004 0.021 0.021
0.014 0.013 0.009 0.014 0.014
Vegetables are grown 0.348*** 0.348*** 0.866*** 0.348*** 0.348***
0.048 0.047 0.252 0.048 0.048
Fruits are grown 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.083*** 0.074*** 0.074***
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Pulses are grown -0.101* -0.101* -0.709*** -0.101* -0.101*
0.055 0.064 0.254 0.061 0.061
# of cultivated products 1.957*** 1.957*** 2.035*** 1.957*** 1.957***
0.176 0.188 0.648 0.182 0.182
Products introduced
by the project
Papaya is grown 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.054*** 0.05 0.05***
0.018 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.017
Cabbage is grown 0.261*** 0.261*** 0.521*** 0.261*** 0.261***
0.050 0.051 0.037 0.049 0.049
Carrot is grown 0.587*** 0.587*** 0.595*** 0.587*** 0.587***
0.032 0.033 0.032 0.033 0.033
Onion is grown 0.285*** 0.285*** 0.285*** 0.285*** 0.285***
0.030 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029
Beet root is grown 0.496*** 0.496*** 0.496*** 0.496*** 0.496***
0.034 0.030 0.032 0.032 0.032
Total revenues
from sale of
Cereals 836.731** 836.731** 933.928* 836.731** 836.731**
419.796 396.388 493.135 408.045 408.045
Vegetables 173.119*** 173.119*** 300.917** 173.119*** 173.119***
38.564 33.712 116.987 34.098 34.098
Fruits 3.223* 3.223* 3.223* 3.223* 3.223*
1.647 1.738 1.737 1.737 1.737
Pulses -449.183*** -449.183*** -804.455 -449.183*** -449.183***
123.811 122.351 827.649 127.011 127.011
Crop sale 565.206 565.206 434.927 565.206 565.206
458.773 504.603 846.141 458.065 458.065
Note: the effects of the program on the variable reported in rows are shown with robust
standard errors reported under the coefficient. DID regressions include the set of controls
as described in section 3.1. * denotes significance at 0.10 level (** at 0.05, *** at 0.01).
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Table 3.9: Project effect on nutrition, Propensity Score Matching Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcome Nearest Neighbor Kernel Caliper Biweighted kernel Radius
Nutrition
# of food types, past 7d 0.329* 0.329* 0.773* 0.329* 0.329*
0.183 0.198 0.432 0.186 0.186
HDDS 0.126 0.126 0.438 0.126 0.126
0.124 0.119 0.304 0.128 0.128
At least once per week
Eat cereals and tubers 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0***
0 0 0 0 0
n. of times eaten
cereals and tubers -0.635*** -0.635*** 0.231*** -0.635*** -0.635***
0.124 0.124 0.081 0.127 0.127
Eat pulses -0.022 -0.022 0.074*** -0.022 -0.022
0.037 0.036 0.026 0.035 0.035
n. of times eaten pulses -0.09 -0.09 0.153* -0.09 -0.09
0.11 0.139 0.078 0.117 0.117
Eat vegetables 0.048 0.048 0.145*** 0.048 0.048
0.04 0.04 0.033 0.04 0.04
n. of times eaten vegetables -0.655** -0.655** -0.455 -0.655** -0.655**
0.286 0.727 1.1 0.27 0.27
Eat fruits 0.136*** 0.136*** 0.136*** 0.136*** 0.136***
0.035 0.034 0.029 0.032 0.032
n. of times eaten fruits 0.265*** 0.265*** 0.24*** 0.265*** 0.265***
0.087 0.094 0.073 0.095 0.095
Eat meat/egg 0.066** 0.066** 0.103*** 0.066** 0.066**
0.034 0.034 0.029 0.033 0.033
n. of times eaten meat/egg -0.054 -0.054 0.008 -0.054 -0.054
0.091 0.122 0.092 0.101 0.101
Eat milk -0.086* -0.086* -0.339 -0.086* -0.086*
0.053 0.052 0.291 0.051 0.051
n. of times eaten milk -0.445** -0.445** -0.029 -0.445** -0.445**
0.194 0.181 0.317 0.193 0.193
Eat oil/fats 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.26*** 0.168*** 0.168***
0.046 0.041 0.034 0.043 0.043
n. of times eaten oil/fats 0.201 0.201 0.628 0.201 0.201
0.272 0.26 1.241 0.26 0.26
Note: the effects of the program on the variable reported in rows are shown with robust
standard errors reported under the coefficient. DID regressions include the set of controls
as described in section 3.1. * denotes significance at 0.10 level (** at 0.05, *** at 0.01).
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CHAPTER 4
Lottery - and survey-based risk attitudes linked through a
multichoice elicitation task 1
1This chapter is based on a joint work with Giuseppe Attanasi (BETA, University of
Strasbourg), Nikolaos Georgantz´ıs (University of Reading) and Daria Vigani (Catholic
University of Milan). It has been written during a visiting period at the University of
Strasbourg. We acknowledge the project “Attractivite´ IDEX 2013” for financial support.
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4.1 Introduction
Experimental evidence and, thus, recent theories of individual decision mak-
ing have acknowledged the fact there is more to a decision maker’s attitude to
risk than risk aversion alone. Concepts like loss aversion, reference points or
aspiration levels, probability weighting and even violations of stochastic dom-
inance are non-negligible aspects which are jointly or separately accounted
for by modern theories aiming at accommodating previously disturbing and
paradoxical phenomena.
However, several practitioners and the vast majority of experimental re-
searchers seem to rely on risk aversion alone, when (the former) pricing a
risky asset and (the latter) eliciting subjects’ risk attitudes as an explanatory
variable of their behavior in another decision making context. For example,
in more than half of the occasions in which experimental economists wish to
account for their subjects’ risk attitudes as a primary or secondary aspect
of their behavior, the Holt and Laury (2002) – HL hereafter – procedure is
adopted, which is primarily a uni-dimensional test often used to map de-
cisions on a uni-parametric utility function. A different procedure involves
a survey question asking subjects to assess their attitude towards risk (self-
assessed risk attitude). Interestingly, whether this is done by a single question
or with a more complex test like Zuckerman’s Sensation Seeking Scale (Zuck-
erman, 1994), even in this literature the variable used is a uni-dimensional
construct assessing a person’s overall riskiness.
In this paper, we contrast both aforementioned methods, to choices in a
Lottery-Panel Test (Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis, 2002) – SG hereafter
–, this method disclosing more information on a decision maker’s risk atti-
tudes. Specifically, each participant makes a choice among a series (panel) of
alternative lotteries. Four panels are constructed, each one of which provides
subjects with a different incentive (risk premium) to make riskier choices. A
parametric approach to the test can offer a simple prediction on subjects’ be-
havior across panels and is easily comparable with uni-dimensional mapping
on the utility parameter space like in HL. The richness of patterns emerging
as deviations from the expected-utility predicted behavior across panels, al-
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lows us to classify subjects according to criteria which are not applicable in
simple models.
A rather surprising finding that is recurrently reported by different ex-
perimental studies is that risk attitudes elicited through different methods
differ significantly from each other.2 Several aspects of this finding relate to
the mere nature of the tasks. For example, tasks with losses are naturally
expected to capture different dimensions of subjects’ psychological attitudes
as compared to tasks limited to the gains domain. Furthermore, it is rather
easily accepted that tasks covering different payoff ranges would also lead to
significant differences in the elicited attitudes.
The consequences of accepting such differences as natural can be of two
types: 1. those concerning the relation between the elicitation task and
the underlying theoretical decision-making model under risk, and 2. those
related to the usefulness of the task as a method of obtaining an explanatory
variable to empirically capture the role of subjects’ risk attitude on his/her
behavior in a different task. Both issues are largely neglected, not so much
by the studies specifically designed to compare risk attitudes elicited through
different tasks, but by those acting as simple users of the tasks as a method
of generating a risk-attitude related explanatory variable for their primary
data from an experiment.
Regarding the first issue, the most striking feature of a number of broadly
used tasks is their dependence on a single choice made by each subject. It is
straightforward to see why such a strategy is both tautologically consistent
with any uniparametric description of the decision problem solved by the
decision maker, and in dissonance with all modern theories based by defini-
tion on more than the product of probabilities with the uniparametric utility
transformation of the associated monetary outcomes.3
Regarding the second issue, we feel that it can be, at the same time, more
2For a recent example of five elicitation methods and reference to such results, see
Crosetto and Filippin (2015). As in previous experimental studies on the topic, they also
find that the estimated risk aversion parameters vary greatly across tasks.
3Anecdotally, we would like to refer to the case of a referee stating and an editor agreeing
that “to elicit one’s risk parameter from a single choice is not problematic, whereas to
obtain it from many decisions generally leads to inconsistencies”.
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urgent to address and less problematic. This is so, because there seems to
be some consensus on the intuitive but not sufficiently supported fact that
decisions made across similar tasks should be expected to elicit attitudes
which do not significantly differ from each other. Of course, one should
not forget that even the repetition of exactly the same task by the same
individual would most probably lead to differences. But such differences
follow specific patterns, some of which have been documented empirically,4
and even conform to the well-known paradigm of preference imprecision.5
Thus, even when choices by the same subject in the same task over differ-
ent trials are different, attitudes elicited in similar tasks should be related to
some extent, even through correlation of the ranking that subjects received
by their choices in the overall population. If this desideratum is satisfied,
then eliciting risk attitudes as an explanatory variable of behavior in another
task can be considered a meaningful strategy. On the contrary, if any ar-
bitrarily small change of the context produces different attitude elicitations
that are not systematically related across tasks, we risk failing to satisfac-
torily answer to the question “does any of what we are observing in the lab
relate at all with what anyone (even the same subject) does outside the lab?”
In this paper, we aim at shedding light on the reliability of HL, the method
mainly used in the last decade to elicit risk attitudes across a wide array of
contexts and environments. To achieve this goal, we compare it experimen-
tally to another risk-elicitation method, SG, which is made by a series of
four tasks that we think can help us in identifying risk-related attitudes dis-
regarded by the implementation of HL alone. Using the type classification
4For example, regression to the mean has been found to affect repeated choices in the
same task by Garc´ıa-Gallego et al. (2011). Furthermore, Le´vy-Garboua et al. (2012) found
a significantly higher elicited risk aversion in sequential than in simultaneous treatment, in
decreasing and random than in increasing treatment, in high than in low-payoff condition.
Their findings suggest that subjects use available information that has no value for nor-
mative theories. Cox et al. (2014) have rationalized some of these findings by showing the
role of the payment mechanism in these distortions. Indeed, they find that random-lottery
incentive mechanisms – as those usually employed in risk-elicitation tasks – may decrease
the proportion of risky choices in the population, if compared to a one-task design. This
could explain why significantly more risk aversion emerges under multiple-task than under
one-task elicitation methods.
5See Butler and Loomes (2007).
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emerging from the choices made in SG, we want to see 1. whether the correla-
tion between the risk-aversion orderings under the two elicitation procedures
increases, and 2. whether any of these two monetary-incentivized mecha-
nism is a good predictor of self-assessed risk attitudes (e.g. elicited through
a hypothetical question about one’s general willingness to take risks).
We report two rather exceptionally positive findings which can contribute
to a literature full of negative or contrasting results. First, we find evidence
of some external validity of these two mutually uncorrelated risk-attitude
elicitation methods – HL and SG – as predictors of self-reported risk atti-
tudes in general human domains. Second, and more importantly, we show
that sufficiently similar incentivized mechanisms elicit correlated decisions
in terms of monetary risk aversion only if other risk-related attitudes are
disentangled. Considered together, our results indicate that, whereas both
HL and SG are reasonably good predictors of self-assessed risk attitudes, the
use of a more complete description of subjects’ risk attitudes is helpful when
stating the ability of each test to predict self-reported attitudes.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 4.2 we review
the literature on risk-aversion elicitation, and show more in depth the spe-
cific issues on which our study aims at contributing. Section 4.3 presents our
experimental design. In Section 4.4 specific behavioral hypotheses are intro-
duced. Section 4.5 analyzes the experimental results, which are discussed in
the concluding section.
4.2 Literature review
Assessing and measuring individuals’ risk preferences is a fundamental issue
for economic analysis and policy prescriptions (Charness et al., 2013). As a
result, economists and other social scientists have developed a wide variety
of experimental methodologies to elicit individual risk attitudes.
Risk preferences have been indirectly derived from first-price sealed bid
auctions (e.g. Cox et al., 1982, 1985, 1988), or elicited as lottery certainty
equivalents (Becker et al., 1964). Individual degrees of risk aversion have
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also been experimentally measured through asking subjects to input a value
for one of the outcomes of a lottery that would make them indifferent with
respect to another proposed lottery (the so-called trade-off method by Wakker
and Deneffe, 1996).
Survey methods have also been employed, where subjects are asked to
self-report their risk preferences through a series of hypothetical questions
concerning a general willingness to take risks (see, e.g., Dohmen et al. (2011),
for a representative sample of roughly 22,000 German subjects) or a specific
willingness to participate in a lottery (see, e.g., Attanasi et al. (2013), for a
sample of about 10,000 Italian subjects over five consecutive years).
Nowadays, among economists, the most common and widespread proce-
dure to measure risk preferences in the laboratory is to ask subjects to choose
one lottery (single decision) among a panel of lotteries. These lotteries can
either entail a single choice among a set of predetermined prospects, pre-
sented in an abstract way (Eckel and Grossman, 2008), or can be framed
as an investment decision (Charness and Gneezy, 2010), or still can be pre-
sented by means of a visual task, without making any explicit reference to
probabilities (Lejuez et al., 2002; Crosetto and Filippin, 2013).
As an extension of the previous method, subjects were asked to make
multiple decisions between pairs or panels of risky lotteries. This is the case
under investigation in this paper. As a matter of fact, both Holt and Laury
(2002) and Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis (2002) use this last method in
order to elicit risk aversion. Holt and Laury (2002) – and follow-up papers6
– is the most well-known example of a “multiple price list design” which, ac-
cording to Cox and Harrison (2008), was first used in Miller et al. (1969). The
risk-elicitation procedure used in Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis (2002) is
a slightly revised version of the “ternary lotteries approach” (see, e.g., Roth
and Malouf, 1979).
In this paper the two risk-elicitation methods are proposed in a within-
subject design. Besides the original version, the multiple pairwise compar-
6See Harrison et al. (2005) and Holt and Laury (2005): the former demonstrated and
the latter confirmed the possibility of order effects in Holt and Laury (2002) original design
by scaling up real payments by 10 or 20 times.
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ison in HL has been usually implemented with two non-mutually-exclusive
variants. The first one – “switching multiple price list” – was introduced by
Harrison et al. (2005) and studied at length by Andersen et al. (2006): Mono-
tonicity is enforced, i.e. the subject is asked to pick the switch point from
one lottery to the other and non-switch choices are filled in automatically.
The second one concerns doubling the number of outcome probabilities for
which the two lotteries are compared, in order to allow the subject to make
choices from refined options: This second variant – together with enforced
monotonicity – has been implemented by Attanasi et al. (2014a), where HL
is made of 20 lottery pairs instead of 10. The second risk-elicitation method
is exactly the one used in Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis (2002) and in
follow-up papers.7
As anticipated in the Introduction, our choice of analyzing and compar-
ing two alternative methods of measuring risk preferences is partly due to
a puzzling result in experimental economics: The degree of risk aversion
shown by subjects in the laboratory is often varying across different elicita-
tion techniques (see, e.g., Isaac and James, 2000; Dave et al., 2010), although
some correlations are found among monetary-incentivized instruments and
survey-based methods (see, e.g., Vieider et al., 2015).
In recent years, a growing literature is investigating different risk-elicitation
methods, comparing their effectiveness in eliciting risk attitudes in non-
interactive settings. Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2008) review experimental ev-
idence on risk aversion in controlled laboratory experiments. The authors
examine the experimental design of several procedures that allow direct esti-
mation of risk preferences from subjects’ choices, as well as the way to draw
inference about laboratory behavior. Furthermore, they provide an investi-
gation on how the data generated by these procedures should be analyzed.
In the same line, Charness et al. (2013) provide a discussion of a series of
prevailing methods for eliciting risk preferences. They outline the strengths
and weaknesses of each of these methods. In particular, they highlight that
choosing which method to utilize is largely dependent on the question the
researcher wants to answer. Both these reviews of risk-elicitation methods
7See Georgantz´ıs and Navarro-Mart´ınez (2010), and Garc´ıa-Gallego et al. (2011).
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include a thorough discussion of HL.
Among experimental studies that compare HL with other risk-elicitation
methods, two are relevant for our paper. Charness and Viceisza (2015) com-
pare two incentivized risk-elicitation methods in a between-subject design,
namely HL, and the modified version of the Gneezy-Potters method as pre-
sented in Charness and Gneezy (2010). In both treatments, subjects also
self-report their risk attitude by answering a hypothetical question similar to
the one in Dohmen et al. (2011). The experiment was run in rural Senegal,
with the aim of providing guidance to experimenters wishing to use risk-
elicitation mechanisms in the rural developing world. Crosetto and Filippin
(2015) compare five incentivized risk-elicitation methods in a between-subject
design: HL, Eckel and Grossman (2008), Charness and Gneezy (2010),Lejuez
et al. (2002), and Crosetto and Filippin (2013). All experimental sessions be-
ing run in Jena (Germany), they find that subjects’ estimated risk aversion
parameters vary greatly across tasks.
Our work is positioned exactly in this branch of the literature.
Using original data from a homogeneous population of Italian subjects,
we provide an experimental comparison of HL with another incentivized risk-
elicitation method (SG), and a self-assessment measure of risk attitude (a
hypothetical question similar to the one in Dohmen et al., 2011). Differently
from the previous literature, this comparison is made through a within-subject
design: each subject in our experiment goes through the three risk-elicitation
procedures, and we control for other effects. Furthermore, we compare two
multiple-decision methods, while in previous studies HL has only been com-
pared to single-decision methods. In fact, we think that coupling HL with
another multiple-decision mechanism could help shed more light on the reli-
ability of the former.
As underlined above, HL is the most widely used risk-elicitation method
in experimental economic analyses in the last ten years: When risk aversion is
considered as an explanatory variable for subject’s behavior in an individual
or strategic decision setting, a preliminary test of risk aversion (preliminary
with respect to the main decision setting where subjects’ behavior should be
analyzed) is needed. In this regard, HL has a clear advantage with respect to
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many other risk-elicitation methods: Especially when enforcing monotonicity
– as it is more frequently the case in economic experiments – it allows to
completely describe a subject’s risk attitude through just one subject’s choice.
It is well known that this requires assuming that the subject is a von
Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximizer. Many papers have shown
that this assumption is questionable (see Wakker (2010) for a review), al-
though other models (e.g., prospect theory) do not seem to have signifi-
cantly higher explanatory power than expected utility (Harrison and Rut-
stro¨m, 2009). However, the goal of our exercise is not to test the expected
utility assumption in HL. Rather, we are interested in other risk-related at-
titudes that are not taken into account when analyzing HL data, since with
just one choice per subject, by construction, attention is restricted to the
curvature of the uniparametric (Bernoullian) utility function.8 Therefore,
other relevant risk-related attitudes may be disregarded.
The intuition behind our exercise is that the series of four tasks that
constitute SG can help us in identifying some of these further risk-related
attitudes. This is the main reason why we focus on the comparison between
HL and SG. Using the type classification emerging from the choices made in
SG, we want to see whether the correlation between the risk-aversion order-
ings under the two elicitation procedures increases. Furthermore, and more
importantly, we want to check whether, by disentangling subjects according
to these further attitudes, the correlation between a subject’s self-reported
sensitivity to risk and the monetary-incentivized choice made respectively
in HL and in SG is higher. A positive answer to the last question – that is
what we actually found in this paper – should help explain why experimental
economists (rather than psychologists) usually do not rely on self-reported
measures of risk: The hypothetical questions used to let subjects self-assess
their level of risk attitude might hide risk-related motivations other than
8Notice that this problem would emerge also in the absence of enforced monotonicity.
In fact, when HL is performed – as in the original paper – by asking subjects to make a
choice between the two options for each of the 10 outcome probabilities, a subject who
switches from one lottery to the other more than once as the probability of the best
outcome increases, is still considered as if he/she has made just one choice (one switch).
This is done by assigning to this subject as switch point from one lottery to the other the
one corresponding to the number of safe choices the subject has made.
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monetary risk aversion, i.e., the curvature of the uniparametric expected
utility function.
4.3 Experimental design
Participants were undergraduate students in Economics, recruited at Bocconi
University in Milan on October 2013. The number of participants was 62.
Each subject could only participate in one session: Two sessions were run
with 31 subjects each in a computerized room of Bocconi University, with
subjects being seated at spaced intervals.
In each session, subjects faced two risk-elicitation tasks (HL and SG)
on a within-subject base. In the two sessions, the two tasks were shown in
reverse order. Only one of the two tasks was used to determine subjects’ final
earnings: The choice of the task to be paid was made in a random way, by
flipping a coin. Payment was preceded by a questionnaire, which included a
question about self-assessment of risk attitude.
Average earnings were e 15.90, including a e 3.00 show-up fee. The aver-
age duration of a session was 45 minutes, including instructions and payment.
The experiment was programmed and implemented using the z-Tree software
(Fischbacher, 2007).
4.3.1 Task 1 (HL)
The first task was HL with the two variants of enforced monotonicity and 20
(rather than 10) lottery pairs, and set of lottery payoffs as in Attanasi et al.
(2014a). See Figure A1 in the Appendix.
Features of the task
• Subjects were presented with a battery of 19 pairs of two-outcome
lotteries, numbered from line L1 to line L19, and a last (empty) line
L20 (bottom line of Figure A1).
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• Each pair described two lotteries called A and B.
• Each lottery presented two positive monetary outcomes and their as-
sociated probabilities.
• The two monetary outcomes of each lottery were kept constant: For
each line L1–L19, lottery A always had the two outcomes , x¯A =e 12.00,
xA =e 10.00, and lottery B always had the two outcomes, x¯B =e 22.00,
xB =e 0.50 .
• Within each pair, x¯A and x¯B were attached the same probability p,
with p increasing – gradually and monotonically – when moving from
the top (L1) to the bottom (L19) of the battery of lottery pairs.
• Probabilities were framed by means of an urn that contained 20 tickets,
numbered from 1 to 20, the number of tickets associated to the highest
of the two outcomes, x¯k , being independent of the lottery (k = A,B)
and varying with the line. In particular, in L1 the highest outcome was
assigned ticket no. 1; in L2, tickets no. 1 and 2; . . . ; in L19, all tickets
but no. 20. Hence, in the light of a final random draw of a ticket from
the urn, the probabilities of x¯k and of xk were respectively: 1/20 and
19/20 in L1; 2/20 and 18/20 in L2; . . . ; 19/20 and 1/20 in L19.
What subjects were asked to do
Given the battery of lotteries, each subject was asked to choose the switch
line, i.e. the pair of lotteries starting from which he/she preferred lottery B
to lottery A. Thus, for all pairs of lotteries above the switch line, a subject
preferred lottery A to lottery B, while starting from the pair on the switch
line and for all the pairs below, he/she preferred lottery B to lottery A. A
subject preferring lottery A to lottery B for all the 19 pairs, selected the last
(empty) line L20.
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Determination of the subject’s earnings
Suppose that task 1 was randomly selected (by flipping a coin) at the end of
the experiment to determine subjects’ earnings. Then, for each subject the
computer would randomly select a pair of lotteries, i.e. one of the 19 lines of
the battery of lotteries. The randomly-selected line indicated the number of
tickets assigned to the highest outcome, hence the probability associated to
the two outcomes of both lottery A and lottery B.
If a subject’s switch line was below the randomly-selected line, then the
two lottery outcomes for which that subject played were x¯A =e 12.00 and
xA =e 10.00; otherwise, the two lottery outcomes for which that subject
played were x¯B =e 22.00 and xB =e 0.50.
Then, an experimenter randomly drew one of the 20 tickets contained in
the urn (physical implementation).9 The ticket drawn by the experimenter
was used to determine whether each subject earned the higher or the lower
outcome of the chosen lottery in the randomly-selected line.
4.3.2 Task 2 (SG)
The second task was SG as implemented by – among other studies – Geor-
gantz´ıs and Navarro-Mart´ınez (2010), Garc´ıa Gallego et al. (2012) and Garc´ıa-
Gallego et al. (2011).10 See Figure A2 in the Appendix.
Features of the task
• Subjects faced four decision problems. Each problem concerned a panel
of 10 two-outcome lotteries described in three rows. Each lottery had
a positive outcome X and a null outcome.
9See Section 5.3 of Attanasi et al. (2014b) for the pros and cons of physical vs. com-
puterized instruments when generating realizations of random processes in laboratory
experiments on decision under uncertainty.
10In Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis (2002) the payoffs are expressed in pesetas, since
the experimental sessions were run in Spain before the introduction of the Euro as official
currency in the European Union. In the follow-up studies cited above, still run in Spain,
the payoffs are equivalently expressed in Euros.
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• The first row presented, for each of the 10 lotteries, the probability p
assigned to the positive outcome X.
• The second row presented, for each of the 10 lotteries, the positive
outcome X.
• The third row consisted of 10 empty cells, for each subject to indicate
with a cross the preferred lottery in each of the four panels.
• Across each panel of lotteries, neither X nor p were kept constant.
However, p was the same for the same column of each panel: Prob-
abilities were framed by means of an urn that contained 10 tickets,
numbered from 1 to 10, the number of tickets associated to X decreas-
ing with the column number of each panel of lotteries. In particular, in
the first column (leftmost lottery), all tickets were associated to X; in
the second column, all tickets but no. 10 were associated to X; . . . ; in
the tenth column (rightmost lottery), only ticket no. 1 was associated
to X. Hence, in the light of a final random draw of a ticket from the
urn, for each panel, the leftmost lottery represented the safest option
(p = 100%) with the lowest positive outcome, while the rightmost lot-
tery represented the riskiest option (p = 10%) with the highest positive
outcome. Moving from the left side to the right side in a panel, the
lotteries were constructed in order to compensate riskier options with
increases in the expected payoff pX. Thus, the positive outcome X
increases with the column number of each panel of lotteries.
• Formally, each continuum of lotteries was defined by the pair (c, t)
corresponding, respectively, to the certain payoff c above which the
expected payoff of the lottery L was increased by t >0, times the prob-
ability of earning nothing, i.e.
E(L) = pX = c+ (1− p)t ⇒ X(p) = c+ (1− p)t
p
,
where t is a panel-specific risk premium, which generates an increase
in the lotteries’ expected values as one moves from safer option (left
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side of Figure A2) to riskier (right side of Figure A2) options within
the same panel.
• In particular, the four panels of lotteries were constructed using c = e 1
in all panels and t = 0.1 for panel 1, t = 1 for panel 2, t = 5 for panel 3,
and t = 10 for panel 4. Hence, the above formula shows that in the first
column (leftmost lottery) the certain positive outcome was the same
for each panel (X(100%) = c = e 1), while in all remaining columns
the certain positive outcome was increasing in the panel number, being
maximum in the last column (rightmost lottery), with X(10%) being
e 10.90 for panel 1, e 19.00 for panel 2, e 50 for panel 3, and e 100 for
panel 4.
What subjects were asked to do
For each panel of lotteries, each subject was asked to choose one of the
10 lotteries (X, p) that implied a probability p of earning X, else nothing.
Hence, for each of the four panels, a subject was asked to put a cross in the
empty cell corresponding to his/her preferred lottery among the 10 available
lotteries (10 columns).
Determination of the subject’s earnings
Suppose that task 2 was randomly selected (by flipping a coin) at the end of
the experiment to determine subjects’ earnings. Then, for each subject the
computer would randomly select one of the four panels of lotteries.
For the randomly-selected panel of lotteries, the cross put by a subject
in the empty cell corresponding to his/her preferred lottery indicated the
positive outcome of the lottery (X) and the number of tickets assigned to
this outcome (p).
Then, an experimenter randomly drew one of the 10 tickets contained in
the urn (physical implementation). The ticket drawn by the experimenter
was used to determine whether each subject earned the positive or the null
outcome of his/her preferred lottery in the randomly-selected panel.
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4.3.3 Questionnaire
A questionnaire about some idiosyncratic features has been submitted at the
end of the experiment. Each subject was asked his/her gender, age, year and
field of study, previous attendance of an advanced course in Decision/Game
Theory, and a question about self-assessment of general attitude towards risk,
similar to the one used in Dohmen et al. (2011). In particular, the question
was posed using the same wording of Bernasconi et al. (2014), which also
run their experiments with Italian subjects: “In a scale from 1 to 10, how
would you rate your attitude towards risk: are you a person always avoiding
risk or do you love risk-taking behavior?”, where 1 was associated with the
statement “I always choose the safest option and try to avoid any possible
risk” and 10 referred to “I love risk and I always choose the more risky
alternative”.
4.4 Behavioral Hypotheses
Each task is mainly targeted to elicit a subject’s degree of (monetary) risk
aversion, through a different method. However, task 1 (HL) being character-
ized by less “flexibility” in the subject’s available choices with respect to task
2 (SG), the latter can be used to disclose and disentangle other risk-related
motivations.
In fact, while in HL a subject is repeatedly asked to choose the preferred
pair of lottery-outcomes between two pairs with the same associated prob-
abilities, in each panel of lotteries in SG the subject is asked to pick the
preferred outcome-probability combination, with both the positive outcome
and its associated probability being different for each lottery. With this in
mind, our first aim is to use a subject’s four choices in SG to disentangle
his/her risk-related motivations behind the unique choice (switch line) in HL.
A Constant Relative Risk Averse (CRRA hereafter) utility function of the
form U(x) = x
1−r
1−r is assumed to elicit a subject’s (monetary) risk attitude in
both HL and SG, implying risk aversion for r > 0, risk neutrality for r = 0,
and risk proneness for r < 0.
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In HL, given the structure of the battery of lotteries (see Figure A1 in
the Appendix), the higher the number of the switch line (pairwise compar-
ison at which a subject chooses to switch from lottery A to lottery B), the
higher his/her disclosed degree r of relative risk aversion (see Table A1 in
the Appendix). In particular: a switch line from L1 to L9 would reveal risk
proneness (the smaller the number of the switch line, the higher |r|, the de-
gree of risk proneness); a risk-neutral subject would indicate L10 as switch
line; a switch line from L11 to L19 would reveal risk aversion (the greater
the number of the switch line, the higher r, the degree of risk aversion).
In the original version of HL, subjects had to choose the preferred lottery
between A and B in each of the 10 lines of the battery, giving rise to the
possibility of inconsistent behavior at the individual level.11 In our study,
due to the enforced monotonicity feature of the implemented variant of HL,
consistency has been imposed: Picking the switching line directly provided
an interval estimate of the subjects’ coefficient r of relative risk aversion.
Moreover, doubling the number of outcome probabilities for which lotteries A
and B are compared (20 lottery pairs instead of 10) allowed a more precise
interval estimate of r, given the switching line.
As far as SG is concerned (see Figure A2 in the Appendix), an expected-
utility maximizing subject with a CRRA utility function as introduced above
would choose a lottery (X∗, p∗) with p∗ = cr
t
+ r in each of the four panel
of lotteries. Hence, the chosen probability p∗ of the positive outcome is
monotonically decreasing in the subject’s degree r of relative risk aversion:
Safer choices in each panel (left side of each panel in Figure A2) are associated
with a higher r (see Table A2 in the Appendix). In particular, all risk-neutral
and risk-loving subjects should choose the lottery at the far right extreme
of each panel in Figure A2 (p = 0.1 in Table A2). Furthermore, given that
the panel-specific risk premium t increases by construction with the panel
index, all CRRA subjects with a given r should not choose safer lotteries
(weakly monotonic transitions) as they move from panel-1 lotteries to panel-
11As a matter of fact, individuals going back and forth in their choices could be consid-
ered inconsistent with a CRRA pattern: This happened for around 13% (7%) of subjects
in the initial (final) low-payoff task of HL.
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4 lotteries. In terms of Table A2, moving to a panel with a higher index,
CRRA subjects should choose in this panel a lottery not being on the left
side of the lottery chosen in the previous panel.
SG has several advantages that are useful to our analysis. Firstly, the
above-mentioned theoretical predictions also hold for other well-known utility
functions like CARA (Constant Absolute Risk Aversion) or other functional
forms for CRRA, different from the one for which the elicited r in Table A1
(for HL) and Table A2 (for SG) has been calculated. Secondly, SG exposes a
subject to the same wide range of probabilities in each panel-wise comparison,
and to a systematic spectrum of monetary rewards from e 1 (far left extreme
of each panel) to the relatively high payoff of e 100 (far right extreme of the
panel 4). Finally, the test offers a range of different returns to risk so that
a highly-risk-averse subject might refuse to take too risky options when a
higher return is at stake (e.g., he/she chooses p = 0.4 in panels 3 and 4),
while he/she could be attracted by highly-risky prospects when returns are
lower (e.g., he/she chooses p = 0.1 in panels 1 and 2). This is incoherent
with the CRRA assumption, however it can disclose other interesting risk-
related motivations, as we will see in the next section. Thus, unlike all
uni-dimensional tests of monetary risk attitude, SG may be used to classify
subjects not only according to their willingness to take monetary risks, but
also with respect to their propensity to change their “objective function”
across different risk-return combinations. This would help disentangle risk-
related motivations that might explain a subject’s different choice in HL.
Our second aim is to check whether the self-reported assessment of risk
preferences in the final questionnaire is an explanatory variable for the degree
of risk aversion elicited in any of the two monetary-incentivized tasks of our
experiment. Many field studies have shown that asking a general hypothetical
question about the self-assessment of risk aversion is a simple procedure to
estimate risk attitudes of subjects (see, among others, Guiso and Paiella,
2008). In particular, Dohmen et al. (2011) have shown that such questions
are as effective as other common and much more complicated procedures
used in laboratory experiments.
In this paper, we separately check whether the answers to the hypothetical
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question on the self-assessment of the degree of risk aversion relate with the
subject’s choices in HL and in SG. Notice that in the general hypothetical
question proposed in our questionnaire, the higher the selected number in
the 1-10 scale, the lower the subject’s self-assessed degree of risk-aversion.
Hence, this should correlate negatively with the number of the switching line
in HL and positively with the probability chosen in each panel of SG.
Given the relevance of HL for current laboratory experiments on risk
elicitation, we further focus on it: We use a subject’s answers to the general
hypothetical question on risk assessment to disentangle his/her risk-related
motivations behind the choice in HL. Therefore, in the final part of the next
section, both SG and the hypothetical question – together with the other
questions on idiosyncratic features in the final questionnaire – will be used
as regressors in the analysis of behavior in HL.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Aggregate analysis
We observe no significant effect of proposing HL before SG or showing them
in reverse order. Thus, in the following we will pool data from the two
treatments.
The distribution of individuals among their risk-related choices is quite
close in the two tasks: 74% of subjects disclose risk aversion in HL, and
77% in SG (on average over the four panels) disclose risk aversion. However,
this first check is made only at a between-subject level. We must also check
whether, within-subject in the two tasks, the sign of the risk attitude does
not change, i.e. if a subject showing risk aversion (proneness) in HL also
shows risk aversion (proneness) in each of the four panels of SG.
Table 4.1 reports the conditions to be satisfied to pass such test, by
summarizing the information reported in Tables A1–A2 in the Appendix (we
indicate with SG i the choice made in panel i of SG, with panel number i =
1,2,3,4). Indeed, a subject disclosing risk aversion because switching after
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L10 in HL (46/62, 74% of the sample), should choose a lottery with p ≥ 0.4
in panel 1, and a lottery with p ≥ 0.2 in the other three panels of SG. All
other subjects should choose a lottery with p ≤ 0.3 in panel 1, and a lottery
with p = 0.1 in the other three panels of SG.
Table 4.1: Threshold levels for coherent choices according to the sign of r
Switch Line Chosen Probability
HL SG1 SG2-SG4
Risk averse (r > 0.038) L11-L20 0.4 ≤ p ≤ 1 0.2 ≤ p ≤ 1
Risk loving and risk neutral (r < 0.038) L1-L10 p ≤ 0.3 p = 0.1
Figure 4.1 reports the percentage of subjects disclosing risk aversion ac-
cording to the elicited r in HL, which also show a positive r in each of the four
panels of SG, and in all the four panels considered together. We can see that,
apart from panel 1 – where the payoff scale is much smaller than in HL12 –
the majority of HL-risk-averse subjects (always more than 60% in each of the
three last panels) also show a risk-averse behavior in SG. Conversely, among
the few (16/62, 26% of the sample) HL-risk-neutral and HL-risk-loving sub-
jects, almost none discloses the same sign of risk attitude in any panel of SG.
For example, in panels 2 and 3, they all make risk-averse choices. All these
findings are summarized in Result 1.
Result 1. The majority of subjects showing risk aversion in HL also show
risk aversion in the four panels of SG. Risk-neutral and risk-loving subjects
according to HL disclose risk aversion in the four panels of SG.
We now check whether the ordering of subjects’ risk preferences does not
vary too much from one task to another.
The controls for SG work as they should: A significant positive correla-
tion (at least 50%, always significant at the 1% level) is found among the
ordering of any randomly-chosen pair of panels of SG. Furthermore, the level
of accepted risk decreases (on average across all subjects) with the panel
number, coherently with the assumption of CRRA (moving from panel 1 to
12Indeed, 50% of all subjects (31/62) choose a lottery with p ≥ 0.4 in panel 1, thereby
disclosing risk neutrality or proneness.
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Figure 4.1: Subjects showing the same sign of risk attitude in HL and SG
panel 4 we have increasing stakes for the same number of tickets assigned to
the positive outcome).
We perform the Spearman rank correlation test among choices made in
each of the four panels in SG, and choices in HL, and between the latter
and a variable representing the average choice in the four panels (SGAvg ).
Results are reported in Table 4.2.
Recall that: In HL, the larger the number of the switch line, the smaller
the number of tickets assigned at this line to the lower of the two outcomes
(see Figure A1 in the Appendix), and the higher the subject’s disclosed degree
of risk aversion (see Table A1 in the Appendix); in each panel of SG, more
in the left the chosen lottery is, the smaller the number of tickets assigned
to the null outcome (see Figure A2 in the Appendix), and the higher the
subject’s disclosed degree of risk aversion (see Table A2 in the Appendix).
Therefore, from now on, when analyzing results for HL, we consider as index
the number of tickets assigned in the switch line to the lower outcome; when
analyzing results for each panel of SG, we consider as index the number of
tickets assigned in the chosen lottery to the null outcome. Hence, a positive
correlation between these two indexes would mirror the positive correlation
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between disclosed risk attitudes in the two tasks.
Table 4.2: Rank correlations between self-assessed risk and average choices
in the two tasks, by panel.
HL – SG1 HL – SG2 HL – SG3 HL – SG4 HL – SGAvg
Spearman’s rho 0.11 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.13
p-value 0.39 0.78 0.37 0.76 0.31
Rank correlations in Table 4.2 lead to the following:
Result 2. A positive but small and not significant correlation is found
between subjects’ risk ordering in HL and their risk ordering in any of the
four panels of SG.
Thus, different risk-elicitation instruments seem to lead to different order-
ings of the relative risk aversion coefficient r, if Expected Utility is assumed
for all subjects. Note that this result still holds when conditioning on age,
gender, and for past attendance of a course in decision/game theory. How-
ever, a positive and quite surprising finding emerges if looking at subjects’
self-reported risk through the hypothetical question in the final questionnaire.
In particular, we make use of the self-assessed risk variable in order to
check on the rank correlation between this subjective measure and the risk-
related choices made by the subjects in the two tasks. Recall that in the
question about self-assessment of general risk attitude, the smaller (closer to
1) the chosen number, the higher the self-assessed general aversion to risk.
Hence, a positive correlation between this choice and the above defined index
in a risk-elicitation task (HL or SG) would mirror the positive correlation
between self-assessment of risk and the disclosed monetary risk attitude in
the task.
This check leads to the following:
Result 3. Significant positive correlation is found between subjects’ or-
dering expressed by self-reported risk and the risk ordering in HL (rho =
0.47, p-value = 0.000). Significant positive correlation is also found between
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the ordering expressed by self-reported risk and the risk ordering in SG (rho
= 0.48, p-value = 0.000).
As can be noticed, the two correlation coefficients are very close. Both
methods seem to be able to account for a good amount of inter-individual
differences in general aversion to risk, with similarly high explanatory power.
From these preliminary results, three questions arise:
1) Why the rankings produced by the two methods are not correlated while
instead each of them is correlated with self-assessed general aversion to risk?
2) Why the correlation coefficient of each method with self-assessed general
aversion to risk is smaller than 50%?
3) Why are the correlation coefficients of each method with self-assessed
general aversion to risk so close?
The analysis in the next subsection, which account for both idiosyncratic
features (elicited in the questionnaire) and other risk-related motivations (as
emerging from choices in the four panels of SG) is meant to answer the above
questions. The reliability of HL as instrument for risk-aversion elicitation
crucially depends on the answers to the previous questions.
4.5.2 Type classification analysis
Results 1–3 above lead us to think that there can be other subjects’ fea-
tures and motivations (other than monetary risk aversion) orienting subjects’
choices in each of the two analyzed instruments. If we disentangle subjects
according to these motivations, we should find individuals who better dis-
close their self-reported risk aversion in HL and others who better disclose it
in SG.
First, we check whether idiosyncratic features (gender, age, education,
etc.), elicited through the final questionnaire, are of some help in providing
a coherent explanation for the previous findings.
Furthermore, since HL only requires one choice for each subject, while
SG requires four choices for each subject, we use this second instrument in
order to disentangle risk-related motivations.
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Individual characteristics
We run again the Spearman rank correlation tests between self-assessed risk
and individuals’ choice in both HL and the average choices in SG by sub-
groups of population.
First of all, we can look at gender. We find that females show a sig-
nificantly higher correlation between self-assessed risk and risk behavior in
both HL and SGAvg. The two correlation coefficients are again of the same
magnitude: rho = 0.60 for HL (p-value = 0.038), rho = 0.60 for SG (p-value
= 0.035). The correlation coefficients for the sub-group of males, though
significant, are lower than those obtained for the whole sample: rho = 0.31
for HL (p-value = 0.050), rho = 0.42 for SG (p-value = 0.006).
Another interesting issue is whether having attended an advanced course
in decision or game theory could strengthen the correspondence between sub-
jects’ self-assessed risk and their actual risk-related choices in the two tasks.
Our auxiliary assumption is that such attendance should indicate some back-
ground in mathematically-related disciplines (recall that our subjects
are undergraduate students in Economics). The usual test reveals that the
previous attendance of a decision/game theory course increases the correla-
tion between self-reported risk and average choice in SG, while the opposite
effect is found with regards to HL (see Table 4.3).
Table 4.3: Rank correlations between self-assessed risk and the two tasks,
disentangled by gender and backgroungd in decision/game theory
Female Male
Self-assess and HL 0.61*** 0.31*
Self-assess and SGAvg 0.60** 0.42***
Game Theory No Game Theory
Self-assess and HL 0.43** 0.52***
Self-assess and SGAvg 0.54*** 0.37*
Significance level: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The former result could be explained by the higher level of complexity of
SG – where both probability and outcome are different for each lottery in
each of the four panels – with respect to HL, where the two pairs of outcomes
are fixed for all pairwise comparisons. Thus, having some background in
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mathematically-related disciplines could be helpful in understanding a risk-
elicitation task (in our case, SG), although Bran˜as-Garza et al. (2008) has
found no such effect across several risk-elicitation tasks.
Our interpretation is partially supported by a correlation coefficient (be-
tween self-assessed risk and the instrument) increasing in the years of study
at the university for undergraduate students (from first to third year), if
considering either SGAvg or HL as risk-elicitation instrument (see Table 4.4).
Notice that, although quite high, few correlations are statistically significant,
due to few observations in each subset of subjects.
Table 4.4: Rank correlations between self-assessed risk and the two tasks,
disentangled by the years of study at the university
First Second Third Fourth Fifth
rho p-value rho p-value rho p-value rho p-value rho p-value
Self-assess and SGAvg 0.30 0.160 0.59 0.070 0.62 0.055 0.53 0.140 -0.01 0.980
Self-assess and HL 0.24 0.270 0.79 0.006 0.67 0.030 0.08 0.840 0.57 0.140
Risk-related motivations
A further step is to consider the possibility that there are several risk-related
motivations that drive subjects’ choices among lotteries in SG. With this in
mind, we split the sample into three categories, according to the three main
patterns of choices a subject can show in the four panels of SG.
The baseline category is the one comprising subjects whose behavioral
pattern across panels is coherent with a Constant Relative Risk Aversion
utility function (CRRA-coherent subjects). In our sample, subjects show-
ing such compatibility are 14/62: They make weakly-increasing choices (in
terms of risk-taking) in the four panels. For example, a subject belonging
to this category select a number of tickets assigned to a positive outcome of
7/10 in panel 1, of 6/10 in panel 2, of 6/10 in panel 3, and of 2/10 in panel 4.
Due to the discreteness of the decision settings, we include in this group also
subjects who always made the same choice in the four panels: Although, as
we will see below, they could reasonably belong to the other two categories,
their behavior do not show incoherence with CRRA.
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The second category includes subjects with weakly-decreasing choices (in
terms or risk) in the four panels, hence incoherent with expected-utility max-
imization. In our sample, subjects showing this behavior are 17/62. We call
them Aspiration-level subjects. Indeed, it is well known in the literature
(Camerer et al., 1997; Diecidue and Van De Ven, 2008) that the concept of
aspiration level is related to the subject’s willingness to reach a particular
outcome. In the paper by Camerer et al. (1997) the idea of aspiration level
is explained through the cab drivers example: Cab drivers are willing to earn
a daily target return, so that they adjust this behavior in order to achieve
their goal. Other examples have been proposed in the literature such as
farmers who want to prevent themselves from falling below the subsistence
level (Lopes, 1987) or investors with the desired target rate of returns to
achieve (Payne et al., 1980). In our framework, the idea of aspiration level
could be explained by the willingness of our subjects to earn “around a given
positive amount”. Given the structure of the four panels in SG, the risk that
one should take to get the “same” positive amount is smaller (the number of
winning tickets is higher) the higher the panel number. For example, suppose
that a subject wants to earn around e 8 in each of the four panels. This is
consistent with selecting a number of tickets assigned to this outcome equal
to 1/10 in panel 1, equal to 2/10 in panel 2, equal to 4/10 in panel 3, and
equal to 6/10 in panel 4.
The residual category is composed by individuals who show non-monotonic
choices in the four panels: They “move right and left” across the four pan-
els. We call them Hedging subjects. The intuition behind this label is
that these subjects might interpret the four panels in SG as a portfolio of
contingent assets (indeed, only one of the four panels is randomly selected
for payment), where they can compensate the greater risk taken in some
state of the world (e.g., in panel 1 and in panel 3) by choosing less risky
assets in the complementary states (e.g., in panel 2 and in panel 4). This
intuition is indirectly shared by Crosetto and Filippin (2015): in motivat-
ing their between-subject design, they underline how proposing several risky
choices on a within-subject base is likely to induce some form of hedging
across panels. In our sample, subjects showing this behavior are 31/62.
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Both Aspiration-level and Hedging can be viewed as additional risk-
related motivations (additional with respect to CRRA). Therefore, two be-
havioral hypotheses can be drawn about behavior in SG :
H1) Aspiration-level vs. CRRA-coherent. Subjects with a given
aspiration level pick a willing-to-win amount in the first panel of lotteries (the
one with the lowest payoffs) and then decrease the probability of winning in
the next panels, where payoffs are increased, in order to get around this
amount. This ends up in a more risk-averse behavior in SG than the one
disclosed in the same task by CRRA-coherent subjects. Indeed, the structure
of SG contraints choices of an Aspiration-level subject in the four panels not
to be too “far away” from one another, i.e. he/she chooses lotteries with
close numbers of winning tickets in the four panels (e.g. earning around e 5
requires choosing a lottery with 2/10, 3/10, 6/10 and 7/10 tickets assigned
to the positive outcome respectively in panel 1, 2, 3 and 4 – see Figure A2
in the Appendix). This ends up in a lower variance of the expected values
of the chosen lotteries in the four panels, with respect to CRRA-coherent
subjects. The latter, given a degree of risk aversion r, when moving from
panel i to panel i + 1, are “free” to choose lotteries with higher expected
values, i.e. with number of winning tickets in panel i + 1 potentially much
higher than in panel i (e.g. a CRRA-coherent subject with r = 0.091 would
choose a lottery with 10/10, 2/10, 1/10 and 1/10 tickets assigned to the
positive outcome respectively in panel 1, 2, 3 and 4 – see Table A2 in the
Appendix).
H2) Hedging vs. CRRA-coherent. Subjects who hedge among lot-
tery panels in SG are more risk-averse than pure CRRA-coherent subjects.
Indeed, hedging among contingent assets (lottery panels) introduces addi-
tional contraints to the set of lotteries a subject can choose in panel i given
the choice made in the other three panels j 6= i. For example, a CRRA-
coherent subject with r > 0.1 would choose a lottery with 10/10 winning
tickets in panel 1 and with 1/10 winning tickets in panel 4. An Hedging
subject with the same r would risk more when stakes are smaller (e.g., by
choosing 5/10 winning tickets in panel 1), compensating this riskier choice
by risking less when stakes are bigger (e.g., by choosing 5/10 winning tickets
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in panel 4). This ultimately leads to a lower variance of the expected values
of the chosen lotteries in the four panels, with respect to CRRA-coherent
subjects.
In order to test H1 and H2 we look at the variance among the expected
values in the four chosen lotteries in SG, for each subject and for each cate-
gory of subjects. In this task, the variance for each subject is a measure of
the dispersion of the four choices with respect to the mean choice.
We find that both Aspiration-level subjects and Hedging subjects have a
lower average variance across panels of lottery expected values (respectively,
4.62 and 6.98) with respect to CRRA-coherent subjects (9.50). Both these
differences are significant at the 5% level.
As a further round of investigation we perform a Mann-Whitney test by
categories on standard deviations of “chosen” expected values in the four pan-
els. Taking CRRA-coherent subjects are reference category, we find that the
rank of these standard deviations is significantly lower for both Aspiration-
level subjects (p-value=0.008) and for Hedging subjects (p-value=0.000). All
this is summarized in the following:
Result 4. Both Aspiration-level and Hedging subjects disclose in SG a more
risk-averse behavior than CRRA-coherent subjects.
Now we check whether by disentangling the sample according to the three
above categories, the correlation between disclosed orderings of risk behavior
in the two instruments increases. To this goal, we run another rank corre-
lation test, and we find that the coefficients are higher with respect to the
whole sample but still not significant (see Table 4.5).
Table 4.5: Rank correlations among instruments (HL and SGAvg), disentan-
gled by category of subjects
SG
Whole Sample CRRA Aspiration Hedging
HL 0.13 0.21 0.22 0.19
Significance level: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The following statement extends Result 2:
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Result 5. If we disentangle by different risk-related motivations, the rank
correlation between risk orderings in HL and SG increases. However, the
correlation is still not significant.
Going back to Result 3, we can improve the analysis of the goodness of
the two instruments in disclosing subjects’ self-assessed general risk aversion,
by running the usual Spearman correlation test on each of the above defined
categories of risk-related motivations (see Table 4.6). Disentangling by risk-
related motivation, we find that HL performs on average better than SG
in disclosing a subject’s self-assessed general risk aversion. However, while
CRRA-coherent subjects show a greater rank correlation with self-reported
risk in HL than in SG, the latter better captures self-assessed risk aversion of
Hedging subjects. None of the instruments is able to elicit the self-assessed
general risk aversion of Aspiration-level subjects.
Table 4.6: Self-assessed risk, disentangled by category of subjects
Self-assessed risk
Whole Sample CRRA Aspiration Hedging
HL 0.47*** 0.80*** 0.38 0.45**
SG 0.48*** 0.39 0.17 0.66***
Significance level: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The following statement extends Result 3:
Result 6. When focusing only on subjects whose behavior is coherent with
CRRA within an expected utility framework, HL is able to capture 80% of
differences in subjects’ self-assessed general aversion to risk. SG better cap-
tures self-assessed differences for subjects whose behavior is not coherent with
CRRA, when they show hedging behavior – hence, additional demand for risk
protection – in this task.
Finally, we focus on the determinants of behavior in HL. We use the
average choice among the four panels in SG and the hypothetical question
– together with the other questions on idiosyncratic features in the final
questionnaire – as regressors (see Table 4.7).
166
Table 4.7: Determinants of behavior in HL (OLS regression)
CRRA Aspiration Hedging Whole sample
SGAvg –1.87* –0.93 0.30 –0.42
Self-assessment 0.92 2.43** –0.12 1.04***
Gender 1.16 –1.11 4.05* 0.05
Age –0.60 –0.27 2.52** –0.05
Years of study 1.00 0.07 –2.40* 0.05
Study 0.42 –0.59 0.28 0.61
Game Theory 1.00 2.91 –2.56* –0.44
Constant 3.88 –16.77 –64.62*** –17.50**
Obs. 17 14 31 62
Significance level: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
First of all, the results in Table 4.7 show the strong relation between risk
behavior in HL and self-assessed aversion to general risk: the latter has a
highly-significant impact on risk-averse behavior in HL.
Second, the regression analysis clarifies why SG is not a good predic-
tor of risk behavior in HL: the two instruments lead to opposite behavior
for CRRA-coherent subjects, this category being the one whose behavior is
better predicted by HL.
Furthermore, Aspiration-level subjects’ behavior in HL is driven by their
self-reported general aversion to risk. The intuition is that the willingness
to take general risks determines a switch line in HL that in turn mirrors the
specific (expected) outcome these subjects wish to obtain.
Finally, the regression analysis show that idiosyncratic features have an
effect on risk behavior in HL only for Hedging subjects. The intuition is
that the heterogeneity of possible hedging strategies (several possible non-
monotonic patterns in SG) might hide the interplay of idiosyncratic features,
that ultimately impact on behavior in HL.
We conclude with some technical remarks. As far as we noted that the
t-statistics for the coefficients are only marginally significant but with an
overall F strongly significant, we conducted analyses to check for the pos-
sibility of multicollinearity. What we found is that the cross-correlations
are low except for the variables Age and Years of Study (high correlations
between pairs of coefficients would have indicated possible multicollinearity
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problems). As a further round of investigation, we run multicollinearity tests
and we looked at the condition number, that is actually high (60.712), as
well as condition indexes. On the contrary, Variable Inflation Factors are
small. The diagnostics widely disagree. This is neither a surprising finding
nor a problem from the point of view of the results. In fact, even extreme
multicollinearity (and this is not the case under consideration here) does not
violate the OLS assumptions: OLS estimates are still unbiased and BLUE
(Best Linear Unbiased Estimators). We actually tried many different specifi-
cations of our regression model on the same data set. None of these changes
produced significant improvements, suggesting that multicollinearity is not
a relevant problem to be considered here.13
The following statement summarizes the main findings about the deter-
minants of behavior in HL:
Result 7. Self-assessed risk appears to be a relevant determinant of risk-
related choices in HL, especially for Aspiration-level subjects. For Hedging
subjects, choices in HL are not explained by either SG or self-assessed risk;
they are rather driven by idiosyncratic features.
4.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we deep delve into a well-established result of the literature
on risk elicitation: Making use of different experimental methods leads to
different results in elicited risk preferences among subjects. To this end, we
compare two Multiple Price List Design methods, one based on a single-choice
setting (HL) and the other on a multiple-choice one (SG).
As a first step, we make use of usual non-parametric statistical tools
to check whether subjects facing our different tasks at least maintain the
same ordering in their risk-related lottery choices. Apparently, what we
find confirms the common result of independence among instruments. As a
matter of fact, the rank correlation between the two instruments turns out
13To account for the ordered nature of our dependent variable, we have also estimated an
Ordered Logit Model: the results are qualitatively unchanged and available upon request.
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to be negligible and not significant.
Our analysis goes beyond by making use of a self-assessed measure of
subjects’ risk preferences, to check whether our instruments are capable to
measure differences in self-reported attitudes towards risk.
What we find is that for both risk-elicitation procedures, risk prefer-
ences disclosed by subjects’ choices are significantly correlated with their
self-reported risk. This result is even stronger when we run a by-group anal-
ysis on different idiosyncratic controls.
Furthermore, and more importantly, we check whether other subjects’
risk-related motivations could explain the correlation between elicited risk
behavior through monetary-incentivized methods and self-assessed risk.
Since a multiple-choice risk elicitation method is available (SG), we use
it so as to disentangle subjects according to three risk-related behaviors: the
baseline behavioral category comprising CRRA-coherent individuals, a group
of Aspiration-level subjects, and a last category of Hedging subjects.
What is found is that in SG both Aspiration-level and Hedging subjects
make on average less risky choices than CRRA-coherent subjects. This con-
firms the intuition that both these categories hide an additional risk-related
motivation (additional with respect to the curvature of the uni-parametric
utility function), that cannot be disentangled by only looking at behavior in
HL.
It is not surprising that if we exclude the two above categories and we
only focus on subjects whose behavior in SG is coherent with CRRA, HL is
able to capture 80% of differences in subjects’ self-assessed general aversion
to risk. A regression analysis confirms that self-assessed risk is a relevant
determinant of risk-related choices in HL.
This result is even more striking when considering that it was obtained
in a within-subject design. Indeed, as Crosetto and Filippin (2015) correctly
notice, proposing several risky choices on a within-subject base is likely to
induce some form of hedging across tasks by non-risk-averse subjects. This
could determine a negative correlation across tasks. Therefore, the low cor-
relation between the behavior in different tasks could in part be an artifact
of the design. We have shown that once this hedging motivation is set aside
169
(i.e. only CRRA-coherent subjects are considered), despite no correlation
between HL and SG, an extremely high correlation between the risk behav-
ior in the former method and self-reported risk attitude emerges. Thus, the
positive results by Vieider et al. (2015) might hold even stronger if we ac-
count for heterogeneity stemming from more complex behavioral patterns
like aspiration levels and hedging.
This result is relevant for experimental economists who wish to account
for their subjects’ risk attitudes as a determinant of behavior, being HL the
experimental method mainly used in the last decade to elicit risk attitudes
in the laboratory and in the field.
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Appendix
Figure A1 : Task 2: Variant of Holt and Laury (2002)
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Figure A2 : Task 2: Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis (2002)
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Table A1 : Elicited r for HL
Switch Line Elicited Degree of Risk Aversion
L1 −∞ < r ≤ −2.863
L2 −2.863 ≤ r ≤ −2.010
L3 −2.010 ≤ r ≤ −1.512
L4 −1.512 ≤ r ≤ −1.156
L5 −1.156 ≤ r ≤ −0.878
L6 −0.878 ≤ r ≤ −0.648
L7 −0.648 ≤ r ≤ −0.450
L8 −0.450 ≤ r ≤ −0.273
L9 −0.273 ≤ r ≤ −0.112
L10 −0.112 ≤ r ≤ 0.038
L11 0.038 ≤ r ≤ 0.180
L12 0.180 ≤ r ≤ 0.317
L13 0.317 ≤ r ≤ 0.454
L14 0.454 ≤ r ≤ 0.592
L15 0.592 ≤ r ≤ 0.736
L16 0.736 ≤ r ≤ 0.891
L17 0.891 ≤ r ≤ 1.068
L18 1.068 ≤ r ≤ 1.287
L19 1.287 ≤ r ≤ 1.613
L20 1.613 ≤ r < +∞
Table A2 : Elicited r for SGG
Panel 1 Panel 2 Panel 3 Panel 4
Chosen p Elicited r Chosen p Elicited r Chosen p Elicited r Chosen p Elicited r
1 0.091 1 0.500 1 0.833 1 0.909
0.9 0.082 0.9 0.450 0.9 0.750 0.9 0.818
0.8 0.073 0.8 0.400 0.8 0.667 0.8 0.727
0.7 0.064 0.7 0.350 0.7 0.583 0.7 0.636
0.6 0.055 0.6 0.300 0.6 0.500 0.6 0.545
0.5 0.045 0.5 0.250 0.5 0.417 0.5 0.455
0.4 0.036 0.4 0.200 0.4 0.333 0.4 0.364
0.3 0.027 0.3 0.150 0.3 0.250 0.3 0.273
0.2 0.018 0.2 0.100 0.2 0.167 0.2 0.182
0.1 0.009 0.1 0.050 0.1 0.083 0.1 0.091
173
174
Bibliography
Andersen, S., Harrison, G. W., Lau, M. I., and Rutstro¨m, E. E. (2006). Elic-
itation using multiple price list formats. Experimental Economics, 9:383–
405.
Attanasi, G., Casoria, F., Centorrino, S., and Urso, G. (2013). Cultural in-
vestment, local development and instantaneous social capital: A case study
of a gathering festival in the south of italy. Journal of Socio-Economics,
47:228–247.
Attanasi, G., Corazzini, L., Georgantz´ıs, N., and Passarelli, F. (2014a). Risk
aversion, overconfidence and private information as determinants of ma-
jority thresholds. Pacific Economic Review, 19:355–386.
Attanasi, G., Gollier, C., Montesano, A., and Pace, N. (2014b). Eliciting
ambiguity aversion in unknown and in compound lotteries: A smooth am-
biguity model experimental study. Theory and Decision, 77:485–530.
Becker, G. M., DeGroot, M. H., and Marschak, J. (1964). Measuring utility
by a single-response sequential method. Behavioral Science, 9:226–232.
Bernasconi, M., Corazzini, L., and Seri, R. (2014). Reference dependent
175
preferences, hedonic adaptation and tax evasion: Does the tax burden
matter? Journal of Economic Psychology, 40:103–118.
Bran˜as-Garza, P., Guillen, P., and del Paso, R. L. (2008). Math skills and
risk attitudes. Economics Letters, 99:332–336.
Butler, D. J. and Loomes, G. C. (2007). Imprecision as an account of the
preference reversal phenomenon. American Economic Review, 97:277–297.
Camerer, C., Babcock, L., Loewenstein, G., and Thaler, R. (1997). Labor
supply of new york city cabdrivers: One day at a time. Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 112:407–441.
Charness, G. and Gneezy, U. (2010). Portfolio choice and risk attitudes: An
experiment. Economic Inquiry, 48:133–146.
Charness, G., Gneezy, U., and Imas, A. (2013). Experimental methods:
Eliciting risk preferences. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
87:43–51.
Charness, G. and Viceisza, A. (2015). Three risk-elicitation methods in the
field: Evidence from rural senegal. Review of Behavioral Economics, forth-
coming.
Cox, J. C. and Harrison, G. W. (2008). Risk aversion in experiments. Emer-
ald: Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 12.
Cox, J. C., Roberson, B., and Smith, V. L. (1982). Theory and behavior of
single object auctions. Research in Experimental Economics, 2:1–43.
Cox, J. C., Sadiraj, V., and Schmidt, U. (2014). Paradoxes and mechanisms
for choice under risk. Experimental Economics, 18:215–250.
Cox, J. C., Smith, V. L., and Walker, J. M. (1985). Experimental develop-
ment of sealed-bid auction theory; calibrating controls for risk aversion.
American Economic Review, pages 160–165.
176
Cox, J. C., Smith, V. L., and Walker, J. M. (1988). Theory and individual
behavior of first-price auctions. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1:61–99.
Crosetto, P. and Filippin, A. (2013). The “bomb” risk elicitation task. Jour-
nal of Risk and Uncertainty, 47:31–65.
Crosetto, P. and Filippin, A. (2015). A theoretical and experimental appraisal
of five risk elicitation methods. Experimental Economics, forthcoming.
Dave, C., Eckel, C. C., Johnson, C. A., and Rojas, C. (2010). Eliciting risk
preferences: When is simple better? Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,
41:219–243.
Diecidue, E. and Van De Ven, J. (2008). Aspiration level, probability of
success and failure, and expected utility. International Economic Review,
49:683–700.
Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Huffman, D., Sunde, U., Schupp, J., and Wagner,
G. G. (2011). Individual risk attitudes: Measurement, determinants, and
behavioral consequences. Journal of the European Economic Association,
9:522–550.
Eckel, C. C. and Grossman, P. J. (2008). Forecasting risk attitudes: An
experimental study using actual and forecast gamble choices. Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization, 68:1–17.
Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic
experiments. Experimental Economics, 10:171–178.
Garc´ıa Gallego, A., Georgantz´ıs, N., Jaramillo Gutie´rrez, A., and Parravano,
M. (2012). The lottery-panel task for bi-dimensional parameter-free elici-
tation of risk attitudes. Revista Internacional de Sociologia, 70:53–72.
Garc´ıa-Gallego, A., Georgantz´ıs, N., Navarro-Mart´ınez, D., and Sabater-
Grande, G. (2011). The stochastic component in choice and regression
to the mean. Theory and Decision, 71:251–267.
177
Georgantz´ıs, N. and Navarro-Mart´ınez, D. (2010). Understanding the wta–
wtp gap: Attitudes, feelings, uncertainty and personality. Journal of Eco-
nomic Psychology, 31:895–907.
Guiso, L. and Paiella, M. (2008). Risk aversion, wealth, and background risk.
Journal of the European Economic association, 6:1109–1150.
Harrison, G. W., Johnson, E., McInnes, M. M., and Rutstro¨m, E. E. (2005).
Risk aversion and incentive effects: Comment. American Economic Re-
view, 95:897–901.
Harrison, G. W. and Rutstro¨m, E. E. (2008). Risk aversion in the laboratory.
In Harrison, G. W. and Cox, J., editors, Risk aversion in experiments,
pages 41–196. Emerald: Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 12.
Harrison, G. W. and Rutstro¨m, E. E. (2009). Expected utility theory and
prospect theory: One wedding and a decent funeral. Experimental Eco-
nomics, 12:133–158.
Holt, C. A. and Laury, S. K. (2002). Risk aversion and incentive effects.
American Economic Review, 92:1644–1655.
Holt, C. A. and Laury, S. K. (2005). Risk aversion and incentive effects: New
data without order effects. American Economic Review, 95:902–904.
Isaac, R. M. and James, D. (2000). Just who are you calling risk averse?
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 20:177–187.
Lejuez, C. W., Read, J. P., Kahler, C. W., Richards, J. B., Ramsey, S. E.,
Stuart, G. L., Strong, D. R., and Brown, R. A. (2002). Evaluation of a
behavioral measure of risk taking: the balloon analogue risk task (bart).
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 8:75–84.
Le´vy-Garboua, L., Maafi, H., Masclet, D., and Terracol, A. (2012). Risk
aversion and framing effects. Experimental Economics, 15:128–144.
Lopes, L. L. (1987). Between hope and fear: The psychology of risk. Advances
in Experimental Social Psychology, 20:255–295.
178
Miller, L., Meyer, D. E., and Lanzetta, J. T. (1969). Choice among equal
expected value alternatives: Sequential effects of winning probability level
on risk preferences. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 79:419–423.
Payne, J. W., Laughhunn, D. J., and Crum, R. (1980). Translation of gambles
and aspiration level effects in risky choice behavior. Management Science,
26:1039–1060.
Roth, A. E. and Malouf, M. W. (1979). Game-theoretic models and the role
of information in bargaining. Psychological Review, 86:574.
Sabater-Grande, G. and Georgantzis, N. (2002). Accounting for risk aversion
in repeated prisoners’ dilemma games: An experimental test. Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization, 48:37–50.
Vieider, F. M., Lefebvre, M., Bouchouicha, R., Chmura, T., Hakimov, R.,
Krawczyk, M., and Martinsson, P. (2015). Common components of risk
and uncertainty attitudes across contexts and domains: Evidence from 30
countries. Journal of the European Economic Association, 13:421–452.
Wakker, P. and Deneffe, D. (1996). Eliciting von neumann-morgenstern util-
ities when probabilities are distorted or unknown. Management Science,
pages 1131–1150.
Wakker, P. P. (2010). Prospect theory: For risk and ambiguity. Cambridge
University Press.
Zuckerman, M. (1994). Behavioral expressions and biosocial bases of sensa-
tion seeking. Cambridge university press.
179
180
Acknowledgments
I would like to express my special thanks to my supervisors Professor Dr. Luca Stanca
and Professor Dr. Giuseppe Attanasi. Thank you for encouraging me even during tough
times in the Ph.D. pursuit. I am thankful for the excellent example you have provided as
successful economists and as professors (actually as masters).
Grazie ai miei amici, quelli incontrati durante il percorso di dottorato e quelli incontrati
lontano nel tempo. Senza di voi non sarebbe stato cos´ı divertente. Un grazie speciale alla
mia famiglia. Non so trovare parole adeguate per dirvi quanto vi sia riconoscente. Grazie
per la pazienza che avete avuto. Senza il vostro sostegno costante non sarei mai arrivata fin
qui. Grazie per aver saputo sognare con me. Grazie anche alla mia nuova famiglia adottiva.
Sono certa che questa fatica l’abbiate in qualche modo vissuta anche voi. Ultimo, ma non
ultimo, un grazie speciale a mio marito, Leonardo. Tu hai creduto piu` di me, hai sperato
piu` di me e sei sempre stato il mio sostegno quando non sapevo piu` credere.
This thesis is also yours.
181
